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Abstract 
 
The kinematics of our movements reflect our internal (mental and affective) states. This 
thesis tests the hypothesis that these kinematic signals contribute to judgments about 
others’ internal states through models based on our own actions. Chapter 1 details the 
theoretical background and previous literature that motivates this hypothesis. 
Chapter 2 (typical adults) and 3 (typical adolescents) test the hypothesis that we use 
models of our own action kinematics to make judgments about others’ affective states. 
Both experiments support the hypothesis by demonstrating that differences in one’s 
own typical action kinematics determine the perceived intensity of affective states of 
observed point-light walkers. 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 examine the hypothesis that atypical movement kinematics in 
autism spectrum disorder (autism) contribute to social communication difficulties. 
Chapters 4 and 5 measure two basic skills required to make internal state judgments 
from observing others’ actions: visual time perception and sensitivity to kinematic 
signals that describe ‘natural’ motion. Both studies find no deficits in the autism group 
compared to the typically developed group – and some enhanced abilities – suggesting 
that these basic skills are intact. However, Chapter 6 demonstrates that typically 
developed individuals are impaired at reading mental states from autistic actions, 
suggesting that atypical movement kinematics may be partly contributing to bi-
directional communicative difficulties experienced between individuals with autism and 
their typical peers.  
Chapter 7 investigates whether differences in movement kinematics early in 
development are associated with later social skills in a group of infants at high- or low-
risk of developing autism. Indeed, movement kinematics at 10 months of age predicts 
social abilities at 14 months of age, demonstrating the value of kinematic markers for 
predicting social functioning and possibly disorder. 
Chapter 8 summarises the studies presented in this thesis, which show support for the 
hypothesis that we judge others’ internal states through models based on our own 
actions. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1. Introduction 
Our actions are our means to interact with the world around us. Through the exquisitely 
detailed coordination of our tongue and lips we are able to communicate; the effortless 
regulation of our legs enables us to travel to our intended destinations; and the precise 
sequencing of the movements of our arms, hands and fingers allows us to obtain and 
manipulate objects we desire. 
The production of action is supported by a complex mechanism integrating efferent 
motoric signals, which move our muscles, with afferent sensory signals, which help us 
to accurately and effortlessly guide our movements (Wolpert, Doya, & Kawato, 2003) 
based on our perception of the world and items with which we interact (Fleming, 
Klatzky, & Behrmann, 2002; Jackson, Jackson, & Rosicky, 1995). Embedded within 
the time course of our movements there is therefore a wealth of information about our 
mental and affective (‘internal’, see Frith & Frith, 2006) states. For example, when 
lifting a box the low-level kinematic properties of our actions (e.g., the acceleration and 
duration of the lift phase of the movement) systematically vary depending on the 
perceived weight of the box (Auvray, Hoellinger, Hanneton, & Roby-Brami, 2011) as 
well as whether we are trying to deceive an observer about the weight of the box 
(Hamilton, Joyce, Flanagan, Frith, & Wolpert, 2007; Tidoni, Borgomaneri, di 
Pellegrino, & Avenanti, 2013).  
There are commonalities in the way that people move, which support our ability to 
develop broad models for understanding others’ internal states from these movement 
features. Some universality in the way internal states are expressed may stem from 
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evolutionarily advantageous functions to prepare the body for the most efficient course 
of action (de Gelder, 2006; Frijda, 2010) and communicate with others (Blair, 2003). 
For example, when experiencing fear we open our eyes widely, open up our nasal 
passageways (Susskind et al., 2008), and move more slowly (Roether, Omlor, & Giese, 
2009b) which allows us to obtain more sensory information to make effective responses 
to the detected threat. Given these commonalities, we can read these cues in others as 
signals towards internal states and act accordingly – in this example, offer reassurance 
or act with caution when interacting with the potential threat oneself (Mineka & Cook, 
1993; Olsson & Phelps, 2007).  
Thus, our actions may facilitate our understanding of others by providing information 
about our ‘hidden’ internal states. Analogously to how specific facial configurations 
actuate attributions of a specific affective state, such as a frown signalling anger, 
recognition of particular kinematic cues may help us to attribute rapidly internal states 
to others’ behaviour, such as fast and accelerated movements also signalling anger. 
Detection of these signals may therefore be an initial step for a range of social-cognitive 
skills that facilitate fluid social understanding and interactions (Brown & Brüne, 2012; 
Klin, Jones, Schultz, & Volkmar, 2003; Lewkowicz, Quesque, Coello, & Delevoye-
Turrell, 2015; Pavlova, 2012). 
However, there are vast individual differences in how actions are produced. For 
instance, differences in movement kinematics may be generated from naturally 
occurring variability in the musculoskeletal structure, producing limbs of different 
lengths and weights, or atypicalities in motor function stemming from neurological 
disorders (e.g., cerebral palsy, or a range of neurodevelopmental disorders see Section 
1.3). Therefore, despite some universality in how we convey our internal states there are 
likely nuances between individuals. Due to the volume of experience with our own 
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actions, the representations via which we understand others’ internal states may be 
tuned to our own actions. Our interpretation of others’ internal states from their actions 
would consequently be regulated by individualised representations, as opposed to a 
universal specification. To use the example outlined above, fast and accelerated 
movement has been previously associated with anger (Paterson, Pollick, & Sanford, 
2001). However, it may be that we only perceive anger in others when they move with 
kinematics that we exhibit when angry, rather than when they move faster than some 
speed threshold which is commonly set in all perceivers. Therefore, our ability to 
accurately ascribe internal states to others we interact with may, in part, be determined 
by the similarity between the observed others’ movements and our own. 
This thesis tests the hypothesis that we judge the internal states of others from their 
action kinematics via models tuned to our own actions. To this end, I examine how 
variation in motor production kinematics can predict variation in internal state 
judgments from kinematic information, and thus investigate the relationship between 
two domains of functioning commonly studied independently – action control and 
social cognition. 
This hypothesis is further detailed in the remainder of the introduction. Firstly, I 
describe the ways in which the kinematic properties of others’ actions can convey 
crucial information about internal states, and outline evidence that experience tunes 
perceptual models. Secondly, I discuss how the atypical movement qualities that have 
recently been identified in individuals with autism spectrum disorders (a social 
communication disorder, American Psychiatric Association, 2013, hereafter autism) 
render this population ideal for testing the main hypothesis, and the specific 
implications of this hypothesis for those with autism. Finally, I outline in more detail 
the mechanisms that could feasibly support the acquisition of models tuned to one’s 
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actions, before summarising the ways in which my thesis tests the current hypothesis 
empirically.    
1.2. Perception of kinematic characteristics of biological movements  
1.2.1. ‘Universal’ kinematic features of biological movements 
Biological motion conforms to specific geometric and kinematic parameters (Dayan et 
al., 2007). A typical human movement between two points follows a bell-shaped 
velocity curve, such that the velocity increases towards the mid-point and decreases 
towards the turning points. The kinematic profile has been named the ‘minimum jerk’ 
profile (Viviani & Flash, 1995; Viviani & Stucchi, 1992) because the smooth changes 
in acceleration generate movements with low levels of jerk (the second derivative of 
velocity, or the change in acceleration), which are highly energy efficient (Viviani & 
Flash, 1995, see Figure 1.1). Despite the variability in the musculoskeletal restraints 
across the body this motion profile appears to be common to movements of different 
effectors (Atkeson & Hollerbach, 1985; de’Sperati & Viviani, 1997; Ostry, Cooke, & 
Munhall, 1987; Tasko & Westbury, 2004). Further, although children’s movements are 
generally more variable compared to adult movements (Schneiberg, Sveistrup, 
McFadyen, McKinley, & Levin, 2002) the kinematic structure complies with these 
general laws of motion (Berthier & Keen, 2006; Viviani & Schneider, 1991). The 
commonalities in kinematics across effectors and age groups are hypothesised to 
represent neuronal properties that govern motor codes and hence are thought to 
represent a typical feature of action production (de’Sperati & Viviani, 1997).  
 
 
 17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effective perception of biological motion is a useful tool. For example, as an infant, 
being aware of the presence of a caregiver can signal imminent food, which may bring 
comfort. Furthermore, a bias to rapidly attend to others’ movements, such as following 
a pointing finger, eye gaze or turning body (Bedford et al., 2012; Charman, 2003; Yoon 
& Johnson, 2009) enables us to learn more about our environment and garner 
information about complex social concepts (Gergely & Watson, 1999). Preferential 
attention to others’ movements may be an adaptation that emerges through natural 
selection to enable us to learn from others (Bardi, Regolin, & Simion, 2011; Simion, 
Regolin, & Bulf, 2008), or may instead be an outcome of the high frequency with which 
infants are presented with biological movements early in life (Fausey, Jayaraman, & 
Smith, 2016; Rochat, 1998). Regardless of the origin or initial function, evidence indeed 
shows that early in infancy we exhibit high attention towards biological motion (Annaz, 
Campbell, Coleman, Milne, & Swettenham, 2011; Fox & McDaniel, 1982), which is 
likely beneficial for social development.  
Figure 1.1: Graphical representation of the ‘minimum jerk profile’. Note the smooth 
increase in velocity to the mid-point of the trajectory and then decrease towards the 
end-point (i), which results in smooth changes in acceleration (ii) and minimal jerk 
(iii).  
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Standard stimuli used to test the ability to recognise different types of information from 
others’ movements are point-light-displays (PLDs). Originally developed by Johansson 
(1973), these stimuli are created from videos of human actors performing various 
actions with infrared light sensors attached to each joint on their body. The videos are 
then manipulated so that only information captured from the point-lights remain. At a 
local level each of the points contains movements that conform to kinematic properties 
of human movements (i.e., minimum jerk) while at a global level the configuration 
properties are constrained to the structure of the human form (see Figure 1.2). These 
stimuli benefit from eliminating contextual cues, such as facial expressions (see Van 
den Stock, Righart, & de Gelder, 2007), and thus allow precise measurement of 
perception of specific kinematic and basic form cues (Blake & Shiffrar, 2007).  
 
There is vast evidence that the information in these simple stimuli is encoded rapidly, if 
not automatically. These stimuli appear to ‘pop-out’ to adult participants (Thornton, 
Rensink, & Shiffrar, 2002) and can distract from performance when they are irrelevant 
to the main task (van Boxtel & Lu, 2013). Human PLDs are easily distinguished from 
scrambled biological motion (point-light stimuli that are made by randomising the 
Figure 1.2: Example frames from a point-light display (PLD) stimulus of an actor 
walking. A light reflective point is attached to each joint of the actor’s body (note in 
some versions of these stimuli the neck or head is also represented) while they perform 
an action. These stimuli are void of contextual information and isolate kinematic and 
basic form information that is expressed by the actor’s movements.  
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spatial location of each of the points from a human PLD, thereby maintaining the local 
motion trajectories but scrambling the configuration or form resulting in ‘unnatural’ 
motion) by both typically developing children and adults (Blake, Turner, Smoski, 
Pozdol, & Stone, 2003; Freire, Lewis, Maurer, & Blake, 2006). The perceptual models 
that enable rapid and robust encoding of biological motion information continue to be 
refined until adulthood, such that the ability to detect biological motion improves well 
into adolescence (Hadad, Schwartz, Maurer, & Lewis, 2015). The extensive experience 
one has with biological movements throughout one’s life may therefore improve 
perceptual representations that enable specialised encoding of this type of motion. 
The specificity of these perceptual representations of biological motion is highlighted 
by the disruptive effects of subtle manipulations of the kinematic or basic form cues on 
perception. For example, replacing the local kinematic trajectories with constant 
velocity (an unnatural motion trajectory, Casile et al., 2009), altering the acceleration 
profile (Chang & Troje, 2009), or changing the temporal phase of the limb movements 
(Bertenthal & Pinto, 1994) causes perceptual disturbances. Similar encoding difficulties 
are observed when the local motion cues are biologically plausible, but the 
configuration is scrambled (Hirai, Watanabe, Honda, & Kakigi, 2009; Murphy, Brady, 
Fitzgerald, & Troje, 2009) or inverted (Atkinson, Tunstall, & Dittrich, 2007; Bertenthal 
& Pinto, 1994; Chang & Troje, 2009). The network that is employed to encode this type 
of information is therefore argued to be highly tuned to both the specific kinematic and 
basic form properties of human actions (Giese & Poggio, 2003; Jastorff & Orban, 2009; 
Ross, 2014).  
1.2.2. Inferring others’ internal states from kinematic cues   
Not only are individuals able to recognise a person from basic kinematic information 
accurately and rapidly, a large variety of movements can also be effortlessly identified. 
 20 
 
For instance, one can discriminate different types of goal-directed or non-goal-directed 
actions from PLDs, such as classifying someone as walking or digging (Atkinson, 
Dittrich, Gemmell, & Young, 2004; Atkinson, 2009; Dittrich, 1993; Johansson, 1973), 
or inferring properties about objects with which the actor is interacting (Runeson & 
Frykholm, 1981). Additionally, other more complex social concepts are readily 
perceived through observation of these simple low-level signals, such as gender 
(Kozlowski & Cutting, 1977), identity (Loula, Prasad, Harber, & Shiffrar, 2005; Troje, 
Westhoff, & Lavrov, 2005), affective states (Atkinson et al., 2007; Atkinson, 2009; 
Bassili, 1976; Barliya, Omlor, Giese, Berthoz, & Flash, 2013; Nackaerts et al., 2012; 
Paterson et al., 2001; Pollick, Paterson, Bruderlin, & Sandord, 2001), and 
communicative intentions (Sebanz & Shiffrar, 2009). Complementary or synchronous 
actions – such as dancing or fighting sequences, or affective exchanges between two 
actors – are also easily detected from the kinematic and temporal cues within PLD 
stimuli, and more readily than actions that exhibit atypical sequential exchanges 
(Clarke, Bradshaw, Field, Hampson, & Rose, 2005; Manera, Schouten, Verfaillie, & 
Becchio, 2013; Neri, Luu, & Levi, 2006; von der Lühe et al., 2016).  
Several studies using normal video recordings of actors performing actions have also 
identified distinct kinematic signatures which convey internal states. For instance, the 
speed at which a model moves towards a button when responding reflects how 
confident they feel, with higher velocity reflecting greater confidence (Macerollo, Bose, 
Ricciardi, Edwards, & Kilner, 2015; Patel, Fleming, & Kilner, 2012). Similarly, the 
speed of movements when performing a joint task can signal your partner’s intention to 
cooperate (slower movements) or compete (faster movements, Georgiou, Becchio, 
Glover, & Castiello, 2007). Furthermore, the length of time it takes someone to form 
their face into a Duchenne-smile (where the cheek muscles form ‘crow’s feet’) indicates 
authenticity (Krumhuber & Kappas, 2005), and movement pace is indicative of 
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affective state, e.g., fast movements denote anger and slow movements indicate sadness   
(Roether et al., 2009b; Roether, Omlor, Christensen, Giese, 2009a).  
This wide range of studies demonstrates that the kinematic information embedded 
within actions are crucial cues that can be utilised to make an array of social judgments. 
Indeed, several studies have shown observers are sensitive to variations in these 
kinematic signals (Lewkowicz et al., 2015; Patel et al., 2012; Pollick et al., 2001; 
Roether, et al., 2009b), which can alter subsequent decisions about how observers 
choose to interact with others (Krumhuber et al., 2007; Georgiou et al., 2007). Evidence 
also suggests that when producing communicative movements the kinematic parameters 
of our actions are more exaggerated than non-communicative movements (Sartori, 
Becchio, Bara, & Castiello, 2009), and we are best at recognising others (Hill & Pollick, 
2000) and their internal states (Atkinson et al., 2004) when the defining kinematic 
signatures are aggrandised. Thus, awareness and detection of these kinematic signals 
may facilitate social interactions (Endedijk, Meyer, Bekkering, Cillessen, & Hunnius, 
2017; Jones et al., 2011; Lewkowicz et al., 2015), such that those who are more able to 
accurately perceive kinematic information from others’ actions will be able to make 
more appropriate responses. 
1.2.3. The role of visual-motor experience in action perception  
The hypothesis tested in the present thesis states that our judgments about others’ 
internal states from action cues are made via models of our own actions. This 
hypothesis originates from the assumption that action models are tuned through 
experience, and that we have intensive experience producing our own actions. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, there is an array of evidence that we build models of 
the world through our sensory and motor experiences. For instance, it is unequivocal 
that infants are sensitive to statistically frequent sensory inputs within their 
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environments (Kirkham, Slemmer, & Johnson, 2002; Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996; 
Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014) and appear to rapidly construct perceptual representations, 
or models, that assist fast and precise encoding of relevant and frequent sensory inputs 
(Kelly et al., 2009; Sangrigoli, Pallier, Argenti, Ventureyra, & De Schonen, 2005; Scott, 
Pascalis, & Nelson, 2007). Throughout our lives we are continuously presented with 
biological motion from observing and producing our own movements. Infants 
incessantly observe their own limbs (Rochat, 1998) and enjoy observing themselves in 
mirrors where they gain a third party perspective of their movements (Amsterdam, 
1972). This continual observation supports the early integration and maturation of the 
motor and visual systems within the brain (de Klerk, Johnson, Heyes, & Southgate, 
2015; Deoni et al., 2011; Gogtay et al., 2004; Paus, 2005), which enhances efficient 
motor control. Thus, in the same way we learn about any statistically frequent sensory 
signals in our environment, our own visual-motor experiences may specifically tune 
models of action (see Section 1.4.2 for a more detailed discussion on the possible neural 
mechanisms underlying this process). 
Experts, such as professional sports players, have high levels of specific visual-motor 
experience. The role of visual-motor experience in tuning our mental models can 
therefore be examined by contrasting the perception of experts within their expertise 
domains with other observers. For example, Sebanz and Shiffrar (2009) asked expert 
and novice basketball players to identify fake from true passes when observing either 
PLDs of real basketball players, or static frames of the same action sequence. The 
expert players, with extensive visual and motoric experience producing fake and true 
passes, were significantly better at distinguishing the shots compared to the novices. 
Observation of the dynamic PLD stimuli also led to superior performance relative to the 
still frames, suggesting the kinematic structure of the passes was important for 
discrimination.   
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Similarly, Aglioti, Cesari, Romani, and Urgesi, (2008) found that expert basketball 
players made more accurate decisions earlier in the action sequence, relative to novice 
players and also expert watchers (e.g., basketball coaches). This finding suggests a 
possible specific function of motor input for enhancing perception, although the visual 
experience of an expert player may also differ between basketball players and coaches. 
Brault, Bideau, Kulpa, and Craig (2012) conducted a related study using virtual reality 
to measure the perceptual responses of expert and novice rugby players, and also their 
action responses when trying to intercept true or fake runs from a virtual attacking 
player. In line with the other findings, the experts were able to make more precisely 
targeted and timed responses compared to the novices, suggesting their visual analysis 
of the attacker’s movement trajectory and their subsequent planned motor responses 
were more accurate. Professional ice-skaters also gave more precise estimates of the 
time-course of observed ice-skating performances that were partially covered by an 
occluder, compared to novices (Diersch, Cross, Stadler, Schütz-Bosbach, & Rieger, 
2012; Diersch et al., 2013). Additionally, these same effects, albeit slightly smaller, 
have been found in a group of retired professionals who still practiced ice-skating, but 
less frequently, compared to novice retirees (Diersch et al., 2012), suggesting the 
extensive visual-motor experience partially protects against some of the general 
declines in action perception in older age.  
Comparable perceptual advantages have also been documented in infants, where there 
has often been greater control over the exposure to specific visual-motor experiences. 
For instance, using the ‘sticky mittens’ paradigm, infants – who have not developed the 
ability to reach and grasp objects they desire – can gain novel reach-and-grasp 
experiences by simply touching their Velcro covered mittens onto a Velcro covered toy. 
Following these experiences, infants show greater attentional biases towards novel goal-
directed actions performed by an actor with the same mittens (Gerson & Woodward, 
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2014; Sommerville, Woodward, & Needham, 2005). In a similar paradigm, novel 
experience with an action was related to more anticipatory eye-gazes when observing 
others produce the same actions (Cannon, Woodward, Gredebäck, von Hofsten, & 
Turek, 2012). Related evidence of anticipatory eye-gazes is found in adults when 
observing others produce actions with which one has had experience (Press & Kilner, 
2013; Rotman, Troje, Johansson, & Flannagan, 2006). However, infants who merely 
observe another producing novel actions, or interact less specifically with novel objects 
(i.e., where they can reach to objects but cannot pick them up) do not show the same 
attentional bias towards the novel actions of others (Cannon et al., 2012; Gerson & 
Woodward, 2014; Somerville et al., 2005), suggesting a specific benefit of ones own 
visual-motor experiences when learning about the perceptual properties of actions. 
Equivalent perceptual advantages have been measured for other novel actions, such as 
crawling and walking (Stapel, Hunnius, Meyer, & Bekkering, 2016), as well as 
complementary neuroimaging evidence reporting similar effects (de Klerk et al., 2015; 
Gerson, Bekkering, & Hunnius, 2015).  
A comparable line of experiments examining the role of biological motion cues for 
action perception suggests similar tuning according to one’s own experiences. For 
instance, when participants judged the time-course of actions partially covered by an 
occluder, they were significantly more accurate when observing natural biological 
movements, relative to manipulated unnatural motion (Stadler, Springer, Parkinson, & 
Prinz, 2012; Stapel et al., 2016). Participants were also better able to identify a specific 
action when observing movements that they actually produced, and therefore have 
kinematic properties that are explicitly matched to their own motor repertoires (Calvo-
Merino, Grèzes, Glaser, Passingham, & Haggard, 2006; Kandel, Orliaguet, & Viviani, 
2000; Knoblich & Prinz, 2001; Loula et al., 2005, see also Abernethy, Zawi, & Jackson, 
2008; Jackson, Warren, & Abernethy, 2006). These findings are consistent with the 
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notion that visual-motor experience of one’s own actions (and action effects) increases 
perceptual sensitivity to specific kinematic parameters.  
These studies emphasise the importance of our own visual-motor experiences for 
generating perceptual representations. Given that many internal states are associated 
with specific kinematic signatures (see Section 1.2.2), we might therefore predict that 
one’s own models of the relationships between action kinematics and internal states 
develop through experience obtained when producing those actions. Specifically, 
although we all produce actions that contain similar kinematic properties (e.g., 
minimum jerk profiles), individual differences in the production of actions will forge 
idiosyncrasies. Thus, perception of others’ actions will arguably be influenced by one’s 
own visual-motor experiences and successful social communication might depend on 
the similarity of action models between ourselves and others with whom we interact.  
Some initial research that is consistent with the current hypothesis has been provided by 
Patel et al. (2012). In this study participants made timed judgments about visually 
presented stimuli and then rated their confidence in their perceptual decision. The speed 
of their responses was found to correlate positively with levels of self-rated confidence, 
such that the participants moved faster when they were more confident in their 
response. Importantly, in a subsequent perception task, when participants were shown 
videos of others performing the original task, the perceived confidence of actors was 
calibrated to the participant’s own confidence-speed relationship, rather than a 
universally defined velocity index for confidence. In other words, participants judged 
the actors’ confidence relative to how confident they felt when they moved at the same 
speed, such that typically slower moving participants rated more movements as 
confident compared to participants who generally moved faster. These results suggest 
 26 
 
that judgments about others’ internal states may be calibrated to our own kinematic-
internal state experiences when performing similar actions. 
Chapters 2 and 3 will ask whether a similar mechanism for calibrating social judgments 
to one’s own action kinematics operates for ascribing affective states to others’ actions. 
By capitalising on individual differences in walking pace in adults (Chapter 2), and 
measuring developmental differences in motor production across adolescence (Chapter 
3), it is predicted that differences in perception will be determined by quantifiable 
differences in the participants’ own typical movement kinematics.  
1.3. Autism: A case of atypical action models?  
Autism is a neurodevelopmental disorder characterised by impairments in social and 
communication skills, as well as stereotypical and repetitive thoughts and behaviours 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Importantly, individuals with this diagnosis 
frequently exhibit motor and co-ordination difficulties throughout development (Bhat, 
Landa, & Galloway, 2011; Cook, 2016; Green et al., 2009; Manjiviona & Prior, 1995; 
Teitelbaum, Teitelbaum, Nye, Fryman, & Maurer, 1998). A meta-analysis across 83 
studies comparing motor abilities of typically developing individuals and those with 
autism found consistent abnormalities in motor production in those with autism (effect 
size = 1.2, Fournier, Hass, Naik, Lodha, & Cauraugh, 2010). Such strong evidence of 
motor impairments in autism has led some to argue that motor skills are a cardinal 
characteristic of the disorder (Anzulewicz, Sobota, & Delafield-Butt, 2016; Fournier et 
al., 2010), and intact motor ability might protect against greater social impairments 
(Sutera et al., 2007).  
The documented motor difficulties and atypicalities in both children and adults with 
autism are vast. The motor impairments include but are not limited to; atypical gait, 
 27 
 
balance and posture (Gowen & Miall, 2007; Jansiewicz et al., 2006; Rinehart et al., 
2006), difficulties with action sequencing and planning (Campione, Piazza, Villa, & 
Molteni, 2016; Cattaneo et al., 2007; Ekberg, Falck-Ytter, Bölte, Gredebäck, & the 
EASE Team, 2016; Fabbri-Destro, Cattaneo, Boria, & Rizzolatti, 2009; Forti et al., 
2011; Glazebrook, Elliott, & Lyons, 2006; Mari, Castiello, Marks, Marraffa, & Prior, 
2003; Martineau, Schmitz, Assaiante, Blanc, & Barthélémy, 2004; Rinehart, Bradshaw,  
Brereton, & Tonge, 2001), atypical eye movements (Schmitt, Cook, Sweeney, & 
Mosconi, 2014; Takarae, 2004), and atypical emotional facial expressions (Macdonald 
et al., 1989; Brewer et al., 2016).   
The diversity of gross and fine motor difficulties suggests a global motor production 
deficit in those with autism. Atypical motor production could be a consequence of 
atypical neuropathology which affects the development of stored motor codes (e.g., 
cerebellar atypical pathology, Mostofsky et al., 2009; Rogers et al., 2013), poor 
connectivity of regions which are required for competent motor control (e.g., visual and 
motor regions, Gowen & Miall, 2007; Nebel et al., 2016; Villalobos, Mizuno, Dahl, 
Kemmotsu, & Miller, 2005), or alternatively a problem arising from more peripheral 
factors, such as abnormal muscle tone (Maurer and Damasio, 1982). 
Importantly for the present thesis, it has been hypothesised recently that these 
production difficulties could be a function of atypical action kinematics. Cook, 
Blakemore and Press (2013) asked participants both with and without autism to produce 
simple sinusoidal arm movements. The analysis of the kinematic trajectories between 
the groups showed that the autistic participants produced movements that were higher in 
jerk, as well as acceleration and velocity, relative to the typical group. Complementary 
findings show greater use of sub-corrections (Forti et al., 2011) or micro-movements 
(Torres et al., 2013) within the trajectories of actions of those with autism, and also 
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greater force, and increased velocity when interacting with an object (Anzulewicz et al., 
2016). These findings suggest that the movement kinematics of those with autism are 
quantifiably different from typical actions. Thus, it might not be that those with autism 
perform actions similarly to typically developed individuals but make a greater number 
of errors, but instead that they generally produce actions atypically which explains the 
greater errors.  
As previously outlined, the production of one’s actions is thought to be instrumental in 
building mental representations that can be used to interpret the actions of those with 
whom we interact. Given the wealth of evidence that autistic
1
 actions are atypical, and 
more specifically follow atypical kinematic parameters relative to typical actions, we 
might predict that individuals with autism have models of actions that are distinct from 
typical models. Therefore, when individuals with autism interact with typically 
developed individuals, if both parties are using models of actions that are tuned to their 
own action experiences, we would expect to find bi-directional errors in action 
perception and understanding, which may consequently result in poor social 
communication between these groups.  
1.3.1. Biological motion perception in autism  
Consistent with the current hypothesis, across a range of experimental paradigms some 
studies report reduced ability to detect typical (i.e., not autistic) biological motion, as 
well as deficits in action recognition tasks, in those with autism compared to typical 
individuals (see Kaiser & Pelphrey, 2012 for review).  
                                                        
1The term ‘autistic people’ is the preferred language of many individuals on the spectrum (see 
Sinclair, 2013). In this thesis, I use this term as well as person-first language (such as 
‘individuals with autism’) to respect the wishes of all individuals on the spectrum. 
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For example, typically developing toddlers (from two-years-old, Klin, Lin, Gorrindo, 
Ramsay, & Jones, 2009) and children (Annaz et al., 2011) show preferences towards 
biological PLD stimuli versus comparison non-biological stimuli (e.g., a spinning top) 
or a configurally scrambled biological motion PLD. In contrast, matched toddlers and 
children with autism show the opposite preference or no preference (Annaz et al., 2011; 
Falck-Ytter, Rehnberg, & Bölte, 2013; Klin et al., 2009). Children with autism are also 
less able to differentiate these two types of motion stimuli (i.e., a person PLD and a 
configurally scrambled PLD, Blake et al., 2003), and children and adolescents with 
autism can tolerate fewer noise dots when identifying the direction of a point-light-
walker (PLW, Kaiser, Delmolino, Tanaka, & Shiffrar, 2010; Koldewyn, Whitney, & 
Rivera, 2010). These studies suggest children with autism have impaired biological 
motion detection compared with matched typical children.  
However, most studies testing biological motion perception in adults with autism find 
fewer differences, implying that they may ‘catch-up’ with their typically developing 
counterparts (Herrington et al., 2007; Freitag et al., 2008; McKay et al., 2012; 
Rutherford & Troje, 2011). These data could be interpreted as a delayed developmental 
trajectory and slower tuning of perceptual models due to a general reduction in early 
orienting to others (Annaz et al., 2011; Trevarthen & Delafield-Butt, 2013). 
Alternatively, as some neuroimaging data suggests, biological PLD stimuli are encoded 
differently, via a compensatory mechanism (see Livingston & Happé, 2017 for 
discussion on compensatory mechanisms in autism) in those with autism but the 
computed representations often allow for comparable perception by adulthood. 
Specifically, those with autism activate similar neural networks to those used when 
typical individuals encode inanimate, unfamiliar motion (Freitag et al., 2008; 
Herrington et al., 2007), making perception slower but in principle equivalent in 
accuracy. In line with this hypothesis, methodologies allowing for slower perception, 
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such as removing the time limits for responses (Freitag et al., 2008; Saygin, Cook, & 
Blakemore, 2010; McKay et al., 2012) report equal perceptual performance.  
It is imperative to note that all of these previous studies have used stimuli where there 
are numerous cues for the presence of a biological agent, for example the form (global) 
as well as the specific kinematic information (local). Individuals with autism classically 
have greater difficulty generating global representations from static information, 
especially rapidly (Van der Hallen, Evers, Brewaeys, Van den Noortgate, & Wagemans, 
2015). Some argue this same difficulty is also evident when observing dynamic 
inanimate stimuli, and contributes to findings of poor biological motion perception 
(Dakin & Frith, 2005). Therefore, it is difficult to draw strong conclusions about the 
precise deficit those with autism have when processing biological motion, as 
performance could relate to perception of a number of these cues.   
One study overcame this problem inherent in many of these studies by measuring 
perceptual sensitivity to kinematic information in isolation (Cook, Saygin, Swain, & 
Blakemore, 2009). In this paradigm participants were presented with two animations of 
either a hand or a ball moving with a profile combining different proportions of natural 
kinematics (minimum jerk or gravitational velocity, respectively) and constant velocity 
(which perturbed ‘naturalness’). When asked to judge which of the two movements was 
‘less natural’ the typical participants were found to have significantly lower thresholds 
for detecting the natural hand movements compared with the autism group, suggesting 
that they were better at detecting natural kinematics of the hand. However, both groups 
were comparable in the gravitational ball condition. In a follow-up study Cook et al. 
(2013) correlated performance on a similar kinematics perception task with a 
measurement of participants’ own movement kinematics. Consistent with the current 
hypothesis, the participants with autism who moved with the most atypical kinematics 
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performed worst on the perceptual task. These results provide some preliminary 
evidence that perceptual differences identified in individuals with autism may stem 
from representations of natural biological motion that do not conform to typical 
kinematic parameters.  
However, it is also possible that those with autism have underlying perceptual 
difficulties that mean their models of action are generally less precise than typical 
individuals. According to this account, perceptual differences are determined by 
different models of action, but not actually driven by differences in action production 
per se. Specifically, individuals with autism may be less able to represent the type of 
sub-second temporal information that is crucial for perceiving kinematic information, 
and thus forming representations of actions. Therefore, in Chapter 4, I will examine 
visual temporal resolution and visual-motor temporal mapping in adults with and 
without autism. This study will enable us to consider whether poor biological motion 
perception could originate from imprecise representations of the temporal qualities of 
others’ actions, or irregularities in the mapping of visual and motor temporal 
information. 
The results of the experiment in Chapter 4 show no impairment in representing sub-
second visual temporal information in autism, and in fact some enhancements. 
Therefore in Chapter 5 I will test the current hypothesis more explicitly by asking about 
perceptual sensitivity to both autistic and typical movement kinematics in both autistic 
and typical observers. Critically, the only previous study testing biological kinematic 
perception in autism used a mathematical representation of typical human motion (i.e., 
minimum jerk profile, Cook et al., 2009) and therefore presented motion that was not in 
fact ‘natural’. Consequently the motion stimuli used in Chapter 5 will derive from real 
typical and autistic models. Using a variation on the Cook et al. (2009) paradigm, 
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participants will be asked to judge the naturalness of movements that follow autistic and 
typical kinematic trajectories. If those with autism have action models that are tuned to 
autistic kinematics (increased velocity, acceleration and jerk), it is predicted that they 
will have greater difficulties perceiving the information in the typical profile, but show 
enhanced perceptual sensitivity to the autistic movements. In contrast the typical 
participants, with typically tuned models, will show enhanced sensitivity to the typical 
movements. (NB. See Section 1.4.2 for discussion of different mechanisms and how 
these differences would only be predicted under a ‘sensitivity’ version of the present 
hypothesis).  
1.3.3. Inferring internal states from movements in autism  
It has been proposed that those with autism have great difficulty with tasks requiring a 
theory of mind, or mentalising (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985), such that 
those with autism do not spontaneously attribute internal states to others, or attribute 
incorrect internal states (Happé, 2015). Understanding of others’ internal states is tested 
through a variety of means (Turner & Felisberti, 2017). However, the most consistent 
deficits in mentalising are found in tasks where participants are required to make rapid 
or implicit decisions about subtle cues provided in others’ behaviours (Brewer, Young, 
& Barnett, 2017), where they are not able to explicitly and carefully think through 
possible solutions (see Livingston & Happé, 2017 for review).  
Impairments in reading others’ internal states in autism, may, at least in part, reflect 
their atypical actions. Consistent with this hypothesis, one of the paradigms frequently 
used to test intention attribution gives all intention information via kinematic signals, 
and consistently reveals deficits in autistic individuals. This task was designed by 
Heider and Simmel (1944) and adapted by Frith and Happé (Abell, Happé, & Frith, 
2000). The stimuli in this paradigm are short animations of inanimate objects (triangles 
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and circles) which represent different social scenarios (internal state animations). 
During the task participants watch the animations and then describe what they thought 
happened. Importantly, to understand the social content of the sequence of movements 
of the shapes, the observer must firstly perceive the objects as animate, and then ascribe 
internal states to the movements, such that the interaction described between the shapes 
is intentional. For example, Figure 1.3 shows the sequence of movements for the 
coaxing animation, where the triangles represent a ‘mother’ and ‘child’. In this scene 
the larger ‘mother’ triangle is encouraging the smaller ‘child’ triangle, who is nervous, 
to come and explore the space outside of the central box. In a set of comparison stimuli, 
participants must again perceive the shapes as animate, but the same high-level 
reasoning about their internal states is not required in order to understand the interaction 
(e.g., one triangle following the other around the scene). In a third set of animations the 
movements of the shapes describe random trajectories, where there was no deliberate 
interaction between the objects (e.g., two triangles aimlessly bouncing).  
Several studies using these stimuli have shown that both typical children and adults 
spontaneously ascribe accurate and appropriate internal states to the shapes (Abell et al., 
2000; Castelli, Happé, Frith, & Frith, 2000). The frequency of intentional words also 
reduces from the internal state to the comparison animations, and is the lowest for the 
random animations. Similar results have been found cross-culturally (Barrett, Todd, 
Miller, & Blythe, 2005), suggesting, at least at some level, universal understanding of 
the social kinematic cues present in these stimuli. Individuals with autism however, 
frequently show atypical responses to these types of animations. Specifically, those with 
autism use more inappropriate intentional language to describe the internal state 
interactions, and more often assign internal states to the random movements (Abell et 
al., 2000; Bowler & Thommen, 2000; Castelli, Frith, Happé, & Frith, 2002; Jones et al., 
2011; Klin, 2000; White, Coniston, Rogers, & Frith, 2011; Zwickel, White, Coniston, 
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Senju, Frith, 2011). Consistent with these behavioural findings, neuroimaging data 
shows individuals with autism activate classic ‘mentalising’ brain regions (e.g., medial 
prefrontal cortex, [mPFC] or superior temporal sulcus [STS], see Section 1.4.2 for more 
discussion on neural mechanisms supporting this process) less when observing the 
stimuli that requires attribution of mental states, compared to typical individuals, and 
also have reduced connectivity within this network (Castelli et al., 2002). 
 
Variants on this paradigm show that those with autism do not have difficulties 
perceiving the objects as animate (Bowler & Thommen, 2000) or taking the shapes’ 
‘visual’ perspective (Zwickel et al., 2011); both of which are prerequisite skills for 
mentalising. The eye-movements (Klein, Zwickel, Prinz, & Frith, 2009; Zwickel et al., 
2011) and some aspects of brain activity of both typical (Castelli et al., 2000) and 
autistic (Castelli et al., 2002) observers when watching the internal state animations 
Figure 1.3: Example frames from the coaxing animation taken from Abell et al., 2000 
where a mother (large triangle) and child (small triangle) are interacting. (a) The 
mother tries to interest the child in going outside (b) the child is reluctant to go 
outside and resists the mother’s pull (c) the mother gently nudges the child towards 
the door (d) child slowly explores outside (e) mother and child play happily together. 
(Script and image taken from Abell et al., 2000).  
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suggest that both groups perceive the relative complexity (Kemner, van der Geest, 
Verbaten, & van Engeland, 2007) and greater unpredictability (Hillebrandt, Friston, & 
Blakemore, 2015) of the movements, compared to the comparison stimulus sets. For 
instance, both groups exhibit longer fixations on the shapes, and activate extrastriate 
visual regions of the brain more when watching the internal state animations, which are 
patterns associated with greater cognitive effort (Klein et al., 2009; van Gog, Kester, 
Nievelstein, Giesbers, & Paas, 2009). These studies suggest that the participants with 
autism are therefore able to recognise the intricacy of the kinematic properties within 
the action sequences. However, the two groups consistently provide different social 
descriptions of the movements, and those with autism are more likely attribute the 
‘wrong’ internal states.  
Under the current hypothesis differences in the production of actions could, in part, 
contribute towards differences in the perception of the kinematic features within others’ 
actions, which may result in incorrect understanding of others’ internal states. It could 
therefore be the case that individuals with autism, who move atypically, are less 
sensitive to typical kinematic features that signal others’ internal states, and therefore 
make more errors, or that different kinematic signatures represent different internal 
states to those with autism. For example, if those with autism move with different 
kinematics, then the kinematic profiles produced by typical individuals when expressing 
certain internal states will not be equivalent to profiles produced by autistic individuals 
when expressing the same internal state. This difference may partly explain the 
relatively consistent findings that individuals with autism exhibit impairments when 
asked to identify the internal states conveyed in typical actions (Atkinson, 2009; Brewer 
et al., 2017; Di Cesare et al., 2017; Hubert et al., 2006; Moore, Hobson, & Lee, 1997; 
Nackaerts et al., 2012; Parron et al., 2008). Those with autism however, may exhibit 
improved understanding when observing autistic actions. Importantly, the current 
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hypothesis would also predict that typical individuals exhibit impaired understanding of 
autistic actions, and thus impaired communication between autistic and typical 
individuals is a bi-directional understanding deficit rather than lying solely with the 
autistic individual. 
Chapter 6 will therefore ask whether typical individuals are impaired at interpreting the 
movements produced by autistic, relative to typical individuals, as well as investigating 
the performance of individuals with autism when observing both groups’ movements. 
To investigate this question I will use an adaptation of the Frith-Happé paradigm (Abell 
et al., 2000).  
For a mechanism where the production of atypical kinematics interferes with the 
perception of others’ actions it is informative to examine whether atypical movement 
kinematics first present early in life. If differences are present early, they may play an 
instrumental role in the development of social cognition atypicalities. Furthermore, 
reliable diagnosis of autism usually occurs at around age 2 or 3 years old (Baird, Cass, 
& Slonims, 2003), and often requires lengthy assessments in a range of settings 
(Charman et al., 2016). This delay is potentially detrimental to the lives of individuals 
with autism given that an intervention that starts earlier in life is believed to be the most 
effective (Eldevik et al., 2009; Howlin, Magiati, & Charman, 2009; Warren et al., 
2011). Thus, identifying an early biomarker that is easily measured, such as movement 
kinematics, may inform the developmental trajectory of social difficulties and aid the 
design of interventions that can start earlier in development. Therefore, in Chapter 7 I 
will investigate whether kinematic differences in early action production (at 10 months) 
are associated with later social skills (at 14 months) in a group of infants who have 
either a high- or a low-risk of developing autism (due to familial risk factors). 
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1.4. The specific mechanisms underlying own action model calibration 
1.4.1. Criterion setting or perceptual narrowing?  
There are a variety of ways in which mechanisms identifying others’ internal states may 
be tuned by our own actions. First, it is likely that the experience with our own action 
kinematics determines the criterion points at which we categorise others action 
kinematics as displaying specific internal states. For example, although we all will 
increase our speed when we express anger, the extent to which we perceive anger in 
others’ movements may vary depending on individual differences in our own typical 
pace. More precisely, an individual who typically moves faster than the average person 
will move particularly quickly when they express intense anger. In contrast a typically 
slower walker will also increase their walking pace when they express intense anger, 
but this speed might still be slower than the fast mover’s angry pace. Consequently – if 
these two individuals are using models with criteria set to their own kinematics – the 
slower walker might perceive the fast walker’s typical pace to convey anger, when in 
fact they are not expressing any strong emotion. Similarly, when the slower walker 
expresses intense anger, the fast-moving observer might not perceive anger, as the 
velocity does not reach their criterion for anger. A more detailed explanation of this 
theory is described in Section 2.1 (see Figure 2.1). Evidence from other fields in 
psychology is consistent with this hypothesis suggesting that such ‘criterion setting’ 
may be a function of our experiences (see Pollak & Kistler, 2002; Pollak, Messner, 
Kistler, & Cohn, 2009).  
Second, action may influence our perception and understanding of others through 
altering our sensitivity to the perceptual information within their actions. To use the 
previous example, a slow mover might not only be more likely to label fast movements 
as angry – because they are much faster than their own typical movement pace – but 
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they may also be less sensitive to subtle differences in fast movements because this 
represents information that they do not typically experience. A range of studies 
corroborate that experiences tune perceptual sensitivities. For instance, Hirsch and 
Spinelli (1970) reared newborn kittens such that they only had visual access to either 
horizontal or vertical lines. After such ‘training’, the trained stimulus type elicited 
greater activation in orientation-tuned neurons than untrained types. Similar evidence is 
found in the human developmental literature and is defined as ‘perceptual narrowing’ 
(Scott et al., 2007). For example, infants show greater sensitivity to faces of the racial 
group encountered most frequently during development (Kelly et al., 2009; Sangrigoli 
et al,. 2005), as well as sounds specific to their environment (Benasich, Choudhury, 
Realpe-Bonilla, & Roesler, 2014; Werker & Tees, 1984). 
Both of these influences of action on perception and understanding are possible and are 
consistent with the basic proposal of the current hypothesis. However, the criterion 
setting version is perhaps more likely with respect to internal state inferences. Different 
internal states have been found to have distinct kinematic signatures (see Section 1.2.2), 
therefore in order to distinguish them we must categorise kinematic information 
accordingly. The criterion setting version of the current hypothesis assumes that we 
establish our criteria based on our own movements when experiencing these internal 
states, and hence determine the internal states in others by assessing their movements 
against these criteria. In other words, it assumes that we all have sufficient experience 
of different kinematics to process the kinematic information but that it means different 
things to different people. In contrast, the sensitivity version assumes that we simply are 
unable to detect the kinematic information that is relevant to making judgments when 
observing others who move outside of our motor repertoire. Although the sensitivity 
version is plausible, differences in detection performance between individuals would 
likely depend on large individual differences in action kinematics such that the 
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distributions do not overlap and that perception is tuned almost exclusively to one’s 
own actions (which is perhaps unlikely, Hunnis & Bekkering, 2014; see also Section 8.2 
and 8.3 related to this point).  
When considering individual differences between typically developing individuals I 
therefore designed experiments specifically to target the criterion setting prediction 
(Chapters 2 and 3). However, when examining differences between autistic and typical 
individuals, the large differences in kinematics (e.g., Cook et al., 2013) and reduction in 
early visual input from observing others (Jones, Gliga, Bedford, Charman, & Johnson, 
2014; Klin et al., 2003) in autistic populations renders the sensitivity hypothesis more 
plausible. This sensitivity question is therefore addressed in Chapter 5, before 
examining mental state inferences in Chapter 6 with a task where both differential 
criterion setting and perceptual sensitivity would influence performance.   
1.4.2. Neural mechanisms of action model tuning – motor and visual contributions 
Our ability to ascribe internal states to others based on analysis of their movements with 
reference to our own kinematic models requires a neural network that incorporates 
higher-level (frontal executive, mPFC and integrative perceptual, temporoparietal 
junction and posterior STS, pSTS; Blakemore, 2008; Castelli et al., 2000; Grossman et 
al., 2000; Herrington, Nymberg, & Schultz, 2011; Gobbini, Koralek, Bryan, 
Montgomery, & Haxby, 2007; Kaiser & Pelphrey, 2012; Van Overwalle & Baetens, 
2009) and lower-level (visual and motor) systems. This high-level network likely 
supports the analysis and prediction of others’ internal states from information from 
low-level inputs (Adolphs, 2003).  
There is much debate about what neural processes are involved in encoding the low-
level kinematic features of others’ actions. For example, the discovery of so-called 
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‘mirror neurons’ (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Gallese & Goldman, 
1998; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) offered a possible neural substrate by which the 
brain can match observed and produced actions. Mirror neurons were first discovered in 
macaques, and are visual-motor neurons that have unique firing patterns such that 
comparable activation is observed when a monkey produces an action and also when he 
observes another monkey making the same action. Although these neurons were 
originally identified in the premotor cortex (PMC; Gallese et al., 1996) and inferior 
parietal lobule (IPL; Fogassi, 2005) of the macaque, there is increasing evidence both 
through neural imaging and behavioural studies that human brains are also equipped 
with a similar system (Molenberghs, Cunnington, & Mattingley, 2012).  
Activity in the motor system (or Mirror Neuron System, MNS) during action 
observation is argued to help us understand others’ actions, and therefore, in relation to 
the current hypothesis, action models may be tuned within the motor system. For 
instance, following application of Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) to the IPL, 
a technique that induces a virtual lesion, reductions in accuracy in labelling others’ 
actions (van Kemenade, Muggleton, Walsh, & Saygin, 2012) and identifying their 
intentions (Tidoni et al., 2013) have been recorded. A range of studies also suggest that 
activity within the MNS specifies motion information that is within one’s own motor 
repertoire (Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grezes, Passingham, & Haggard, 2004; Calvo-
Merino et al., 2006; Liew, Han, & Aziz-Zadeh, 2011; Lloyd-Fox, Wu, Richards, Elwell, 
& Johnson, 2015; Paulus, Hunnius, van Elk, & Bekkering, 2012), with evidence that the 
PMC is essential for discriminating actions that move with impossible and possible 
kinematics (Candidi, Urgesi, Ionta, & Aglioti, 2008) and configurations (Urgesi, Calvo-
Merino, Haggard, & Aglioti, 2007). The motor system may therefore be tuned to our 
own motor experiences, and during action observation these signals could directly 
influence perception of others’ internal states by feeding information into higher-level 
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regions (de Lange, Spronk, Willems, Toni, & Bekkering, 2008; Liew et al., 2011; Van 
Overwalle & Baetens, 2009).  
However, visual regions are also important to consider for action model tuning as 
during action production we of course have lots of visual inputs from our actions (e.g., 
Rochat, 1998). The pSTS is a high-level perceptual region involved in synthesising a 
range of visual (and other sensory) inputs during observation of biological motion 
(Hillebrandt et al., 2015; Vaina, Solomon, Chowdhury, Sinha, & Belliveau, 2001) and 
parses the consolidated information into relevant temporal units (Redcay, 2008) and on 
to motor regions (Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). The pSTS also has direct 
connections with frontal regions relevant for inferring internal states from observing 
movements (Moessnang et al., 2017). Thus, the structure of the ‘mentalising’ network 
(including frontal, higher-level visual and motor regions) is such that low-level visual 
and motor signals can communicate and integrate rapidly (Sepulcre, 2014), and send 
information directly onto higher-level regions. Moreover, it is worth noting that the 
activity in the motor system during action perception originates from filtered 
information from the visual system. This arrangement enables the production of fluid 
visually guided movements (Wolpert et al., 2003), but importantly suggests the visual 
system is also highly tuned to our motoric experiences and thus the kinematical 
qualities of our actions. We may therefore generate perceptual models of actions that we 
use when observing and interpreting others’ actions without necessarily requiring any 
motor input.  
Either of these mechanisms – direct motor models or indirect motor tuning of perceptual 
models – would generate effects whereby one’s motor experiences can alter judgments 
about others’ internal states from their actions. Of course, it is likely that both the visual 
and the motor system work in concert to aid perception and understanding of others’ 
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actions and therefore that they both play a role in any own action calibration. This thesis 
will not attempt to disentangle these two possibilities, however it will provide novel 
experiments that examine whether variability in visual-motor experiences moulds 
‘mental models’ that are unique to one’s experiences, and therefore can either help or 
hinder social understanding and communication depending on the similarity of one’s 
interaction partners’ movements to one’s own.  
1.5. Summary  
Under the main hypothesis it is predicted that individual differences in one’s own 
actions lead to idiosyncrasies in judgments of internal states from movement cues. 
Consequently, observing others performing actions that are more closely matched to 
one’s own actions will result in more accurate assessments about their internal states. 
This hypothesis will be tested in three ways. First, I will examine whether differences in 
action kinematics predict differences in emotion perception in typical development 
(adults: Chapter 2 and adolescents: Chapter 3). Second, I will consider the role of 
atypical action kinematics in the perceptual and social impairments found in adults with 
autism. I will verify that basic visual temporal perception skills required for these 
judgments are intact in autism (Chapter 4) before asking about the perceptual sensitivity 
to typical and autistic action kinematics in typical and autistic observers (Chapter 5). I 
will then measure how differences in action kinematics may generate differences in 
higher-level socio-cognitive skills (mentalising, Chapter 6). Finally, in Chapter 7, I will 
examine whether atypical kinematics are present early in development (10 months) and 
are associated with later social skills (14 months). In Chapter 8 I will summarise the 
findings, and provide some suggestions for future work to further the findings of this 
thesis.  
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Chapter 2: Our own action kinematics determine the perceived 
affective states of others  
 
Our movement kinematics provide useful cues about our affective states. Given that our 
experiences furnish models that help us to interpret our environment, and that a rich 
source of action experience comes from our own movements, the present study 
examined whether we use models of our own action kinematics to make judgments 
about the affective states of others. For example, relative to one’s typical kinematics, 
anger is associated with fast movements. Therefore, the extent to which we perceive 
anger in others may be determined by the degree to which their movements are faster 
than our own typical movements. We related participants’ walking kinematics in a 
neutral context to their judgments of the affective states conveyed by observed PLWs. 
As predicted, we found a linear relationship between one’s own walking kinematics and 
affective state judgments, such that faster participants rated slower emotions more 
intensely relative to their ratings for faster emotions. These findings suggest that 
perception of affective states in others is predicted by one’s own movement kinematics, 
with important implications for perception of, and interaction with, those who move 
differently. 
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2.1. Introduction  
Behavioural expressions of affective states are often automatic and exhibit many 
similarities across individuals (Frijda, 2010). These similarities allow recognition of 
affective states in others from a range of cultures (e.g., Sauter, Eisner, Ekman, & Scott, 
2010). Various cues provide information about our affective states, such as facial 
expressions (Bassili, 1979; Ekman & Friesen, 1975), vocalisations and sign language 
(Hietanen, Leppänen, & Lehtonen, 2004; Scherer, 1995), touch (App, McIntosh, Reed, 
& Hertenstein, 2011; Hertenstein, Holmes, McCullough, & Keltner, 2009) and 
importantly, the way that we move (Dael, Mortillaro, & Scherer, 2012). In the same 
way that perception of a smile prompts the attribution of happiness, perception of fast 
movements can prompt the attribution of anger (Atkinson et al., 2007; Roether et al., 
2009a; 2009b). The association of specific movement cues with specific affective states 
can provide a rapid route for the attribution of affective states to others, enabling fast 
and appropriate responses to others’ behaviour (Brown & Brüne, 2012; Klin, et al., 
2003; Sartori, Cavallo, Bucchioni, & Castiello, 2012).  
As detailed in Chapter 1, our experiences with our own actions may generate action 
representations tuned to our own movements (e.g., Calvo-Merino, et al., 2006; Gerson 
et al., 2015; Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014; Paulus et al., 2012). Therefore, when 
observing the actions of others our attributions of their internal states may be calibrated 
to these mental models which are tuned to our own actions.  
The present study tests whether participants’ models of their own movements determine 
their interpretation of the affective states of others. Whereas anger is associated with 
fast and accelerated movement (Ada, Suda, & Ishii, 2003; Montepare, Goldstein, & 
Clausen, 1987; Roether, et al., 2009a), sadness is demonstrated through low velocity 
and reduced acceleration (Michalak et al., 2009; Pollick et al., 2001). Some (Ada et al., 
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2003), but not all (Barliya et al., 2013; Ikeda & Watanabe, 2009), studies also find that 
happiness is associated with high velocity relative to a neutral affective state. It was 
therefore hypothesised that individual differences in participants’ own typical 
movement kinematics would determine differences in the perception of others’ affective 
states.  
For example, we may all increase our velocity when we feel angry, and reduce our 
velocity when we feel sad. However, a ‘fast mover’ – who typically moves faster than 
an average person – will move particularly quickly when they are angry, but when 
feeling sad their speed might be more comparable to that of an average person who is 
not experiencing any strong emotional state (see Figure 2.1A). If this ‘fast mover’ is 
using a model of their own kinematics to interpret others’ affective states, another’s fast 
movements (conveying anger) are unlikely to be perceived as intensely angry (see 
Figure 2.1Aii) because they are comparable to the fast mover’s own typical movements. 
However, this person will perceive sad (slow) movements as intensely sad because they 
are much slower than they would typically move and therefore reach their kinematic 
criterion for detecting sadness. Conversely, someone who moves slower than average 
would perceive fast (angry) movements as more intensely emotional relative to slow 
(sad) movements (see Figure 2.1Ai).  
Variability in participants’ typical kinematics was assessed by recording the velocity of 
their motion while walking in a neutral context. In addition, participants viewed 
emotional (angry, happy or sad) PLW stimuli (see Figure 2.1B). The kinematics of 
these stimuli were either affect-specific (e.g., high velocity for angry walkers), or 
manipulated to converge to neutral kinematics (see Figure 2.1C). Participants were 
asked to rate the extent to which the PLW appeared happy, angry and sad.  
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Figure 2.1: (A) Schematic diagram of the experimental hypothesis. The left panel (Ai) 
depicts the kinematics of fast, average, and slow walkers when sad. The right panel (Aii) 
depicts the kinematics of fast, average, and slow walkers when angry. Note that at the 
velocity highlighted by the arrow in the left panel, a slow walker is feeling no particular 
emotion, but a fast walker is feeling intensely sad. (B) Example frames taken from the 
happy intermediate (45°) male PLW. In these PLWs, 12 points reflect the motion at the 
important joints in the body (see http://www.bbk.ac.uk/psychology/videos/CPress/ for 
example videos). (C) The velocity of the original (100%) animations was altered to 
assess the extent to which kinematic information is used to make affective state 
judgments. 0% stimuli exhibited velocities equal to the neutral stimuli (e.g. the 0% 
happy male coronal velocity was equal to that in the neutral male coronal animation), 
and 33% and 67% animations exhibited velocities between the neutral and 100% 
emotion stimuli.   
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It was predicted that there would be a linear relationship between one’s own walking 
velocity and perception of others affective states, such that the faster participants would 
rate the slower emotions more intensely relative to the faster emotions. Findings of this 
nature would indicate that our perception of others’ affective cues are determined by our 
own action models.  
2.2. Method 
2.2.1. Participants 
This study was initially conducted with 41 participants (17 males, aged 20-43 years, 
M=27.37, SEM=1.04), however it was subsequently deemed prudent to increase the 
sample size (full sample N=87, 40 males, aged 18-62 years, M=29.48, SEM=1.00), to 
ensure that the initial effects were not due to sampling error. The effects reported below 
replicated in both sub-samples, but given that the precision of effect size estimation 
depends primarily on sample size (Maxwell, Kelley, & Rausch, 2008; Asendorpf et al., 
2013) all participants were pooled in reported analyses for optimal sensitivity. 
Participants were recruited through the local university database. All participants gave 
informed consent, procedures received ethical approval from the Birkbeck ethics 
committee and all data were collected in accordance with the guidelines laid out in the 
1964 Declaration of Helsinki
2
. There were no multivariate outliers. 
2.2.2. Stimuli  
The original stimuli were PLWs (Figure 2.1B) adapted from those developed by 
Nackaerts et al. (2012). These original PLWs depicted a male or female actor 
expressing happy, sad, angry or neutral affective states, in two different viewpoints 
                                                        
2
Note this was the same protocol in all studies presented in this thesis.  
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(coronal [0°] and intermediate to coronal and sagittal [45°]). Stimuli were 
approximately 21° visual angle vertically, and 8–17° horizontally, when viewed at the 
typical distance of 40 cm.  
The velocity of each original affective animation (original animations are referred to 
hereafter as 100% emotion stimuli) was manipulated to generate velocity-adapted 
animations (0%, 33% and 67% velocity, [NB. our algorithms were ineffective for 
generating kinematic adaptations of the original sagittal [90°] animations which is why 
the other two viewpoints were selected]). 
To produce the kinematic adaptations, each of the 12 points were isolated using Adobe 
After Effects. The change in x and y position of each point was tracked across each 
frame by first order differentiation of the position vectors and averaged to calculate the 
mean velocity of each point. The overall mean velocity of each animation was then 
calculated across all 12 points. The ratio between the mean velocity of the 100% 
emotional animation and its corresponding neutral animation was calculated (i.e., the 
mean velocity for the neutral coronal male divided by the mean velocity for the happy 
coronal male). From this ratio, animation-specific constants were generated by 
multiplying by the desired velocity level (e.g., 33%), which was finally multiplied by 
the frame-rate of each of the 100% animations to speed up or slow down the animation 
accordingly.  
Given that the affective stimuli varied in both length of animation and number of step 
cycles, two versions of the experiment were produced. All 100% animations were either 
cropped to the equivalent duration (2.04 seconds, N=17), or the same number of step-
cycles (1.8 cycles; N=69). The findings did not differ according to the animation type 
used so analyses are reported collapsed across both versions.  
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Two random frames from each neutral walker frame-set were also selected, resulting in 
eight static control images which contained no affective information – postures were 
neutral and there was no kinematic information.  
2.2.3. Procedure 
All participants first completed the emotion perception task with the original PLWs, 
followed by the velocity adapted PLWs, and finally the static control images. 
Participants subsequently performed the walking task and completed the questionnaire 
measures
3
.  
2.2.3.1. Emotion perception tasks 
Each task was run via Matlab® on a 24 inch screen computer. On each trial, the 
participants were presented with a PLW and asked to rate the extent to which the walker 
was expressing one of the three target emotions: happy, angry or sad. The rating scale 
ranged from ‘not at all (happy, angry, sad)’ to ‘very (happy, angry, sad)’. Participants 
clicked on a visual analogue scale, and responses were recorded on a 0-10 scale (to two 
decimal places; value not shown to participants). The initial position of the cursor was 
randomised for each trial. Participants could change their response until they pressed a 
key to continue. The affective state judgment to be made was blocked, resulting in three 
separate blocks (happy, angry and sad judgments). All stimuli were presented once in 
each block, and the order of the blocks was counterbalanced across participants. In 
addition, the order of presentation of the stimuli was randomised for each participant 
within each block. Before beginning the study the participants had three practice trials. 
                                                        
3
A fixed order was selected to enable comparability between the testing conditions for all 
participants and allow the study of individual differences. It was deemed that the walking task 
should always be performed after the emotion perception tasks to minimise the risk that 
participants were primed to make explicit reference to their own walking pace during the 
perception tasks. 
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In each practice trial participants were asked to rate one of the three emotions and were 
shown a randomly selected 100% emotional sagittal PLW. For the static control images 
the procedure was also the same, however, on each trial within each of the three blocks, 
the image was presented for 2.04 seconds (mean duration of the animations). These 
stimuli were used to measure response bias (Greenleaf, 1992). 
Participants were therefore asked to make a total of 48 ratings of the 100% emotion 
PLWs, then 108 ratings of the velocity adapted emotional PLWs, and 24 ratings of the 
static control images. The emotion perception tasks took approximately 35 minutes to 
complete with breaks between each task.  
2.2.3.2. Walking task and questionnaires  
Participants were instructed to walk continuously between two cones (10 metres apart) 
at their own typical walking pace and that they would be told when to stop (after 120 
seconds). An iPhone 5c was attached to the medial side of the participants’ right ankle 
using a running strap, and an identical band was attached to the left ankle with an 
equivalent weight to the iPhone. The internal accelerometer of the iPhone was used to 
track the precise time taken and distance travelled for each participant, via the Sensor 
Kinetics Pro© application. To calculate mean walking velocity, each participant’s data 
was cropped to the beginning and end of the last full lap of the walking period by visual 
inspection. The distance walked (metres) was calculated from the accelerometer data as 
the number of full laps, again identified by visual inspection of the data, multiplied by 
10 (one lap corresponded to 10 meters). The duration was calculated as the difference 
between the time at final and first timestamp for the cropped data (deduced from Sensor 
Kinetics Pro© timestamps). Mean velocity was calculated as the distance travelled 
divided by the time taken.  
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It is worth noting that the participants’ own walking kinematics could not be precisely 
compared to those of the PLWs for several reasons, such as the fact that the kinematics 
of the animations were two-dimensional. This limitation precludes the possibility of 
determining absolute differences between the kinematics of the observed PLWs and 
one’s own walking pace. Nevertheless, regardless of the precise equivalence point, the 
important point for the analyses is that the affect-specific kinematics in the animations 
will have been lower /higher relative to the typical kinematics of the fast /slow 
participants.  
Mood has previously been shown to bias perception when making affective judgments, 
such that one’s own affective state influences perception of a range of affective stimuli 
(Forgas, 1995; Fiedler, Nickel, Muehlfriedel, & Unkelbach, 2001; Mayer, Gaschke, 
Braverman, & Evans, 1992). Therefore, at the end of the experiment, to assess response 
biases associated with mood all participants were asked to think carefully about how 
they felt during the whole experimental session and rate their current mood (happy, 
angry and sad) using the same scale as that used in the emotion tasks, from ‘not at all 
(happy, angry, sad)’ to ‘very (happy, angry, sad)’. Sixty-six of the participants also 
completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-Expanded form (PANAS-X, 
Watson & Clark, 1994) to assess trait General Positive and General Negative Affect.  
2.3. Results  
Greenhouse-Geisser corrections have been applied where necessary, and all multiple 
comparisons are reported with Bonferroni corrected p values. 
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2.3.1. Control measures 
2.3.1.1. Static control ratings 
To test for response biases from using the different emotional rating scales, a One-Way 
ANOVA was conducted on the three emotional ratings from the static control task. 
There was a main effect of emotion scale (F(1.84,158.11)=44.12, p<.001, ηp
2
=.339), 
with follow-up simple comparisons revealing higher ‘happy’ ratings for the neutral 
static images (M=5.28, SEM=.12) compared to both ‘sad’ (M=3.82, SEM=.13, p<.001, 
95% CI [1.52, 2.83], d=.87) and ‘angry’ ratings (M=4.19, SEM=.15, p<.001, 95% CI 
[1.12, 2.13], d=.84), with no difference between the ‘angry’ and ‘sad’ ratings (p=.080, 
95% [-.046, 1.14], d=.24). This effect is indicative of a ‘happy’ response bias, as is 
commonly found in emotion perception studies, and it is important to assess its 
influence on the primary result (see Section 2.3.3).  
2.3.1.2. Mood ratings  
Due to technical error mood ratings data was lost for one participant. To test for 
differences in mood ratings a One-Way ANOVA was performed using the participants’ 
mood ratings (happy, sad, angry). There was a main effect of emotion 
(F(2,170)=127.66, p<.001, ηp
2
=.600). Follow-up comparison tests showed a happy 
mood bias, such that participants rated themselves as happier (M=6.46, SEM=.21), than 
angry (M=1.40, SEM=.25, p<.001, 95% CI [4.15, 5.98], d=1.46) or sad (M=1.90, 
SEM=.24, p<.001, 95% CI [3.61, 5.52] , d=1.26), but no differently on the sad and 
angry scales (p=.206, 95% CI [-1.16, .16], d=.12).  
To test for differences in participants’ trait mood measures a paired t-test was conducted 
comparing participants’ General Negativity and Positivity scores for the subsample who 
completed the PANAS-X. There was again a ‘happy trait bias’ (t(65)=9.95, p<.001, 
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95% CI [16.12, 10.73], d=1.23), such that participants scored higher on the positivity 
(M=30.03, SEM=1.06) relative to the negativity scale (M=16.61, SEM=.79).  
These mood biases could influence participants’ walking pace, as well as emotion 
perception ratings, therefore it is important to assess the influence of participants’ mood 
on the primary analysis (see Section 2.3.3).    
2.3.2. Emotion perception ratings for the velocity adapted animations 
From the participants’ judgments ‘emotional intensity scores’ (EIS) were calculated for 
each emotion and velocity level (3 emotions x 4 levels). These measures were 
calculated as the mean rating on the modelled emotion scale (e.g., angry for the 0%, 
33%, and 67% angry stimuli) minus the mean of the two ratings on the non-modelled 
emotion scales (happy and sad in this case). This subtraction was performed to isolate 
participants’ rating of the modelled emotion from the non-modelled emotions, akin to a 
measure of precision. This measure distinguished participants who rated highly on all 
emotional scales for any given PLW, from those who correctly differentiated the 
modelled from the non-modelled emotions. High EIS therefore indicates that 
participants judged the PLW as intensely expressing the modelled emotion, while low 
(or negative) scores indicate that the PLW is judged as weakly expressing the modelled 
emotion or expressing a non-modelled emotion.  
To test whether participants across the whole group were using the kinematic 
information in the animations to make their emotion intensity judgments a 3x4 ANOVA 
was conducted, with emotion (happy, angry and sad) and velocity level (0%, 33%, 67% 
and 100%) as within-participant factors. As expected, there was a strong linear trend 
across velocity level (F(1,86)=290.71, p<.001, ηp
2
=.772), suggesting that as the affect-
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specific velocity information was removed, intensity ratings for the modelled emotion 
decreased (see Figure 2.2).  
There was also a main effect of emotion (F(2,172)=16.87, p<.001, ηp
2
=.164) and a 
linear interaction between level and emotion (F(1,86)=28.27, p<.001, ηp
2
=.248). To 
examine this interaction separate ANOVAs were performed for each of the three 
emotions with velocity level as the within-participant factor. For all three analyses there 
was a linear trend across velocity level (sad: F(1,86)=230.67, p<.001, ηp
2
=.728; happy: 
F(1,86)=29.98, p<.001, ηp
2
=.239; angry: F(1,86)=86.23, p<.001, ηp
2
=.501). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Emotional intensity scores (EIS) across the four velocity levels for the three 
emotions. Shaded areas represent the SEM.  
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These analyses suggest that the kinematic cues are important for detecting all three 
emotions, with the interaction driven by lesser use for happy emotions (see Figure 2.2). 
These results therefore extend previous findings that kinematic information is a crucial 
cue for the perception of emotion (Atkinson et al., 2007; Roether et al., 2009a; 2009b) 
by demonstrating that removal of affect-specific kinematic cues is associated with a 
decrease in the intensity of the perceived emotion.  
2.3.3. Relationship between walking kinematics and emotion perception (EIBS) 
To assess the primary hypothesis concerning the relationship between participants’ 
walking speed and emotion perception a composite emotional intensity rating was 
calculated. These ‘emotional intensity beta scores’ (EIBS) represent the linear 
relationship in intensity scores from the slowest (sad) to the fastest (angry) emotions 
(via happy). This score was calculated by modelling the regression slope (β) between 
animation kinematics and EIS, such that the predictor values were the mean velocity of 
the PLWs’ right ankle for each of the three modelled emotions in the 100% emotion 
stimuli (see Figure 2.3A), and the dependent values were the corresponding EIS. A 
positive EIBS denotes higher intensity ratings for the faster relative to the slower 
emotions and a negative score represents higher intensity ratings for the slower 
emotions.  
A Pearson Product Moment Correlation was performed to examine whether individual 
differences in walking velocity were related to emotion perception, measured by the 
100% EIBS. In line with the hypothesis, there was a negative relationship (r=-.310, 
N=87, p=.003, 95% CI [-.489, -.106]; see Figure 2.3B) such that participants whose 
walking kinematics were faster rated the slower emotions more intensely, relative to the 
faster emotions. 
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To control for the ‘happy response bias’ identified from the results of the static control 
task (see Section 3.1) a happy bias score was calculated. This score represented the 
extent to which participants rated control stimuli higher on the ‘happy’, relative to the 
‘sad’ and ‘angry’ static scales (i.e., happy static ratings – mean of the sad and angry 
static ratings). A measure of the participants’ ‘happy mood bias’ was also calculated 
from their state mood ratings by subtracting the mean of their sad and angry mood 
ratings from their happy mood rating. To ensure neither bias mediated the observed 
relationship between walking kinematics and emotional perception, a partial correlation 
Figure 2.3: (A) Mean ankle velocity for animations in each affective category. Error bars 
represent SEM in both panels. (B) Scatter plot of the negative correlation between the 
100% EIBS and the participants’ own walking velocity. A high 100% EIBS represents 
participants rating the faster emotions (anger) as more intense relative to the slower 
emotions (sadness).  
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was performed controlling for variability relating to both happy rating and happy mood 
biases. This control analysis showed the same negative correlation as reported above 
(r=-.312, N=86, p=.004, 95% CI [-.406, -.212]).  
The same result was also found when controlling for trait happy mood bias (i.e., 
participants general positivity scores – general negativity scores calculated from the 
PANAS-X questionnaire), in the sub-sample for whom scores were obtained (r=-.332, 
N=66, p=.007, 95% CI [-.533, -.090]).  
2.3.4. Relationship between walking kinematics and individual emotion ratings 
(EIS) 
 
To examine the individual contribution of each emotion to the relationship found 
between walking velocity and emotion perception (as measured by the 100% EIBS), 
three follow-up correlations were calculated between participants’ walking velocity and 
each of the three individual 100% EIS (which made up the 100% EIBS). As expected, 
the angry EIS showed a negative relationship with velocity (r=-.243, N=87, p=.023, 
95% CI [-.038, -.429]), and the sad EIS showed a small numerical, but non-significant 
positive relationship (r=.126, N=87, p=.245, 95% CI [.325, -.083]). There was no sign 
of a relationship between the happy EIS and velocity (r=.062, N=87, p=.570, 95% CI 
[.266, -.147]; see Figure 2.4). While one would have predicted that any unique 
relationship between happy ratings and walking velocity would have been negative – 
given findings that happiness is sometimes associated with high velocity (Ada et al., 
2003) – the absence of a relationship may be unsurprising given the inconsistencies in 
this finding (Barliya et al., 2013; Ikeda & Watanabe, 2009). Furthermore, although the 
relationship between sad EIS and walking velocity did not approach statistical 
significance the numerical relationship was in the positive direction that would be 
expected (see Figure 2.4A).  
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Figure 2.4: Scatterplots showing correlations between participants’ walking velocity 
and 100% EIS (A) Sad EIS showing a non-significant correlation trending in a positive 
direction, (B) Happy EIS showing no correlation and (C) Angry EIS showing a 
negative correlation. 
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The non-significance of this relationship is perhaps related to the reduced variability in 
the sad EIS (see Figure 2.4). It is worth noting that the aim of the present study was to 
look for overall relationships between the EIBS (participants’ relative intensity ratings 
across the three emotions) and walking velocity and therefore one should be cautious in 
drawing emotion-specific inferences from the present findings. 
2.4. Discussion 
This study examined whether an individual’s own movement kinematics predict their 
perception of others’ affective states. In line with this hypothesis, participants who 
walked with greater speed were found to rate the high velocity (angry) emotions as less 
intense relative to low velocity (sad) emotions, this association could not be explained 
by variance related to participants’ response bias, state or trait mood. Such findings 
provide novel evidence that attributions about others’ covert affective states are 
calibrated to one’s own action experiences. Observation of walking may therefore be 
assumed to activate codes used when walking at that velocity oneself and attribution of 
an affective state to the observed other may be determined by the speed of these codes 
relative to one’s own typical pace.  
The present findings have important implications for our understanding of affect 
perception between different populations. The current study predicts that social 
interactions should be most successful between interaction partners who move similarly, 
as greater understanding of others’ internal states is likely to result in more successful 
social interactions. For example, differences in the production of actions may impact 
cross-cultural affect perception (Hareli, Kafetsios, & Hess, 2015; Matsumoto, Seung 
Hee Yoo, & Fontaine, 2008; Quiros-Ramirez & Onisawa, 2015). Indeed, Japanese 
participants rate animated emotional body expressions with a smaller range of 
movement as more intense compared to both Sri Lankan and American participants 
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(Kleinsmith, De Silva, & Bianchi-Berthouze, 2006), and such results could be 
interpreted as reflecting the smaller range of movements used to express emotions in 
Japanese culture. Thus, it is important to consider how movement differences between 
cultures may contribute to impaired cross-cultural understanding (Hareli, Kafetsios, & 
Hess, 2015; Quiros-Ramirez & Onisawa, 2015), specifically for more subtle cues. 
In conclusion, the present results suggest that we use models of our own movement 
kinematics to make affective judgments about others. This finding may have important 
implications for those with whom we choose to interact, and also how well we interact 
with them. 
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Chapter 3: Developmental differences in action kinematics across 
adolescence determine emotion perception 
 
Chapter 2 demonstrated that – in adults – perception of affective states was determined 
by individual differences in kinematics during action production. A prediction from this 
study is that groups who move differently will show comparable differences in 
perceiving affect in others. Adolescence is a pivotal stage of social, cognitive and 
physical development, which also frequently coincides with an increase in conflicts 
with caregivers. There are likely numerous factors that contribute to this change in 
relationship; however, one important factor could be differences in how each group 
moves, given that adolescents are likely to move differently from adults as they learn to 
control their changing body. To test this hypothesis, the same experiment as described 
in Chapter 2 was conducted with three groups of adolescents; Early (11-12 years old), 
Middle (13-14 years old) and Late (16-18 years old) Adolescence. As predicted, we 
found differences in walking kinematics between the groups. Specifically, there was a 
linear relationship between age group and walking kinematics, such that as the groups 
got older they moved more slowly. Importantly, measures of emotion perception also 
followed a linear trajectory across age groups, as was anticipated on the basis of the key 
hypothesis. Namely, as the groups got slower (i.e., older) they rated the slower emotions 
less intensely relative to their ratings for faster emotions. Social communication 
difficulties between adolescents and caregivers could therefore, in part, stem from 
misattributions concerning internal states.  
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3.1. Introduction  
The transition from childhood to adulthood is a gradual evolution defined by a 
succession of important social and biological events (Spear, 2000). During adolescence 
(for the purposes of this chapter defined as 11-18 years old, see Spear, 2000) one learns 
to cope with the greater level of independence, making more decisions, and dealing with 
increasingly complex social demands and novel experiences. This pivotal part of 
development is marked by changes in brain structure and function (Paus, 2005; 
Dumontheil, 2016; Peters, Vlamings, & Kemner, 2013), which support the maturation 
of the socio-cognitive skills (Batty & Taylor, 2006; Burnett & Blakemore, 2009; Crone 
& Steinbeis, 2017; Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010; Heller & Casey, 2016; 
Moore et al., 2012; Steinberg, 2005; Taylor, Barker, Heavey, & McHale, 2013; Vink, 
Derks, Hoogendam, Hillegers, & Kahn, 2014) required for an autonomous adult life 
(Tonks, Williams, Frampton, Yates, & Slater, 2007).  
Adolescence is a time notorious for conflicts with caregivers (Flannery, Montemayor, 
Eberly, & Torquati, 1993) as well as a high incidence of mood disorders (Merikangas et 
al., 2010; Ormel et al., 2015). A meta-analysis shows the number of conflicts peaks in 
early adolescence, but the emotional intensity of conflicts continues to increase until 
mid-adolescence, and eventually declines towards the end of adolescence (Laursen, 
Coy, & Collins, 1998). There are likely a multitude of contributing factors to caregiver-
adolescent conflict, for instance both poor emotional regulation (Heller & Casey, 2016; 
Pfeifer et al., 2011) and reduced inhibition (Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006; Steinberg, 
2005) in adolescents likely play major roles, as well as more general socio-cultural 
factors related to the content of the conflicts.  
However, one possibly important factor that has received little empirical attention is 
bilateral misinterpretation of the internal states experienced by adults and adolescents. 
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Perception of others’ affective states across adolescence has been examined in a handful 
of studies using facial expressions. Most studies show identification accuracy and 
sensitivity to emotion specific signals continues to improve well into adolescence, with 
small improvements observed between younger children (~8 years) and early 
adolescents, then a steep linear trajectory between mid and late adolescence (~13-18 
years old; Herba, Landau, Russell, Ecker, & Phillips, 2006; Johnston et al., 2011; Kolb, 
Wilson, & Taylor, 1992; Thomas, De Bellis, Graham, & LaBar, 2007). Despite body 
movements being an equally important emotional signal (de Gelder, 2006), the change 
in the perception of emotion from body movements has not been examined across 
adolescence (NB. Ross, Polson, & Grosbras, 2012 included adolescents in their sample 
of children but had insufficient power to compare effects across this developmental 
period).  
As well as changes to social relationships and related cognitive functions in 
adolescence, there are also vast changes to the physical shape and size of the body 
(Rogol, Clark, & Roemmich, 2000; Tanner, Whitehouse, & Takaishi, 1966). Changes to 
the neuromuscular system and musculoskeletal growth in this period result in continued 
refinement of motor repertoires during adolescence, with differences in performance 
and movement kinematics between adolescence and adults observed in a range of motor 
tasks (Davies & Rose, 2000; Largo et al., 2001; Quatman-Yates, Quatman, Meszaros, 
Paterno, & Hewett, 2012; Rueckriegel et al., 2008; Visser, Geuze, & Kalverboer, 1998; 
Wilson & Hyde, 2013), including walking (Froehle, Nahhas, Sherwood, & Duren, 
2013; Sutherland, 1997). Given the findings in Chapter 2, it is predicted that differences 
in action production between adults and adolescents would result in different tuning of 
action representations, and thus divergent calibration of internal state judgments from 
kinematic cues.   
 64 
 
One’s ‘spontaneous’ speed of movements (McAuley, Jones, Holub, Johnston, & Miller, 
2006) and ‘preferred’ walking pace (Oberg, Karsznia, & Oberg, 1993) has been 
documented to slow across development and into old age. Therefore it is predicted that 
adolescents will exhibit an elevated baseline speed relative to adults, and thus 
adolescent affective state judgments from others’ kinematic cues will be different from 
those of adults. For example, an adolescent’s expression of anger will be much faster 
than a typical adult’s expression of anger. Differences in the production of actions 
between adults and adolescents may lead to incorrect attributions of internal states. 
More precisely, an adult expression of intense anger (speed increase relative to baseline) 
may not be perceived as an intense expression of anger to an adolescent observer 
because it corresponds to an adolescent’s typical movement pace. Misattributions of 
others’ affective states could therefore contribute to conflicts between caregivers and 
their adolescent children. 
The present experiment tests the hypothesis that adolescents interpret affective states 
from movement cues differently from adults, in a way that would be predicted on the 
basis of their own movement kinematics. Three groups of adolescents were tested 
(Early, Middle and Late Adolescence), and the same methodology described in Chapter 
2 was used to measure walking velocity, individual ‘emotion intensity scores’ (EIS), 
and the composite emotion perception scores (EIBS) across three target emotions (sad, 
happy and angry).  
There were two hypotheses. First, it was predicted that there would be differences in 
walking velocity between adults and adolescents. Specifically, given that our preferred 
speed of movements tends to slow as we age (Oberg et al., 1993; McAuley et al., 2006), 
walking speed was predicted to decrease linearly as the groups got older. In line with 
the findings reported in Chapter 2, the second prediction was that the decrease in 
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walking speed (across the age groups) would determine the trend of emotion perception 
ratings across groups. To date no previous studies have tested whether adolescent 
observers are able to use affect-specific kinematic cues. Therefore before assessing the 
second hypothesis it was necessary to confirm that adolescents use kinematic 
information in others’ actions to make affective judgments by comparing ratings across 
0, 33, 67 and 100% velocity levels. Having confirmed that they indeed use these cues, it 
was examined whether the youngest (fastest) group rate the slower emotions (sadness) 
more intensely than faster emotions (anger), with the pattern decreasing or reversing 
across age, as walking speed decreased.  
3.2. Method 
3.2.1. Participants  
Adolescent participants were recruited from two schools (one in London and one in 
Sussex, both were state funded mixed secondary schools with attached sixth-form 
colleges). Three age groups (11-12; 13-14; and 16-18 years old) were chosen to be 
representative of distinct stages of adolescent development (Early, Middle and Late 
Adolescence), which have previously been defined in the developmental literature 
(Spear, 2000). Forty randomly selected adolescents from each age range (20 of each 
gender) were invited to participate in the study. All of those who self-consented, and for 
all children under 16-years-old also obtained consent from their legal guardian were 
tested. This method of opportunity sampling resulted in 35 adolescents in the Early 
Adolescence Group (19 males), 30 in the Middle Adolescence Group (9 males), and 30 
in the Late Adolescence Group (13 males).  
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These adolescent groups were compared against the adult group reported in Chapter 2 
(N=86, 20-62 years old, 39 males
4
). There was no difference in the ratio of male to 
female participants across the four groups (χ2(3)=3.95, p=.267). To confirm that gender 
did not contribute to any of the effects found, gender was added as a fixed factor in each 
of the analyses reported below and no interactions with gender were found. 
Demographic data for all the participants are shown in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1: Demographic data for the three Adolescence and Adulthood groups 
 Age  
Mean (SEM) 
Gender  
(N=male) 
Early Adolescence  
(N=35) 
 
11.83 (.06) 19 
 
Middle Adolescence  
(N=30) 
 
13.90 (.06) 9 
Late Adolescence 
(N=30) 
 
16.67 (.10)  13 
Adulthood  
(N=86) 
 
29.62 (1.00) 39 
 
3.2.2. Procedure   
The stimuli and procedure were identical to that reported in Chapter 2. In summary, 
participants were asked to make emotional judgments (happy, angry and sad) after 
observing 100% and velocity-adapted animations (67, 33 and 0% affect-specific 
velocity) of actors expressing happiness, anger, sadness and a neutral affective state, 
                                                        
4
Please note that one adult was excluded from the sample reported in the current experiment 
because they were 18-years-old, but they were included in the adult sample in Chapter 2 as they 
were recruited through the same means as the other adults. Also note that 17 of the adult 
participants performed a different version of the experiment whereby they rated animations that 
had been matched for duration and not number of step cycles. No differences were found 
between participants who performed the two variations and the results reported in the current 
experiment were the same when excluding these participants.   
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and static control stimuli (see Section 2.2.2 for further details). Participants then 
performed the walking task and finally completed a state-mood questionnaire (described 
in Section 2.2.3.2). Adolescent participants were tested in a quiet room at their school 
during a lesson in the school day and the ‘walkway’ in the walking task was an isolated 
corridor in the school or playground.  
3.3. Results  
Greenhouse-Geisser corrections have been applied where necessary, and all multiple 
comparisons within and between groups are reported with Bonferroni corrected p 
values. 
3.3.1. Control measures  
3.3.1.1. Group differences in static control ratings 
Before testing the main hypotheses, group differences in response biases were assessed 
by analysing the static control scores when observing the static control stimuli. A 4x3 
Mixed ANOVA was conducted with age group (Early, Middle, Late Adolescence, and 
Adulthood) as a between-participant factor, and emotion (happy, angry, sad) as a 
within-participant factor. There was no main effect of age group (F(3, 177)=1.31, 
p=.273, ηp
2
=.022). As in the experiment reported in Chapter 2, there was a main effect 
of emotion (F(1.91, 337.46)=37.09, p<.001, ηp
2
=.173), and there was also an interaction 
between emotion and age group (F(5.72, 337.46)=2.73, p=.015, ηp
2
=.044).  
The same ‘happy bias’ was identified in the Middle (F(1.56, 45.29)=4.21, p<.030, 
ηp
2
=.127) and Late Adolescence (F(2,58)=13.83, p<.001, ηp
2
=.323) groups, as 
previously found for the Adulthood group (F(1.84, 156.54)=44.05, p<.001, ηp
2
=.341), 
although the simple effects were significant only in the Late Adolescence group. The 
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pattern in the data demonstrated that the static control images were rated as more happy 
than sad (Middle Adolescence: p=.084, 95% CI [.09, 1.53], d=42; Late Adolescence: 
p<.001, 95% CI [.81, 1.87], d=.95) or angry (Middle Adolescence: p=.125, 95% CI [.02, 
1.03], d=.39; Late Adolescence: p<.001, 95% CI [72, 1.80], d=.88) but with no 
differences between sad and angry ratings (Middle Adolescence: p=.726, 95% CI [.09, 
1.53], d=.22; Late Adolescence: p=1.0, 95% CI [-.76, .60], d=.04). This bias was not 
evident for the Early Adolescence group (F(1.62, 55.09)=1.76, p=.187, ηp
2
=.049), 
where participants rated equally across the three scales (Happy vs. Sad: p=1.0, 95% CI 
[-.18, .97], d=.23; Happy vs. Angry: p=.726, 95% CI [-.15, 1.02], d=.26; Sad vs. Angry:  
p=1.00, 95% CI [-.33, .42], d=.04). Overall these results suggest that the three older 
groups used the three emotional scales similarly, with a ‘happy bias’, but the Early 
Adolescence group tended to be less biased in their responses (see Table 3.2). To 
account for any variance in emotion perception scores between the groups that is 
attributable to differences in response bias the main emotion perception analyses were 
also conducted with the ‘happy bias’ scores (happy static ratings – mean[sad, angry 
static ratings]) added as a covariate. 
Table 3.2: Mean affective ratings for the four age groups for the static control task 
 Mean Sad  
Static Rating 
(SEM) 
 
Mean Happy 
Static Rating 
(SEM) 
Mean Angry 
Static Rating 
(SEM) 
Early Adolescence 
(N=35) 
 
4.57 (.16) 4.95 (.17) 4.52 (.19) 
Middle Adolescence 
(N=30) 
 
4.15 (.28) 4.96 (.22)* 4.44 (.16) 
Late Adolescence 
(N=30) 
 
3.83 (.23) 5.17 (.15)** 3.91 (.27) 
Adulthood  
(N=86) 
 
3.82 (.14) 5.29 (.12)** 4.20 (.15)* 
Note. **p<.001 (difference from sad and angry ratings), *p<.10 (difference from sad ratings) 
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3.3.1.2. Group differences in mood ratings 
Due to technical error, mood ratings were lost for one Late Adolescence participant and 
one Adulthood participant.  
A 3x4 Mixed ANOVA was conducted to test for group differences in mood ratings, 
with age group as a between-participant factor, and mood rating (sad, happy and angry) 
as a within-participant factor. There was a main effect of emotion (F(1.65, 
289.28)=292.27, p<.001, ηp
2
=.625), but importantly no main effect of age group (F(1, 
175)=712, p=.546, ηp
2
=.012) or interaction between age group and emotion (F(4.96, 
289.28)=1.35, p=.236, ηp
2
=.023). The main effect of emotion was driven by all 
participants rating themselves as happier (M=6.45, SEM=.15) relative to angry 
(M=1.24, SEM=.18, p<.001, 95% CI [4.77, 5.67], d=1.71) and sad (M=1.67, SEM=.18, 
p<.001, 95% CI  [4.26, 5.25], d=1.40), with no difference seen between sad and angry 
ratings (p=.060, 95% CI [-.79, -.14], d=-.21).  
Table 3.3: Mean mood ratings for the four age groups  
 Happy Mood 
Rating (SEM) 
Sad Mood 
Rating (SEM) 
Angry Mood 
Rating (SEM) 
 
Early Adolescence 
(N=35) 
 
7.11 (.25) 1.17 (.31) 1.24 (.41) 
Middle Adolescence 
(N=30) 
 
5.91 (.40) 1.74 (.43) .93 (.33) 
Late Adolescence 
(N=30) 
 
6.30 (.32) 1.86 (.44) 1.51 (.41) 
Adulthood  
(N=86) 
 
6.48 (.21) 1.90 (.24) 1.30 (.23) 
A ‘happy mood bias’ was calculated (happy mood rating – mean[sad and angry mood 
ratings]) and again, the emotion perception analyses were also conducted with this 
measure added as a covariate.  
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3.3.2. Walking kinematic analysis  
Kinematic data was lost due to technical error for one Late, four Middle, and eight Early 
Adolescence participants, which resulted in N=29 Late, N=26 Middle, and N=27 Early 
Adolescence participants data being including in the walking kinematic analysis.  
To test for linear effects of walking pace across the groups a One-Way ANOVA was 
conducted comparing mean walking velocity. This analysis identified a linear trend 
across age groups (F(1, 164)=36.40, p<.001, ηp
2
=.140). In line with the prediction, the 
direction of the linear trend was such that the groups walked more slowly as age 
increased, with the Early Adolescence group walking the fastest and the Adulthood 
group walking the slowest (see Figure 3.2A).  
3.3.3. Group differences in emotion perception for the velocity adapted animations   
The emotion perception data was pre-processed using the same method detailed in 
Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.2). To reiterate, high EIS scores indicate that participants judged 
the PLW as intensely expressing the modelled emotion while low (or negative) scores 
indicate that the PLW is judged as weakly expressing the modelled emotion or 
expressing a non-modelled emotion.  
Before examining the main hypothesis, it was necessary to confirm whether the 
adolescent groups used the variation of the kinematic information in the animations to 
the same extent as the adults. A 3x4x4 Mixed ANOVA was therefore performed, with 
emotion (happy, angry and sad) and velocity level (0%, 33%, 67% and 100%) as 
within-participant factors, and age group as a between-participant factor (Early, Middle, 
Late Adolescence, and Adulthood).  
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Similarly to the effect reported in Chapter 2, there was a linear trend across the four 
velocity levels (F(1,177)=548.38, p<.001, ηp
2
=.756), which importantly showed no 
linear interaction with age group (F(3,177)=1.00, p=.392, ηp
2
=.017). Again, as found in 
Chapter 2 there was a linear interaction between level and emotion (F(1,177)=12.73, 
p<.001, ηp
2
=.067), but notably no three way interaction between this effect and age 
group (F(3,177)=1.49, p=.219, ηp
2
=.025). These results demonstrate that all age groups 
used the kinematic cues in animations to identify the modelled emotion, such that the 
perceived intensity of the emotion reduced as the kinematic signal decreased. Again, the 
effect of kinematic cues was larger for affective states that are more robustly associated 
with specific kinematic signatures (sad and angry; Barliya et al., 2013). See Figure 3.1 
for a summary of the main effect of level across the four age groups.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3.1: Emotional intensity scores (EIS) across the four velocity levels for the 
four age groups. Shaded areas represent the SEM. 
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To control for the differences between the groups in ‘happy rating bias’ measured from 
the static control task, and ‘happy mood bias’, the same analysis was conducted with 
these measures as covariates. All effects remained the same. The linear trend across 
level remained significant (F(1,173)=136.761, p<.001, ηp
2
=.442), and the linear 
interaction with age group was non-significant (F(3,173)=1.04, p=.377, ηp
2
=.018). 
Therefore differences in scale use or mood could not account for the effects found.   
3.3.4. Emotion perception linear analysis (EIBS)   
Like in Chapter 2, composite EIBS were calculated for the 100% animations, which 
represented the linear relationship in intensity scores from the fastest (angry) to the 
slowest (sad) emotions (via happy). A high score denotes higher intensity ratings for the 
faster relative to the slower emotions and a low score represents higher intensity ratings 
for the slower emotions. 
Based on the results from Chapter 2 it was predicted that the 100% EIBS scores would 
follow an opposite linear trend across age groups to that found for walking velocity. 
Specifically, in line with the results from the kinematic analysis the fastest group (Early 
Adolescence) are predicted to have the lowest 100% EIBS and the scores will increase 
as the groups get older. To test this prediction a One-Way ANOVA was performed 
between age groups for 100% EIBS scores. Critically, there was a linear trend across 
age group that followed the predicted trajectory (F(1,177)=4.84, p=.029; see Figure 
3.2B). The identical linear effects were found when controlling for ‘happy mood bias’ 
and ‘happy response bias’ (r=-.095, N=179, p=.046, 95% CI [-.185, -.004]). This pattern 
of results shows that the fastest walking group (Early Adolescence) rated the slowest 
emotion (sadness) higher relative to the fastest emotion (anger) and this relationship 
decreased as the own walking speed within the groups decreased.  
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Figure 3.2: (A) Mean walking velocity demonstrating the linear effect across age groups 
(B) Mean 100% EIBS showing the opposite linear trend to walking velocity across 
groups. A low EIBS represents participants rating the slower emotions (sad) as more 
intense relative to the faster emotions (anger). Shaded areas represent SEM.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.5. Individual emotion ratings linear analysis (EIS)  
As in Chapter 2 the specific contribution of each emotion generating the linear effect 
across the 100% EIBS was examined in follow-up One-Way ANOVAs across age 
groups for each emotion.  
The 100% EIS analyses revealed no significant linear effect across the sad 
(F(1,177)=.365, p=1.00), happy (F(1,177)=4.46, p=.108), or angry (F(1,177)=2.67, 
p=.312) scores. Although most effects did not survive Bonferroni corrections the 
directions of the effects went in the predicted directions based on the speed of the 
groups. In other words, the sad ratings tended to decrease as the groups got older (i.e., 
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slower) whereas the happy and angry ratings increased (see Figure 3.3; please also note 
that the aim of the present study was to look at the relationship between the EIBS, i.e., 
the relative relationship between the participants different affective state ratings, and 
group differences in walking pace). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4. Discussion  
The present study asked whether group differences in walking kinematics between 
different stages of adolescence (Early, Middle, and Late Adolescence and Adulthood) 
were associated with differences in affect perception. As predicted, there was a linear 
effect of walking velocity across the age groups, such that as participants got older they 
walked more slowly. Adolescent participants were also able to use the kinematic 
information in others’ actions to make appropriate affective judgments, as evidenced by 
the analysis with the velocity-adapted animations. However, consistent with the main 
Figure 3.3: 100% EIS across the four age groups. A high EIS shows participants rated 
the modelled emotion as more intense than the unmodelled emotion (i) Sad (ii) Happy 
and (iii) Angry. Note for the faster emotions (angry and happy) the linear trends are 
positive, such that the faster groups have lower ratings relative to the slower groups, 
whereas the slow emotion (sad) trends in the opposite direction. E= Early Adolescence; 
M= Middle Adolescence; L=Late Adolescence; A=Adulthood. Shaded areas represent 
SEM  
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hypothesis, an opposite linear trend to that found for walking velocity was found across 
age groups for the composite affect perception measure. Specifically, the extent to 
which the participants rated the slowest animations (sad) as more intense relative to the 
fastest animations (angry) also changed across age groups, in the way that would be 
predicted based on their walking kinematics. Differences in response biases and state 
mood bias did not account for these differences in affect perception scores between the 
groups.  
The current findings suggest that although adolescents are able use the kinematic 
information within others’ actions to make affective judgments, they might misrepresent 
the intensity of their caregiver’s expressed internal states. Misattributions of others’ 
internal states due to differences in how one moves could therefore contribute to the 
increase in conflicts between caregivers and their adolescent children (Flannery et al., 
1993; Laursen et al., 1998). Emotional socialisation can also be influenced by how 
caregivers and adolescents recognise and respond to each other’s internal states 
(Halberstadt, 1986; Meyer, Raikes, Virmani, Waters, & Thompson, 2014; Sanders, 
Zeman, Poon, & Miller, 2015; Zeman, Cassano, & Adrian, 2013), and errors in 
identifying others’ internal states could disrupt normal socialisation as well as the 
relationships between caregivers and their adolescent children.  
Moreover, the current results could help to explain some behavioural preferences in 
adolescence. For instance, as children enter adolescence they show a large preference 
for spending their time interacting with their peers, rather than adults (Brown, 2013; 
Spear, 2000). This shift in preference may be partially related to a desire to spend more 
time with those who they understand better and who also understand them more. The 
positive feedback following these more successful interactions, which may partly stem 
from similarity in movements as well as possibly other social signals such as 
 76 
 
similarities in facial cues (Rhodes & Anastasi, 2012), may drive adolescents to spend 
increasingly more time with their peers.  
It is assumed, from the current data, that adults will also be more likely to attribute 
erroneous affective states to adolescent actions, as they would be kinematically different 
from adult expressions. For example, adolescents who are not expressing any strong 
emotion may be perceived as angry by an adult observer, and expressions of sadness 
will be more frequently missed. The same predictions could extend to other internal 
states that are expressed by specific kinematic signatures. The perception of others’ self-
confidence (Patel et al., 2012), competitiveness (Georgiou, et al., 2007) or 
trustworthiness (Krumhuber & Kappas, 2005) may also be incorrectly attributed 
between adults and adolescents who move differently. To fully explore the bi-
directionality of communication difficulties between adolescents and their caregivers, 
future work could look to replicate the current experiment but using adolescent actors, 
as well as actions expressing other internal states.  
When examining developmental effects it is often the case that individuals simply 
improve with age and there could be a range of factors that explain such improvements. 
However, this generalised improvement is unlikely to explain the current results. It is 
first important to note that the EIBSs are relative rating scores. Therefore a high or low 
score represents the participants’ tendency to rate higher on the slow or fast emotions, 
with higher values representing a greater disparity across the affective ratings. This 
measure does not represent accuracy or better performance per se. Furthermore, the 
adolescence groups do not show a comparable change across all three affective states. 
The differences in affective ratings were in line with perceptual differences due to 
walking pace (i.e., the adolescents tended to rate lower than the adults on the two faster 
emotions, but had comparable and often higher ratings on the sad animations). This 
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imbalanced performance, where the younger group performed ‘best’ on sadness, but 
‘worse’ on happiness and angry would not be consistent with a general developmental 
improvement effect, or any performance effect related to the valance of affective states 
(as the two ‘fast’ emotions were opposite valances).  
The current study examined developmental differences according to age.  However, 
there will likely be within age group differences with respect to stages of pubertal 
development. Puberty typically occurs between ~11-16 years old, but can be much 
earlier and later (Tanner et al., 1966). During this time there are large changes in the 
hormonal, physical and neurological processes, which might contribute to changes in 
movement kinematics, but importantly also socialisation processes such as learning to 
self-regulate affective states (Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006) and gaining greater 
perspective taking or mentalising skills (Dumontheil et al., 2010). Development of these 
more complex social-cognitive skills will improve judgments about others’ internal 
states, which could be related to refinement of kinematic models of internal states. 
Interestingly, some evidence suggests puberty onset can disrupt some social-cognitive 
functions (e.g., McGivern, Andersen, Byrd, Mutter, & Reilly, 2002) and pubertal 
development has dissociable effects of maturation of neuronal networks recruited 
during social tasks from those related to chronological age (Goddings, Burnett Heyes, 
Bird, Viner, & Blakemore, 2012). Therefore, further work may look to examine whether 
the relationship between typical movement kinematics and affect perception changes 
when assessing group differences based on pubertal development, particularly for more 
complex internal states expressed by others. 
In conclusion, these results suggest that adolescents are sensitive to the same cues as 
adults that signal others’ internal states from body movements. However, and most 
importantly for the present thesis, the linear difference in typical walking velocity 
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across the age groups is consistent with the observed linear changes in affect perception 
ratings, suggesting that use of own action models to interpret others in adolescents leads 
to different models relative to adults. These differences in perception could contribute 
towards breakdowns in social communication between these differently moving 
developmental groups.   
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Chapter 4: Adults with autism spectrum disorder show no deficits in 
visual time perception and enhanced visual-motor coordination 
 
This thesis tests whether we use models of our own actions to help us understand 
others’ internal states. In the case of those with autism it is predicted that the problems 
with social understanding and communication are partly due to different models of 
action and associated internal states relative to typical individuals, which are a result of 
differences in action production. Before examining this hypothesis it is essential to 
investigate whether the basic skills required for modelling others’ actions are impaired 
in those with autism. Specifically, to generate and use models of one’s own actions one 
must accurately represent temporal information. A general difficulty representing this 
type of information would mean that social functions relying on action models are 
impaired due to inherently deficient rather than different models. In the present Chapter, 
adult participants with autism and matched typically developed adults performed two 
visual time perception tasks with sub-second stimuli. The first was a purely perceptual 
task, whereas the second required integration of visual and motor time codes. The 
participants with autism performed similarly to typical controls for measures of time 
perception, and they outperformed their typical counterparts on measures of visual-
motor temporal integration. The basic time perception abilities required for 
understanding of others’ actions therefore appear to be intact in individuals with autism. 
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4.1. Introduction 
Precise representation of temporal information is important for a host of social cognitive 
skills. For example, to understand spoken words and sentences one must accurately 
represent the duration of specific elements of the speech sounds and the silent intervals 
between sounds (Bhatara, Babikian, Laugeson, Tachdjian, & Sininger, 2013; Grossberg 
& Myers, 2000; Repp, Liberman, Eccardt, & Pesetsky, 1978). Similarly, during non-
verbal communication, measuring the duration of an interactant’s movements enables us 
to make social judgments, such as the extent to which their smile is genuine 
(Krumhuber et al., 2007) or whether they are trying to be deceptive (Hamilton et al., 
2007). Monitoring the duration of joint actions, like eye contact, can also make 
interactions feel more successful (Binetti, Harrison, Coutrot, Johnston, & Mareschal, 
2016). Importantly for the hypothesis examined in the present thesis, the representation 
of time is also a prerequisite for making more complex assessments about the kinematic 
features of others’ actions (e.g., calculating velocity, acceleration and jerk, Dayan et al., 
2016), which can provide significant social signals (Krishnan-Barman, Forbes, & 
Hamilton, 2017). 
As outlined in Chapter 1, autism is characterised by difficulties with social 
understanding and communication. Given the importance of temporal information for a 
host of social-cognitive skills (Bartlett & Bartlett, 1959; Gergely & Watson, 1999; 
Falter & Noreika, 2011; Fawcett & Tuncgenc, 2017; Neri et al., 2006; Shepherd, 2010; 
von der Lühe et al., 2016; White & Schlosberg, 1952), many of the impairments 
exhibited by those with autism could in principle stem from problems representing this 
type of information (Falter & Noreika, 2011; Wimpory, Nicholas, & Nash, 2002). In 
relation to the current hypothesis, inaccuracies in representing the temporal information 
in others’ actions could generate erroneous estimates of kinematic signals, which could 
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result in unreliable kinematic models and thus incorrect attributions of others’ internal 
states. To give an example, when assessing whether someone is reaching towards an 
object in an aggressive or calm manner we must measure the speed of their movement. 
If our temporal estimate for duration of their movement was inaccurate we might make 
the wrong judgment about their internal state, or generally be unsure as to what state 
they are expressing (Di Cesare et al., 2017). This suggestion would be in line with 
consistent findings that individuals with autism make a greater number of inaccurate 
internal state judgments when observing dynamic social stimuli (Atkinson, 2009; 
Brewer et al., 2017; Castelli et al., 2002; Livingston & Happé, 2017; Nackaerts et al., 
2012). Errors in representing temporal information could also lead to miscalculations of 
the duration and kinematic parameters of one’s own movements, and may therefore lie 
at the heart of atypical action kinematics in autism (Anzulewicz et al., 2016; Cattaneo et 
al., 2007; Cook et al., 2013; Fabbri-Destro et al., 2009; Fitzpatrick et al., 2016; Forti et 
al., 2011). 
There have been a handful of studies that have tested time perception in individuals 
with autism and these have found mixed results. Some studies show that autistic 
children and adolescents indeed have reduced sensitivity to temporal information 
(Allman, DeLeon, & Wearden, 2011; Karaminis et al., 2016), and also perform in a 
pattern that is indicative of an immature or developmentally delayed timing mechanism 
(Allman et al., 2011; Brenner et al., 2015; Falter, Noreika, Wearden, & Bailey, 2012a; 
Karaminis et al., 2016). Some studies find mixed results across the durations tested, 
with those with autism performing worse on some test durations – either the longer 
durations in the test set (Allman et al., 2011; Karaminis et al., 2016; Martin, Poirier, & 
Bowler, 2010) or the longest and shortest durations (Maister & Plaisted-Grant, 2011; 
Szelag, Kowalska, Galkowski, & Pöppel, 2004). In contrast other studies find no 
differences between children and adolescents with autism and matched typical groups 
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(Gil, Chambres, Hyvert, Fanget, & Droit-Volet, 2012; Mostofsky, Goldberg, Landa, & 
Denckla, 2000; Wallace & Happé, 2008).  
Different neural mechanisms are recruited when encoding durations of different lengths 
(Grondin, 2010; Meck, 2005). For example perception of durations less than ~1 second 
is thought to rely heavily on automatic mechanisms centred in sensory and motor 
regions, such as the cerebellum (Ivry & Spencer, 2004; Schubotz, Friederici, & Yves 
von Cramon, 2000). In contrast, perception of longer durations is hypothesised to 
require greater cognitive representation, with an important role of sustained attention 
and working memory (Ivry & Schlerf, 2008; Mangels, Ivry, & Shimizu, 1998). 
Consequently, temporal representation of longer durations could be affected by 
atypicalities in a number of cognitive processes. Most previous studies examining 
temporal perception in autism have tested durations greater than 1 second. Thus, 
discrepancies across studies of temporal perception may be a result of differential 
executive requirements, and not necessarily an indication of a specific timing deficit. 
Representation of sub-second temporal information is arguably most essential for a 
number of social skills, such as accurately following and anticipating others’ 
movements (Rosenbaum, 1975; Viviani & Stucchi, 1992) and contingency learning 
(Bartlett & Bartlett, 1959; Gergely & Watson, 1999; White & Schlosberg, 1952). Most 
importantly for the present thesis, temporal encoding required for representing the 
kinematic information in others’ action likely relies upon processing sub-second 
temporal intervals. Only a handful of studies have examined perception of sub-second 
intervals in individuals with autism, with the majority using auditory stimuli and 
findings are inconclusive (Falter et al., 2012a; Gil et al., 2012; Gowen & Miall, 2005; 
Jones et al., 2009; Mostofsky, et al., 2000). There is evidence that different mechanisms 
operate for encoding temporal information in different sensory modalities (Grondin, 
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1993; Grondin, Meilleur-Wells, Ouellette, & Macar, 1998). For the current hypothesis 
concerning assessment of the kinematics of others’ actions it is most important to test 
whether perception of temporal information that is presented visually is atypical in 
individuals with autism, and therefore the present study assessed perception of visually 
presented sub-second intervals.   
Additionally, to generate and utilise action models one must be able to precisely map 
visual temporal codes onto motor codes. For example, if we cannot map the temporal 
information between motor and visual systems then the action models we generate of 
our own internal states will be grounded on unreliable kinematic information. Thus, 
even if we are able to perceive accurately the temporal information when observing 
others’ actions we might make inconsistent attributions about others’ internal states due 
to deficient visuo-motor mapping. Therefore, it is also imperative to examine the ability 
to coordinate and synchronise visual and motor temporal information. Temporal 
auditory-motor coordination has been previously measured by Gowen and Miall (2005). 
In this study adults with and without autism were asked to tap their finger in time with 
tones. The participants with autism produced actions with a greater absolute error with 
respect to the timing of the tones (interval 400- 800 ms apart). These findings would be 
in line with a prediction that individuals with autism have difficulty mapping sensory 
and motor temporal information. However, as outlined above, there is evidence that 
visual and auditory temporal processing may be different (Grondin, 1993; Grondin, et 
al., 1998). Therefore it is important to measure whether the same deficits are found in 
visual-motor temporal perception.   
The aim of the current study was to determine whether adults with autism have deficits 
in perceiving durations of visually presented sub-second intervals, as well as deficits 
producing accurately timed motor responses to such stimuli. The design was based upon 
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the Gowen and Miall (2005) study, but presented visual rather than auditory events for 
coordination, and an additional task with no coordination requirements but where 
participants must simply judge the intervals between the events.  
4.2. Methods 
4.2.1. Participants 
Twenty-five typical adults and 26 adults with autism were recruited from the local 
research volunteer database. An opportunity sample was used – all those registered on 
the database were contacted and all who volunteered were tested. The Birkbeck ethics 
committee approved the study, and all participants gave informed consent.  
Two participants with autism were excluded because they gave insufficient responses 
on the visual-motor task (> 20% missed trials). Four participants with autism and one 
typical participant were excluded because their responses on the visual-motor task were 
three standard deviations above the group mean. Excluded participants were removed 
from all analyses, but it should be noted that the results for the perception task were 
identical regardless of whether these participants were included or not. These exclusions 
resulted in a final sample of 24 typical participants and 20 participants with autism.  
An independent clinician diagnosed participants in the autism group according to DSM-
IV criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 1994), and the Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule -2 (ADOS-2, Lord et al., 2012) was administered to confirm 
participants’ current level of social functioning. Two participants’ total ADOS score 
was below the required cut off (score < 7) for classification of an autism spectrum 
disorder. These participants were indistinguishable from the other participants on all 
measures therefore data from all participants in the autism group is reported, however, 
the same pattern of results was found when excluding those who did not reach the total 
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score criterion
5
. 
The two groups were matched on Full-Scale IQ (FSIQ), as measured by the Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI, Wechsler, 1999; t(42)=.948, p=.331, d=.30), 
age (autism 18-69 years, typical 19-50 years, t(42)=.417, p=.679, d=.13) and gender 
(Fisher’s Exact Test, p=.316), but, as expected, there was a significant difference 
between the groups in Autism Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, 
Martin, & Clubley, 2001) scores (t(42)=6.68, p<.001, d=2.02; see Table 4.1).  
Table 4.1: Demographic information for the autism and typical group  
**p<.001 
 
4.2.2. Procedure 
The experiment consisted of two temporal tasks – one visual perception and one visual-
motor coordination task – the order of which was counterbalanced across participants. 
The stimulus for both tasks was a white dot presented (for 100 ms) in the centre of a 
black screen (13 inches), 3° diameter visual angle when viewed at the typical distance 
of 40 cm. On each trial the dot stimulus was shown four times with a fixed inter-
stimulus interval (300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 800, or 900 ms). Each test duration was 
                                                        
5
Note this protocol was used for all experiments in this thesis that included participants with 
autism, see participant sections Chapters 5 and 6.  
 FSIQ 
Mean 
(SEM) 
Age  
Mean 
(SEM) 
Gender 
(N=male) 
AQ 
Mean 
(SEM) 
ADOS 
Mean 
(SEM) 
 
Autism 
Group 
(n=20)  
 
114.05 
(3.05) 
 
35.15 
(3.16) 
 
17 
 
35.05 
(2.00)** 
 
9.45 
(.77) 
 
Typical 
Group 
(n=24) 
 
 
110.04  
(2.71) 
 
33.67  
(1.91) 
 
23 
 
18.67  
(1.54) 
 
- 
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presented in a random order six times in each task, resulting in a total of 42 trials per 
task. 
Verbal instructions for both tasks were provided before the testing session began. Once 
the experiment began, the participant was made aware of the task they would be 
completing first via computerised instructions. As part of the onscreen instructions, 
examples of the shortest (300 ms) and longest (900 ms) durations were presented, and 
the participants completed two practice trials – one at the slowest and one at the fastest 
speed. No performance feedback was given during the practice trials, or the actual 
experiment.  
4.2.2.1. Perception task 
Participants were instructed that on each trial four white dots would flash on the screen, 
each separated by a constant interval that was either long or short. Following 
observation of the four dots, participants were asked to make a judgment about the 
speed at which the dots were presented. Responses were made by pressing a key on a 
scale that ranged from 1 (slow) to 7 (fast) and there was no time limit for responses. 
After the participant had made their response a fixation cross appeared in the centre of 
the screen for 500 ms to indicate the start of the next trial.  
For each trial the participants’ deviation from the correct interval duration was 
calculated by subtracting their response from the correct response (i.e., for a 900 ms 
trial the correct response would be 1, therefore a response of 2 would result in a 
deviation of 1).  
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Absolute mean errors were calculated by averaging across these values for each of the 
seven test durations
6
.  
4.2.2.2. Visual-motor task  
Like in the perception task, participants were instructed that on each trial four white 
dots would flash on the screen, separated by a constant duration. Participants were 
instructed to assess the duration between the first and second events, and to tap the 
spacebar in time with the third and fourth. After the fourth dot, a fixation cross appeared 
for 500 ms to signal the start of the next trial. If the participant failed to respond on one 
or both of the required responses within a trial, the trial was omitted from analysis (total 
omitted trials did not differ between groups t(42)=.873, p=.387, 95% CI [-1.269, .502], 
d=.29 autism: M=.45/42 trials, SEM=.20, typical: M=.83/42 trials, SEM=.36).   
Visual-motor coordination deviation was defined as the absolute deviation between the 
time of the first and second response and the onset of the third and fourth dot stimuli, 
respectively. The deviations were averaged to generate an overall mean deviation score 
(please note no significant main effect or interaction was found when the two responses 
were entered separately in the analysis). 
For all measures on both tasks scores closer to zero indicated more accurate 
performance. 
4.3. Results 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were applied where necessary, and all multiple 
                                                        
6
Note that the shortest (300 ms) and longest (900 ms) test durations could only have errors in 
one direction as they were at the end of the scale, and deviations could have greater range as the 
duration became closest to the central value. However, analyses excluding the more extreme 
responses and equalising the range of possible deviations yielded results in line with those 
reported, therefore the skewed scale measure was not thought to contribute to the effects found.  
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comparisons are reported with Bonferroni Corrections. 
4.3.1. Perception task 
To test for group differences in visual time perception a 2x7 Mixed ANOVA was 
performed with test duration (300-900 ms) as a within-participant factor and group 
(autism or typical) as a between-participant factor. Crucially, there was no main effect 
of group (F(1,42)=.002, p=.964, ηp
2
<.001), or interaction between duration and group 
(F(6, 252)=1.613, p=.144, ηp
2
=.037). There was, however, a main effect of duration 
(F(6,252)=6.36, p<.001, ηp
2
=.136). From visual inspection of the pattern of results in 
Figure 4.1A, the main effect of duration appears to be driven by participants making 
most errors when judging the longest durations relative to the shortest. Consistent with 
this observation there was a linear trend across duration (F(1,42)=19.90, p<.001, 
ηp
2
=.332). These results suggest that both groups have similar perceptual sensitivity to 
differences in visually presented sub-second intervals.   
4.3.2. Visual-motor task 
To examine group differences in visual-motor coordination a 2x7 Mixed ANOVA was 
performed on the visual-motor deviation scores, with test duration (300-900 ms) as a 
within-participant factor, and group (autism or typical) as a between-participant factor. 
There was a main effect of group (F(1,42)=7.35, p=.010, ηp
2
=.149), which was driven 
by the autism group producing responses that were more accurate (M=82.93 ms, 
SEM=7.37) compared to the typical group (M=110.01 ms, SEM=6.73). There was no 
main effect of test duration (F(4.56,191.65)=1.20, p=.310, ηp
2
=.028), but there was a 
trend towards an interaction between group and duration (F(4.56,191.65)=2.31, p=.052, 
ηp
2
=.052). This trend appears to reflect the fact that participants with autism 
outperformed the typical group to the greatest extent on the longest duration (see Figure 
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4.1B).  
 
 
 
4.4. Discussion  
The current experiment measured the performance of participants with and without 
autism on two visual temporal tasks. No differences in performance were found 
between the groups on the perception task, where participants were required to judge 
the speed of visually presented intervals. In the visual-motor temporal perception task, 
where participants had to tap in time with a visually presented stimulus, the autistic 
participants were more accurate than the typical group, particularly for the longest test 
duration. The data from the current study therefore suggests that those with autism are 
unimpaired in their visual perception of sub-second intervals, and exhibit enhanced 
abilities in performing a motor response in time with these temporal signals. Therefore, 
difficulties observed in social cognitive tasks that may require precise temporal 
Figure 4.1: (A) Mean Perception Deviation scores calculated as the absolute mean error 
for each test duration in the perception rating task. (B) Mean Visual-Motor Deviation 
scores calculated as the absolute mean deviation error of both motor responses from the 
visual stimulus in the visual-motor task. On both scales scores closer to zero are more 
accurate. Shaded areas represent the SEM.  
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representations, such as perceiving the subtle kinematic cues within others’ actions or 
accurately mapping visual and motor temporal codes to generate models of action, are 
unlikely to be a function of deficient time perception, as some have previously theorised 
(Falter & Noreika, 2011; Wimpory, et al., 2002).  
The finding of enhanced visual-motor coordination performance in the autism group 
may be speculatively due to a detail focused cognitive style (Happé & Frith, 2006; see 
also Lawson, Rees, & Friston, 2014; Pellicano & Burr, 2012). This style of processing 
has previously been emphasised in spatial encoding (Happé & Frith, 2006; Van der 
Hallen et al., 2015) but could possibly also apply to processing of visual detail over 
time (Dakin & Frith, 2005; Falter, Elliott, & Bailey, 2012b). More accurate detection of 
the onset and offset of the visual targets could result in more precise temporal resolution 
(Ivry & Schlerf, 2008) and thus improved visual-motor coordination. One study 
supports this hypothesis, by showing that visual simultaneity thresholds – measured by 
asking participants to judge the synchronicity of two grey bars  – are significantly lower 
in those with autism, such that autistic participants have a lower tolerance for 
asynchrony in simultaneity judgments (Falter et al., 2012b).  
The group performance may have differed between the perception and visual-motor task 
due to differences in the sensitivity of the measures. Specifically, the inter-stimulus 
interval increased by 100 ms across each of the seven test durations, however this 
manipulation resulted in global difference of 300 ms for each test duration (e.g., the 400 
ms test trial lasted 1600 ms, whereas the 500 ms test trial lasted 1900 ms). The coarser 
difference in the length of each trial may have made the perception task easier and 
hence the groups performed more equally. Additionally, ratings only differed on a 1-7 
scale in the perception task whereas the dependent variable could vary more in the 
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visuo-motor task. Therefore, speculatively the visual-motor measure might be a more 
reliable estimate of the two groups’ temporal resolution. 
In conclusion, adults with autism were found to have no deficit in representing sub-
second temporal information, relative to a group of matched typical adults in a temporal 
perception task. Performance was superior in the autism group in a visual-motor 
temporal task, which is speculated to relate to a detail focussed processing style. The 
current results rule out the possibility that those with autism have difficulty representing 
sub-second temporal information, and hence the possibility that problems making social 
judgments from observing others’ actions stems from an inability to generate temporal 
models of action. In the next chapter I will therefore investigate the main hypothesis 
more explicitly, by asking whether the two groups differ in terms of their sensitivity to 
autistic and typical kinematics. 
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Chapter 5: Adults with autism are sensitive to the kinematic 
information that defines typical and autistic motion profiles 
 
Chapter 4 suggested that it is unlikely that a visual timing deficit contributes to atypical 
action perception in autism. It is therefore possible that different models of action 
contribute to social and communicative difficulties in autism. Under the ‘sensitivity’ 
version of this hypothesis (see Chapter 1 Section 1.4.1), individuals with autism may 
exhibit enhanced perceptual sensitivity for autistic relative to typical action kinematics. 
Additionally, typical individuals may exhibit poor sensitivity for autistic relative to 
typical actions. To test this hypothesis in the current study, adults with autism and 
matched typical adults were presented with two animations of a moving hand and asked 
to identify which was the ‘less natural’. One animation always moved with parameters 
that reflected typical or autistic kinematics, and the other was a linear combination of 
the same profile combined with constant velocity. The participants’ sensitivity to 
perturbations of both natural movement profiles (typical and autistic models) was 
measured through a staircase procedure. There was an interaction between observer 
group and modelled profile, but it was driven by the typical participants demonstrating 
greater sensitivity to the autistic relative to typical movements and equally good 
sensitivity to both profiles in the autism group. These findings therefore provide no 
support for the sensitivity hypothesis. 
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5.1. Introduction 
The main hypothesis tested in this thesis posits that extensive experience producing 
actions generates mental representations tuned to one’s own action kinematics, which 
are used to aid perception and understanding of others’ actions. As outlined in Chapter 
1, one possible mechanism by which action models are tuned is through a process akin 
to ‘perceptual narrowing’ (Scott et al., 2007). Under this version of the hypothesis the 
concentrated experience with one’s own action kinematics generates models that are 
highly sensitive to similar kinematic features, but poor sensitivity to kinematic 
information that is different, or infrequently experienced. In the case of individuals with 
autism – who have consistently been found to produce movements with atypical 
kinematics (Cook, 2016; Fournier et al., 2010; Gowen & Hamilton, 2013) compared to 
typical individuals – this sensitivity account would predict that perception of typical 
movement kinematics should be impaired, yet perception of atypical autistic kinematics 
should be enhanced. Importantly, the converse prediction can be made of typical 
individuals, where their perceptual sensitivity to typical kinematics should be enhanced 
relative to that of autistic movements.  
Findings of insensitivity to kinematic information from others’ actions in those with 
autism could contribute towards social understanding and communicative deficits in this 
population. For instance, if individuals with autism fail to perceive information within 
typical others’ actions they will not be able to learn from and about others’ movements 
in the same way as typically developing individuals (Klin et al., 2003). In the same vein, 
insensitivity in typical individuals to autistic individuals’ actions could also contribute 
towards diagnostic deficits within autism by influencing communication efficacy for 
individuals with autism. More precisely, if typical individuals are unable to perceive the 
information in autistic actions accurately they may make more errors in their 
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attributions of internal states and miscommunicate with autistic individuals. 
Inappropriate and /or inconsistent responses of typical individuals to autistic individuals 
may also obstruct how those with autism learn about typical social exchanges (Gergely 
& Watson, 1999) which could hinder their social development.   
The previous literature examining action perception in those with autism finds 
conflicting results (see Chapter 1 and Kaiser & Pelphrey, 2012 for review). There are 
numerous potential methodological reasons for the discrepancies in these findings, 
which make it difficult to draw firm conclusions about biological motion perception 
abilities in individuals with autism. For example, most previous studies have used 
stimuli where it is difficult to tease apart perceptual abilities that might be related to 
kinematic encoding of biological movements and those related to computing the 
structural form or posture of the body from the perceptual. 
However, as outlined in Chapter 1, one study has tested exclusively perceptual 
sensitivity to kinematic information in typical biological movements. Cook et al. (2009) 
asked participants with and without autism to identify which of two vertical sinusoidal 
hand movements was less natural. One movement was programmed to move following 
the minimum jerk profile (thought to characterise biological movement; Todorov, & 
Jordan, 1998, see Figure 5.1), while the other moved with a linear combination of this 
profile and constant velocity (CV or unnatural movement). In line with the sensitivity 
hypothesis the typical participants showed enhanced sensitivity to this profile compared 
to the participants with autism. Furthermore, in a follow-up study, Cook et al. (2013) 
found a positive relationship in an autism group between a bias to label natural motion 
as unnatural and the extent to which their own movements were kinematically atypical 
(high acceleration and jerk). In other words, the autistic participants who moved most 
atypically perceived the objectively ‘natural’ movement to be more unnatural.  
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However, to date no studies have fully tested the bi-directionality of the current 
hypothesis. Specifically, no studies have used ‘autistic’ models to test perception in 
either typical or autistic observers. The current study therefore modified the paradigm 
employed in Cook et al. (2009) by displaying both typical and autistic motion profiles. 
Additionally, the profiles for the current study were generated using the average profiles 
of the real hand movements of typical and autistic participants collected by Cook et al. 
(2013). Thus, as well as testing the bi-directionality of the hypothesis, the stimuli 
presented motion that was in fact natural. The previous study addressing kinematic 
perception in autism used stimuli generated from the mathematical formula representing 
minimum jerk (Todorov, & Jordan, 1998). The mathematically generated stimuli differ 
from natural profiles of real movements in that they have less kinematic noise (see 
Figure 5.1). In principle autistic participants may simply be less willing to label this 
computationally-derived profile as natural – especially if their sub-second temporal 
perception is enhanced (Chapter 4) – and therefore previous findings may not be driven 
by lower sensitivity to typical human motion in autism but the fact that the profile used 
was not in fact natural.   
The sensitivity hypothesis would predict that participants with autism would show 
enhanced performance on the autistic profile, compared to the typical profile, as this 
movement trajectory would be better matched to their own atypical representation of 
natural movement. This account would also predict that the typical participants would 
show enhanced performance on the typical profile relative to the autistic movements. In 
contrast, if one’s own action does not influence action models through perceptual 
narrowing, no such differences would be found.  
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5.2. Methods 
5.2.1. Participants 
Thirty-one typical adults and 25 adults with autism were recruited from the local 
research volunteer database. Seven participants from the typical group and three 
participants from the autism group were excluded because their data for one (autism 
N=2, typical N=2) or more (autism N=1, typical N=5) of the four test staircases did not 
reach criteria to produce robust perceptual threshold estimations (see section 5.2.4). 
These exclusions resulted in a final sample of 24 (23 males) typical and 22 (18 males) 
Figure 5.1: Example kinematic trajectories for one direction of movement used by Cook 
et al. (2009) (A) and the current experiment (B = autism profile, C = typical profile). The 
first column denotes the velocity (pixels/frame) within each reference profile, the middle 
column acceleration (pixels/frame
2
), and the last column jerk (pixels/frame
3
). Note the 
typical and autistic profiles, generated from real actors, follow a profile that generally 
complies with the minimum jerk profile (increase and decrease in velocity) but the signal 
is more noisy i.e., less superficially smooth.    
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participants with autism. An independent clinician diagnosed participants in the autism 
group, and the ADOS-2 (Lord et al., 2012) was additionally administered to confirm 
participants’ current level of functioning. Three participants did not meet all ADOS-2 
criteria for classification of an autism spectrum disorder. In line with the other autism 
chapters, data from all autistic participants are reported, but the same pattern of results 
was found regardless of their inclusion. The participants were matched on FSIQ, as 
measured by the WASI (Wechsler, 1999; t(44)=1.34, p=.186, d=.40), age 
(t(32.86)=1.63, p=.121, d=.48), and gender (Fisher’s Exact Test, p=.178), but, as 
expected, there was a significant difference between the groups in AQ (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2001) scores (t(44)=6.79, p<.001, d=2.00; see Table 5.1).  
Table 5.1: Demographic information for the autism and typical groups 
**p<.001 
 
5.2.2. Stimulus generation  
The stimuli for the experiment were created using Matlab® Cogent. An image of a hand 
was manipulated to move across the horizontal plane of a computer screen with varying 
movement kinematics. The movement trajectories for the stimuli were generated using 
data collected in a previous study where participants either with or without autism 
performed a sinusoidal horizontal hand movement (Cook et al., 2013). For each profile 
 FSIQ 
mean 
(SEM) 
Age  
mean 
(SEM) 
Gender 
(N=male) 
AQ 
mean 
(SEM) 
ADOS 
mean 
(SEM) 
 
Autism 
Group  
(n =22)  
 
 
111.18 
(3.27) 
 
36.77 
(3.02) 
 
18 
 
32.77 
(1.91)** 
 
9.86 
(.782) 
Typical  
Group  
(n =24) 
 
105.46  
(2.77) 
31.21  
(1.68) 
23 17.58  
(1.41) 
- 
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(autism or typical), the mean x and y displacements of the actor groups’ hand 
movements were used as the x and y co-ordinates at which to present the image of the 
hand on the computer screen. This process therefore generated two distinct animated 
profiles that represented the mean of the two previous autistic and typical actor groups’ 
natural kinematic trajectories. These animations were the ‘reference’ (100% natural) 
stimuli. Each animation lasted approximately 2 seconds.  
The ‘target’ stimuli presented a linear combination of reference stimuli and a CV 
(unnatural) profile. The velocity morphs were calculated using the formula:  
Velocity Morph = p1(Natural Movement) + p2(Unnatural Movement) 
where the p1 weight determines the proportion of ‘natural’ movement in the trajectory, 
and the p2 weight determines the proportion of the ‘unnatural’ movement profile. The 
initial target stimulus at the beginning of each block contained a weighing of 1 
unnatural motion, and 0 natural (typical or autism) such that it was highly 
distinguishable from the reference stimulus. The weighting of the subsequent target 
stimulus on each trial was calculated according to the participant’s performance on the 
preceding trial (see section 5.2.4).   
5.2.3. Procedure  
The experiment was run via Matlab® on a 24 inch screen computer. The experiment 
consisted of a forced choice paradigm, where on each trial the participant was presented 
with a target and a reference animation, which were presented in a random order and 
separated by a black blank screen for 1500 ms. Following the two animations, 
participants were asked to choose which of the two hand movements was ‘less natural’ 
(see Figure 5.1A for schematic diagram of an example trial). Responses were made by 
pressing a key to indicate the first or second animation; and there was no time limit for 
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the participant’s response.  
Before the experiment, the experimenter read instructions to the participant, where 
natural movement was defined as how a person would typically move when moving 
their arm, without expressing any emotion; and unnatural movement was defined as odd 
or mechanical movement. To familiarise participants with the procedure and the stimuli 
they completed two practice mini-blocks of five trials for each condition, which were 
randomised across participants. No feedback was given. Next, the participants began the 
testing session, which consisted of six blocks for each condition. Each block contained 
17 trials (total of 204 trials), and lasted approximately two minutes. The conditions of 
the blocks were interleaved and randomised in pairs, such that participants never 
completed more than two blocks of the same condition in a row. The duration of the 
whole experiment was approximately 30 minutes.  
5.2.4. Sensitivity threshold calculation  
To measure each participant’s sensitivity to the two types of ‘natural’ movement their 
psychophysical threshold was calculated using a two-interval forced-choice adaptive 
staircase procedure. The ratio between natural and unnatural motion within the target 
stimulus decreased linearly throughout the staircasing procedure (see morphing formula 
above, and Figure 5.1B), according to the participant’s performance. The weighting of 
the target stimulus was determined on a trial-by-trial basis, using a ‘three-down, one up’ 
adaptive technique. In this procedure three correct responses resulted in a step down the 
staircase (decrease in threshold, the unnatural weighting decreased and the natural 
weighting increased, thus the target and reference became more physically similar). One 
incorrect response resulted in a step up the staircase (increase in threshold, the unnatural 
weighting increased and the natural weighting decreased, thus target and reference 
became more perceptually distinct). This method aims to identify the 79.4% correct 
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point on a psychometric function. In a two-choice method, the probability of moving 
down or up the staircase must be equal. Therefore, if the probability of moving up the 
staircase is p, then the probability of moving down must be equal p*p*p, or .5, and 
hence the target probability of getting a correct response 
3√.5 =.794 (Kingdom & Prins, 
2010).  
Initially, the weighting changes for either three successive correct, or one incorrect 
response was 20% (hereafter a ‘jump’). Given that the proportion of ‘unnatural’ 
movement could never exceed 100%, incorrect responses at this level resulted in the 
subsequent trial continuing to display the target with full CV. Note that the lowest level 
of CV movement was capped at 16% (again, if participants reached this threshold, and 
continued to get the responses correct then the target would continue to be shown at 
16% unnatural motion). After four turning-points on the staircase, these weighting 
‘jumps’ were reduced to smaller ‘steps’ (step size = 2.5%) to allow for a finer 
estimation of the participants threshold. A lower psychophysical threshold therefore 
represents greater sensitivity to the specific movement cues that define natural motion.  
Each staircase consisted of three experimental blocks (51 trials) for each condition and a 
psychophysical threshold estimate was calculated for each. The threshold was 
calculated as the mean proportion of unnatural movement present across all step 
turning-points. The estimates from the two staircases for each condition (autistic or 
typical models) were then averaged to obtain one estimate per condition. When staircase 
number (first or second) was included in the analysis as an additional within-participant 
factor the pattern of results was the same, and there was no main effect of staircase 
number, or interactions with any of the other variables. Participants who failed to 
transition from ‘jumps’ to ‘steps’ (i.e., had fewer than 4 turning-points) on any staircase 
were excluded as it was not possible to generate a robust threshold for their data 
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(Kingdom & Prins, 2010; see Participants section 5.2.1). 
 
Figure 5.2: (A) Schematic diagram of an experimental trial. Within each trial 
participants were presented with two animations of a hand moving across the screen 
and were asked to judge which was less natural. Blocks were randomised in pairs, 
such that participants never completed more than two blocks of the same condition in 
a row. (B) Examples of the velocity profiles for the first half the sinusoidal motion 
(e.g., from left to right on the computer screen), both profiles show a general bell 
shaped curve (blue lines represent the typical velocity profile, red lines represent the 
autistic velocity profile), with the reference stimuli in the first panels on the left of the 
figure, initial targets in the last panels on the right, and examples of some of the 
possible linear combinations shown in the middle panels.   
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5.3. Results 
A 2x2 Mixed ANOVA was performed on the sensitivity threshold data, with group 
(autism or typical observer) as a between-participant factor, and model (autistic or 
typical movement trajectory) as a within-participant factor. There was no main effect of 
group (F(1,44)=0.81, p=.778, ηp
2
=.002) or of model (F(1,44)=1.33, p=.255, ηp
2
=.029). 
As predicted under the sensitivity hypothesis, there was an interaction between model 
and group (F(1,44)=4.08, p=.049, ηp
2
=.085). However, unexpectedly the simple effects 
revealed that this interaction was driven by the typical group showing greater sensitivity 
to the autistic than typical model (autistic model: M=.68, SEM=.06, typical model: 
M=.75, SEM=.05, p=.027, 95% CI [.008, .126], d=.42) and the autism group showing 
equivalent, and relatively good, performance with both profiles (autistic model: M=.70, 
SEM=.06, typical model: M=.68, SEM=.05), p=.551, 95% CI [-.027, .065], d=.11, see 
Figure 5.3). 
Figure 5.3: Perceptual sensitivity thresholds (79.4% accuracy) for the autism and 
typical observers for the autistic and typical movement conditions. Lower thresholds 
indicate that participants have greater sensitivity to perturbations in the natural 
kinematics. Error bars represent the SEM. *p<.05 
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5.4. Discussion   
Perceptual sensitivity to biological motion, where the motion stimuli were generated 
from motion profiles obtained from autistic and typical actors (Cook et al., 2013), was 
measured in a group of matched typical and autistic adults. The sensitivity version of 
the own action hypothesis proposes that the intensity of experience with one’s own 
action kinematics generates models that are highly sensitive to similar kinematic 
features, but with poor sensitivity to kinematic information that is different, or 
infrequently experienced. Therefore, under this theory it was hypothesised that 
participants would show greatest perceptual sensitivity to their own group’s natural 
movement exemplars. However, the results did not support this hypothesis; the typical 
group showed greater sensitivity to the autistic, relative to the typical profile, yet the 
autism group showed similarly strong performance for both profile types.  
Given that the present findings did not provide support for the sensitivity hypothesis, 
one possibility is that both groups have frequent experience of both movement profiles. 
Notably, the kinematic qualities of our movements can vary dramatically depending on 
our internal states. Thus, although individuals with autism might generally move faster, 
and with greater acceleration and jerk, they may frequently also produce movements 
that follow a more typical kinematic profile in some circumstances (e.g., when under-
confident; Patel et al., 2012). Likewise, a typical individual may also occasionally 
produce movement kinematics that comply with an autistic profile (e.g., when in a state 
of greater social uncertainty typical individuals produce jerkier movements; Quesque et 
al., 2013). Therefore general differences in how typical and autistic individuals move 
may correspond to different internal state-kinematic models but due to the variability in 
action experiences across a range of settings perceptual sensitivity to kinematic features 
that fall within both exemplar profiles might be equal.  
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Nevertheless, it must also be considered that the typical group were superior when 
observing the autistic profile. Of relevance here is that the autistic motion was in fact 
more physically distinct from the unnatural (CV) profile (see Figure 5.2B), and 
therefore perhaps it is easier to distinguish from the unnatural profile compared to the 
typical profile. Interestingly, the autism group did not show the same enhancement (in 
fact their performance was comparable to the typical performance with the autistic 
profile such that they generally showed good performance on the task, regardless of 
profile).  
One potential explanation could be the lesser influence of context on perceptual 
judgments in the autism group, which has been theorised to explain differences in 
perceptual processing styles in autism (Lawson et al., 2014; Pellicano & Burr, 2012). 
The participants with autism may have made their judgments on a trial-by-trial basis, 
always identifying the action out of the two comparison stimuli that they saw to have 
the greater kinematic variants (i.e., greater changes in velocity and acceleration) as more 
natural (Bowler & Thommen, 2000; Tremoulet & Feldman, 2000). However, the typical 
participants might have been considering the range of other profiles they had been 
shown throughout the experiment and making comparisons against these, such that the 
less kinematically distinct typical profile became harder to detect. Therefore in the 
context of the current experiment the autistic profile, with greater kinematic variants, 
was labelled as more natural than the typical profile by the typical participants.  
It should also be noted that the results of the present experiment may require a 
reinterpretation of the findings of Cook et al. (2009), where the autistic participants 
performed more poorly than the typical group on a similar motion perception task. A 
crucial difference between the current study and Cook et al. (2009) are the stimuli. 
Cook et al. (2009) used computer-generated movements that followed the mathematical 
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formula for human movements, while the current study used kinematic trajectories of 
real movements. The computer-generated movements, which follow a perfectly smooth 
trajectory, may have been devoid of vital kinematic ‘noise’ that provides a better cue for 
naturalness. Consequently, the computer-generated stimuli may in fact be too artificially 
smooth (see Figure 5.1), which might have had greatest impact on the autistic group 
who may be more sensitive to sub-second kinematic information (Chapter 4).  
In conclusion, the current study found no evidence for impaired perceptual sensitivity to 
natural typical movements in adults with autism, or improved sensitivity to typical 
relative to autistic movements in matched typical adults. Previous findings suggestive of 
such differences in sensitivity may therefore be generated by use of stimuli that were 
computationally derived rather than natural. The current results suggest that any 
differences in internal state understanding and communication in autism generated 
through different action models are therefore more likely to result from differences in 
models concerning the relationships between actions and their associated mental states – 
differences in ‘criterion setting’ not ‘sensitivity’.   
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Chapter 6: Interaction takes two: typical individuals show 
mindblindness towards those with autism  
The experiments in Chapters 4 and 5 found evidence that the basic perceptual skills 
required for interpreting the actions of others – visual temporal perception and 
perceptual sensitivity to kinematic information – in adults with autism are intact. The 
atypicalities in internal state inference and communication may therefore result from 
bilateral difficulties between those with autism and typical others in interpreting the 
internal states of others from their kinematics (cf. Chapters 2 and 3). Specifically, some 
of the social impairments exhibited by individuals with autism may, at least in part, be a 
product of a failure to infer internal states from the movements of those who move 
differently, and therefore autistic individuals may infer incorrectly the internal states of 
typical others. Similarly, communicative difficulties may emerge from typical 
individuals misreading internal states from autistic movements. To test this hypothesis, 
in the current experiment, individuals with autism and matched typical adults manually 
directed two triangles to generate animations depicting mental state interactions. 
Replicating previous findings, kinematic analysis of the generated animations 
demonstrated that the participants with autism moved atypically, specifically with 
increased jerk, compared to the typical participants. In confirmation of the primary 
hypothesis, typical individuals were better able to identify the mental state portrayed in 
the animations produced by typical, relative to autistic individuals. The participants with 
autism did not show this ‘same group’ advantage, demonstrating comparable 
performance for the two sets of animations. These results suggest that differences in the 
kinematic qualities of the movements constrain typical individual’s ability to understand 
internal states of those with autism, which may contribute to communication difficulties 
between autistic and typical individuals. 
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6.1. Introduction  
As discussed in Chapter 1, there is vast evidence that our interactions with the world 
enable us to develop models that facilitate our interpretation of others’ behaviour. For 
example, greater experience of executing a particular action leads to more accurate 
judgments about the underlying intentions of other individuals performing that action 
(Abernethy et al., 2008; Aglioti et al., 2008; Sebanz & Shiffrar, 2009). Therefore, the 
way in which we execute actions is likely to have dramatic implications for our 
understanding of others’ internal states, such that we may be better placed to understand 
and interact with those who move most like us (see Chapters 2 and 3 for evidence 
supporting this hypothesis in typically developing individuals). 
Given that individuals with autism move in a quantifiably different way from typical 
adults (Cook et al., 2013) it is predicted that those with autism will have distinct 
representations of action compared to typical individuals, which might affect social 
interaction between these two groups. The two experiments presented in Chapter 4 and 
5 demonstrate that individuals with autism are able to 1) perceive temporal differences 
in visually presented information, 2) modulate their actions to accurately co-ordinate a 
motor response with a visual cue and, 3) are sensitive to the kinematic features that 
define natural motion. Therefore, those with autism appear to have at least some of the 
basic perceptual skills that are required to encode the complex kinematic cues that 
provide informative signals for a whole host of socio-cognitive processes, such as 
ascribing internal states to others actions or mentalising.  
One possible explanation for the difficulty those with autism have in interpreting others 
actions (Abell et al., 2000; Atkinson, 2009; Bowler & Thommen, 2000; Castelli et al., 
2002; Jones et al., 2011; Klin, 2000; Nackaerts et al., 2012; White et al., 2011; Zwickel 
et al., 2011) concerns a mismatch between autistic and typical individuals in models of 
 108 
 
the relationship between kinematics and internal states. In other words, because those 
with autism have experience producing actions that are atypically jerky, their 
representations of which kinematic signal exemplify which mental state may be distinct 
from those of typical individuals. When observing typical actions the kinematic 
properties will not signal the same information to an autistic observer, leading to 
erroneous ascriptions. For example, faster, jerkier movement is associated with angry 
affective states in typical individuals but similar movement may be produced by 
individuals with autism when they feel relatively calm. Autistic individuals may 
therefore fail to perceive anger in typical others, and conversely typical others may 
interpret autistic calm movements as reflecting anger.  
Therefore, it was hypothesised that typical individuals will be impaired at reading 
internal states from kinematic cues in autistic actions, and autistic individuals will be 
impaired when interpreting typical actions. Critically, under this hypothesis, 
communication difficulties experienced by individuals with autism may not solely be 
due to understanding and behavioural impairments solely in the autistic individual. 
Individuals with autism may frequently attempt to communicate their desires, intentions 
and affective states, yet typically developing individuals may not interpret them 
correctly. Therefore, social communication difficulties between these two groups may, 
at least partly, be a manifestation of inaccuracies of both parties.  
To test this hypothesis, the current study used an adaptation of the Frith-Happé 
animation task to test online mentalising. In an initial ‘Generation Phase’, participants 
with and without autism were asked to direct hand-held triangular magnets on a table 
top to depict the same mental state verbs as used in the standard version of the task 
(coaxing, mocking, seducing and surprising). In a subsequent ‘Perception Phase’, 
participants watched the animations and rated the extent to which they depicted each of 
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these target mental states (note that participants never observed their own generated 
animations). The accuracy of ratings in the ‘Perception Phase’ was compared when 
typical and autistic participants observed both typical and autistic animations to 
investigate whether individuals with autism show improved intention attribution when 
interpreting the movements of others with autism relative to typical movements, and 
vice versa for the typical group.  
6.2. Generation phase  
To test the main research question it was necessary to record animations generated by 
autistic and typical individuals, and verify that there were kinematic differences 
between them.  
6.2.1. Method 
6.2.1.1. Participants  
Fifteen typically developed adults and 16 adults with autism were recruited via the same 
method used in Chapters 4 and 5. An independent clinician diagnosed participants in the 
autism group according to DSM IV criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 1994), 
and the ADOS-2 (Lord et al., 2012) was administered to confirm participants’ current 
level of social functioning. Two participants did not meet all ADOS-2 criteria for a 
classification of autism spectrum disorder. Like in Chapters 4 and 5, these participants 
were indistinguishable from the other participants on all measures and therefore the data 
are reported across all participants, but the same pattern of results was found when 
excluding them. The two groups did not differ on FSIQ, as measured by the WASI 
(Wechsler, 1999, t(29)=2.00, p=.054, d=.72), age (t(29)=1.69, p=.102, d=.61,) or gender 
(Fisher’s exact test, p>.99), but as expected the autism group had significantly higher 
scores on the AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001, t(23.34)=6.15, p<.001, d=2.19), see Table 
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6.1).  
Table 6.1: Demographic information for the participants who generated the animations 
**p<.001 
 
6.2.1.2. Animation generation  
The setting for the animations was based on the stimuli used in the Frith-Happé 
paradigm (Abell et al., 2000). A white table with a black enclosure was used as the 
background for the animations (see Figure 6.1A). A large red and a small blue triangle 
made from coloured card were attached to two magnets; the opposite pole of the magnet 
was attached below the table to enable manual operation of each triangle. Participants 
were given time to practise operating the magnets to manoeuvre the triangles, and had 
two practice trials (see Figure 6.1A; note that participants could see their action effects 
in the form of the triangle movements). A video camera (Panasonic SDR-S50) was 
positioned directly above the table to film the participants’ animations at a rate of 25 
frames /second.  
The four target mental state words (coaxing, mocking, seducing and surprising – the 
same as used in Abell et al., 2000) were presented to participants in a random order. On 
each trial the participants were asked: ‘How will you represent (coaxing, mocking, 
 
 
FSIQ 
Mean 
(SEM) 
Age  
Mean 
(SEM) 
Gender 
(N=male) 
AQ 
Mean 
(SEM) 
ADOS 
Mean 
(SEM) 
 
Autism Generator 
Group  
(n =16)  
 
 
116.00 
(3.04) 
 
42.06  
(2.96) 
 
14 
 
30.44 
(2.24)** 
 
9.63  
(.96) 
Typical Generator  
Group  
(n =15) 
 
105.53 
(4.32) 
34.80  
(3.12) 
13 14.67  
(1.25) 
- 
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seducing, surprising) with the two triangles?’ Participants were instructed that their 
animations should last ~30 seconds, and given one minute to think before providing a 
verbal response of how they would animate the mental state word. Participants were 
directed to the dictionary definition if they were unsure of the word’s meaning, and no 
further guidance was given. Following the verbal response the participants performed 
their animation. Each animation was edited to make size and colours consistent using 
Adobe After Effects (see Figure 6.1B). Any items that appeared on the screen, other 
than the triangles, were edited out (e.g. participants’ heads).  
The animations were analysed using Matlab® to extract the kinematics (jerk, 
acceleration and velocity) of both triangles. First, every pixel (720 x 576 pixels) within 
each frame was coded for the presence of red or blue and saved as a colour-coded frame 
set. The following analysis was run twice to code the location of the red and blue 
triangle separately. 
The colour-coded frame sets were scanned, starting at each corner of the background of 
the animation (top, bottom, left and right), to locate the four most extreme points of the 
triangles. Two of these points related to the same corner of the triangle, and therefore 
one was removed. From the remaining three points, the ‘nose’ of the triangle was 
located by identifying the adjoining point at the end of the two longest sides. The ‘tail’ 
was the mid-point between the other two points. This procedure resulted in location 
markers for the nose and tail of the red and blue triangle on each frame. The change in x 
and y position was tracked between each frame by first order differentiation of the 
position vectors. These vectors were low-pass Butterworth filtered at 2 Hz to remove 
noise associated with the imperfect localization of the x and y values on some frames 
due to occasional poor contrast in the animations. The velocity was calculated as the 
square root of the summed squared x and y displacement per frame. The velocity values 
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were then low-pass Butterworth filtered at 3 Hz to remove noise due to the imperfect 
measure of displacement of the nose / tail owing to occasional flickers in the animations 
due to extreme exposure in some of the frames. It was verified manually that filters 
were optimal in both preserving the movement information and removing noise. Visual 
inspection determined that frames with velocity values below 1 pixel / frame were 
periods of no movement, and were removed from further calculations. Acceleration was 
calculated as the absolute first order differential of the velocity vectors, and jerk was 
calculated as the absolute second order differential. The mean velocity, acceleration and 
jerk was calculated from these absolute values, and transformed from pixels / frame to 
mm / second. 
6.2.2. Results  
6.2.2.1. Animation kinematic analysis  
To verify that the animations generated by the two groups differed in their kinematics, a 
2x4 Mixed ANOVA was performed for each kinematic measure with group (autism or 
typical) as a between-participant factor, and mental state (coaxing, mocking, seducing 
Figure 6.1: (A) Participants generated animations by manually directing triangles on a 
table top with magnets to represent the target mental state words (coaxing, mocking, 
seducing and surprising). (B) Edited example stimulus that was displayed to participants 
as a ~30 second animation  
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or surprising) as a within-participant factor.  
Most importantly, there was a main effect of group for the jerk measure (F(1,29)=4.89, 
p=.035, ηp
2
=.144). This effect was a result of the autism group moving with higher jerk 
relative to the typical group (see Figure 6.2), therefore replicating previous findings of 
jerkier movements in autistic individuals.  
There was a main effect of mental state animation on jerk (F(3,87)=8.74, p<.001, 
ηp
2
=.232), but there was no interaction between mental state animation and group 
(F(3,87)=.132, p=.941, ηp
2
=.005). Follow-up pairwise comparisons to examine the main 
effect of mental state revealed the mocking animations (M=6.52 mm/s
3
, SEM=.33) had 
higher mean jerk than the coaxing (M=4.46 mm/s
3
, SEM=.34; p=.003, 95% CI [.55, 
3.56], d=.71) and seducing animations (M=4.57 mm/s
3
, SEM=.34; p=.002, 95% CI [.57, 
3.32], d=.73), and the surprising animations (M=5.57 mm/s
3
, SEM=.32) had higher 
mean jerk than the coaxing animations (p=.016, 95% CI [.151, 2.07], d=.60). The lack 
of interaction between mental state animation and group–- and therefore comparable 
pattern of kinematics across the four mental state animations (see Figure 6.2B) –
suggests that both groups modulated the kinematic features of their movements to 
represent different mental states in a similar fashion. This result suggests that both 
groups possessed a similar understanding of the different mental states (see also Verbal 
task, section 6.4).  
There was no main effect of group for the acceleration data (F(1,29)=1.62, p=.213, 
ηp
2
=.053). There was also no interaction between mental state animation and group 
(F(3,87)=.33, p=.806, ηp
2
=.011), but again, there was a main effect of animation 
(F(3,87)=9.73, p<.001, ηp
2
=.251). Follow-up pairwise comparisons revealed the same 
pattern as the jerk measure; the mocking animations (M=15.36 mm/s
2
, SEM=1.05) had 
higher mean acceleration than the coaxing (M=10.71 mm/s
2
, SEM=.83; p=.003, 95% CI 
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[1.31, 7.99], d=.72) and seducing animations (M=11.06 mm/s
2
, SEM=.69; p=.003, 95% 
CI [1.20, 7.40], d=.70), the surprising animations (M=13.94 mm/s
2
, SEM=.74) had 
higher mean acceleration than the coaxing animations (p=.001, 95% CI [1.13, 5.33], 
d=.79), and the surprising animations had higher mean acceleration than the seducing 
animations (p=.038, 95% CI [.12, 5.65], d=.53).  
Finally, there was no main effect of group for the velocity measure (F(1,29)=.027, 
p=.870, ηp
2
=.001). There was also no interaction between mental state animation and 
group (F(3,87)=.38, p=.766, ηp
2
=.013), but there was a main effect of mental state 
animation (F(3,87)=9.08, p<.001, ηp
2
=.238). Follow-up pairwise comparisons 
demonstrated the same pattern as in the acceleration and jerk analyses. The mocking 
animations (M=109.05 mm/s, SEM=7.23) had higher mean velocity than the coaxing 
(M=80.77 mm/s, SEM=4.57; p=.003, 95% CI [7.84, 48.73], d=.71) and seducing 
(M=83.62 mm/s, SEM=4.53; p=.015, 95% CI [3.61, 47.26], d=.59) animations, the 
surprising animations (M=101.29 mm/s, SEM=5.12) had higher velocity than the 
coaxing animations (p=.001, 95% CI [7.74, 33.31], d=.83), and the surprising 
animations had higher mean velocity than the seducing animations (p=.050, 95% CI 
[.02, 35.33], d=.52).     
These results indicate that the animations produced by the participants with autism had 
different kinematic properties, specifically increased jerk relative to the typical 
generators. This confirmed our hypothesis and replicated the previous results, showing 
individuals with autism move with atypical kinematics (Cook et al., 2013).  
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6.3. Perception task  
6.3.1. Methods 
6.3.1.1. Participants  
Twenty-five typical adults and 23 adults with autism were recruited via the same 
method of recruitment for the typical and autistic participants described in the 
generation phase methods (Section 6.1.1, see Section 6.3.1.2 for information relating to 
those participants who also participated in both the generation and perception phase of 
the experiment).  
Three participants did not meet all ADOS-2 criteria for a classification of autism 
Figure 6.2: (A) Mean velocity, acceleration and jerk for the autism and typical 
animations. (B) Mean jerk for the four mental states for the typical and autistic 
animations. It can be seen that the jerk effect did not interact with mental state, such that 
both groups modulated their kinematics comparably according to the different mental 
states. Error bars represent the SEM. *p<.05   
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spectrum disorder. These participants were included in the main analyses reported, but 
the pattern of results was the same when excluding these three participants. Two 
participants (one participant from each group) were excluded from the analysis as their 
verbal responses suggested that they did not understand the task demands. The 
remaining participants were matched on FSIQ (t(44)=.05, p=.964, d=.01), age 
(t(44)=.63, p=.531, d=.19) and gender (Fisher’s exact test, p=.702), and as expected, the 
groups differed in AQ scores (t(44)=5.98, p<.001, d=1.85; see Table 6.2).  
Table 6.2: Demographic information for autistic and typical participants in the perceptual 
task and those who took part in the verbal descriptions experiment 
 **p<.001 
 
6.3.1.2. Animation selection  
Six autism and six typical animations of each of the four mental state words were 
presented in the perception task, resulting in 48 animations. This number of animations 
was selected to ensure that the task, on average, took no longer than an hour to complete 
and therefore reduce possible fatigue effects.  
From the usable animations each stimulus was selected for inclusion based on two 
 FSIQ 
Mean 
(SEM) 
Age 
Mean 
(SEM) 
Gender 
(N=male) 
AQ 
Mean 
(SEM) 
ADOS 
Mean 
(SEM) 
 
Autism Perceiver Group 
(n =22)  
 
 
111.05 
(3.62) 
 
38.50  
(2.97) 
 
19 
 
32.82 
(2.11)** 
 
9.77 
(.79) 
Typical Perceiver Group 
(n=24) 
 
111.25 
(2.69) 
36.08 
(2.45) 
19 17.29 
(1.56) 
- 
Typical Verbal 
Experiment Group 
(n=24)  
 
- 35.46 
(2.98) 
18 - - 
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criteria. First, two animations above and two below the mean jerk value for that group 
(e.g. autism) and target mental state (e.g. mocking) were selected, all within one 
standard deviation of the mean, and two animations greater than one standard deviation 
from the mean (one above and one below the mean). This criterion was employed to 
match the jerk of the selected stimulus set to the distribution of the full sample of 
generated animations (see Table 6.3). Second, a maximum of three animations created 
by any given participant were included. This criterion was employed to ensure that any 
one participant’s animations did not dominate the stimulus set.  
Table 6.3:  Mean jerk measures (mm/s
3
) for the two groups for all the animations in the 
generation phase, and for the selected animations to be shown in perception phase 
Note: units mm/s
3 
 
Thirteen of the autism group and eight of the typical group also participated in the main 
perceptual task. There were approximately nine months between the animation 
generation and perceptual task. Participants who took part in both animation generation 
and the main perceptual task were not shown their own animations. Their animations 
were substituted with another exhibiting the closest jerk value for that animation (e.g., 
mocking) within their group (autism/ typical).  
 
 
 Coaxing Mocking Seducing Surprising 
 Autism Typical  Autism Typical  Autism Typical Autism  Typical 
 
Total Jerk 
mean (sd)  
 
5.16 
(2.53) 
 
3.94 
(1.50) 
 
7.10 
(3.48) 
 
5.73 
(2.40) 
 
5.41 
(2.04) 
 
3.55 
(1.20) 
 
6.00 
(1.86) 
 
4.84 
(1.55) 
 
Six Selected 
Stimuli Jerk 
mean (sd) 
  
 
4.9 
(2.71) 
 
4.27 
(1.77) 
 
7.44 
(3.00) 
 
6.03 
(2.11) 
 
5.13 
(2.79) 
 
3.60 
(1.35) 
 
6.07 
(1.58) 
 
4.78 
(1.37) 
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6.3.1.3. Procedure 
The experiment was run via Matlab® on a 24 inch computer screen. An initial practice 
trial familiarised participants with the procedure and task requirements. On each trial, 
after viewing the animation, participants were asked to describe verbally what happened 
in the animation, to ensure that they had attended to the whole animation. Following the 
verbal response, they were asked to rate on a visual analogue scale (ranging from 1 [not 
at all] to 50 [a lot]) the extent to which the animation depicted the four target mental 
state words: coaxing, mocking, seducing, and surprising. Participants were able to 
choose the order in which they rated the four target mental state words, and they could 
change their responses at any point. It was not possible to go onto the following trial 
until all scales had a rating. The participant pressed a key when they were ready to 
begin the next trial.  No feedback was given on their performance.  
6.3.2. Results 
Participants’ ratings were scored for accuracy. This measure was calculated by 
subtracting the average of the three ‘incorrect’ ratings, from the ‘correct’ rating on each 
trial (e.g., the coaxing rating minus the mean rating of mocking, seducing and surprising 
when viewing a coaxing animation). A higher score indicates a greater match to the 
intended representation, and any score below zero indicates that the participants were 
unable to identify correctly the intended mental state verb. 
Both the autism (M=5.63, SEM=.70; t(21)=8.05, p<.001, 95% CI [4.18, 7.09], d=1.76) 
and typical (M=6.96, SEM=.62; t(23)=11.29, p<.001, 95% CI [5.68, 8.23], d=2.30) 
perceiver groups’ overall mean accuracy was significantly higher than zero, indicating 
that both groups could do the task effectively. Additionally, the mean accuracy for the 
animations generated by the autism (M=5.48, SEM=.48; t(45)=11.48, p<.001, 95% CI 
[4.51, 6.44],  d=1.28) and typical (M=7.19, SEM=.63; t(45)=11.45, p<.001, 95% CI 
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[5.93, 8.46], d=2.56) participants was higher than zero, demonstrating significant signal 
present in the animations generated by both groups. 
To test for differences in perception between the two perceiver groups a 2x2x4 Mixed 
ANOVA was performed with perceiver group (autism or typical observer) as a 
between-participants factor, and generator group (autism or typical generator) and 
mental state (coaxing, mocking, seducing or surprising) as within-participants factors. 
There was a main effect of mental state animation (F(3,132)=43.13, p<.001, ηp
2
=.496), 
which did not interact with perceiver group (F(3,132)=1.70, p=.171, ηp
2
=.037) but did 
interact with generator group (F(3,132)=7.10, p<.001, ηp
2
=.139). There was no three 
way interaction between generator group, perceiver group and mental state animations 
(F(3,132)=2.04, p=.111, ηp
2
=.044). Follow-up t-tests indicated that the interaction 
between generator group and mental state animation was driven by better performance 
on the typical (M=6.16, SEM=.61) relative to autism surprising animations (M=-1.16, 
SEM=.48; p<.001, 95% CI [4.43, 10.21], d=.73), without a generator group difference 
for the other mental state animations.  
The main effect of perceiver group was not significant (F(1,44)=2.04, p=.160, 
ηp
2
=.044), yet there was a main effect of generator group, with better rating accuracy 
when participants observed the typical (M=7.14, SEM=.61) compared to the autism 
animations (M=5.45, SEM=.48; F(1,44)=8.53, p=.006, ηp
2
=.162). However, most 
importantly, this effect was qualified by an interaction with perceiver group 
(F(1,44)=4.32, p=.044, ηp
2
=.089). Simple effects analysis showed the typical perceivers 
were significantly better at rating the typical animations than the autism animations 
(p=.001, 95% CI [1.23, 4.48], d=.66), but the autism perceivers performed equally for 
the autism and typical animations (p=.563, 95% CI [-1.22, 2.18], d=.14; see Figure 6.3). 
These results indicate that the typical group was able to identify the intended mental 
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state in the typical generated animations to a greater extent than for the autism-
generated animations, while the autism group performed comparably on both groups’ 
animations. 
 
 
6.4. Verbal Task  
It was deemed prudent to verify that both generator groups had sufficient understanding 
of the mental state concepts. A follow-up study was conducted using the verbal 
descriptions provided by the generator participants prior to the production of their 
animations, to test whether the descriptions from both groups portrayed the intended 
mental states.  
Figure 6.3: Mean rating accuracy for the autism and typical groups when rating the 
autism and typical generated animations. Error bars represent the SEM. *p=.001 
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6.4.1. Method 
6.4.1.1. Participants  
For this study an independent group of typically developed participants (N=24) were 
recruited. They were matched for age (23 – 67 years, t(46)=.16, p=.872, d=.73) and 
gender (χ2(2)=.12, p=.731) to the typically developed participants in the perception task 
(see Table 6.2).  
6.4.1.2. Stimulus selection and procedure 
The stimuli for this task were based on the verbal descriptions the ‘generators’ gave 
prior to producing their animations (see section 6.2.1.2). From the descriptions of 
animations used in the perception task only those that did not use the target verb were 
included for possible selection as stimuli in the current task. From the remaining 
descriptions items were chosen at random to equate the number of autistic and typical 
descriptions for each mental state verb. This method resulted in three surprising and 
mocking, and four coaxing and seducing descriptions from each group, totalling 28 
descriptions.  
On each trial participants were presented, in a random order, with a verbal description, 
and rated out of 50 the extent to which the description represented each of the four 
target mental states (coaxing, mocking, seducing, and surprising). This method was 
designed to match closely the method employed in the perception task. 
6.4.2. Results  
Exactly as in the perception task, participants’ ratings of each of the verbal descriptions 
were scored for accuracy. To recap, accuracy was calculated by averaging the ratings of 
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the three ‘incorrect’ mental states (e.g. the mean rating of mocking, seducing and 
surprising when reading a coaxing description) and subtracting this number from the 
‘correct’ rating. A score above zero therefore indicates that the participants rated the 
intended mental state verb more highly than the other verbs, with higher scores 
indicating a greater match to the intended representation. 
Firstly, to verify that both generator groups had similar conceptual understanding of the 
mental state verbs included in the task the mean accuracy ratings for the autism and 
typical verbal descriptions were tested against zero. Both the autism and typical 
descriptions ratings were found to be significantly greater than zero (autism 
t(23)=15.89, p<.001, 95% CI [19.46, 25.29], d=3.24; typical t(23)=22.65, p<.001, 95% 
CI [18.95, 22.76], d=4.62), indicating that both generator groups understood the 
concepts. Moreover, a paired t-test revealed no difference between ratings for the two 
groups’ responses (t(23)=1.24, p=.226, 95% CI [-1.01, 4.06], d=.25; autism M=22.38, 
SEM=1.41; typical: M=20.85, SEM=.92).  
The absence of this effect demonstrates that the verbal descriptions provided by each 
group were equally comprehensible, thereby suggesting that both generator groups had 
equal understanding of the social concepts. Thus, the failure of the typically developed 
observers to understand the autistic animations is unlikely to be due to the autism group 
producing animations based on ‘inaccurate’ conceptual representations of the intended 
mental states.  
6.5. Discussion  
The present experiment required individuals with autism and matched typical adults to 
generate animations depicting mental states. The animations generated by the 
movements of the participants with autism were found to have greater jerk than their 
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typical counterparts. In a subsequent perceptual task, the typical participants 
demonstrated an enhanced ability to attribute the intended mental state to the animations 
produced by other typical participants, relative to those produced by participants with 
autism. In contrast, individuals with autism exhibited no difference in assigning the 
intended mental state to animations produced by autistic and typical individuals. A 
secondary verbal task demonstrated that both generator groups had similar conceptual 
understanding of the mental state verbs therefore the perceptual differences are likely 
reflective of differences in the kinematic properties within the animations.  
Differences in movement kinematics between the groups replicate previous findings of 
increased jerk when adults with autism make simple horizontal arm movements (Cook 
et al., 2013). The current findings extend this work by showing that these atypical 
kinematics are evident when those with autism produce complex, object-based actions. 
A lack of typical kinematics might be a consequence of peripheral factors such as 
abnormal muscle tone (Maurer & Damasio, 1982; Todorov, 2004), or central nervous 
system factors, such as poor anticipation of the subsequent part of a motor sequence 
(Cattaneo et al., 2007; Fabbri-Destro et al.,  2009), or potentially relatedly, cerebellar 
neuropathology (Mostofsky et al., 2009; Rogers et al., 2013). Interestingly, Cook et al. 
(2013) also found group differences in velocity and acceleration, which were dependent 
upon the phase of the movement (turning-point or midpoint; see also Forti et al., 2011; 
Glazebrook et al., 2006). The phase effects are likely greater for larger magnitude 
movements (e.g., full length arm movements), therefore the absence of group 
differences in velocity and acceleration in the present study may be due to the relatively 
small magnitude of movements (hand and wrist gestures) which may have reduced 
differences pertaining to the phases of the movements.  
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Enhanced perception of typical, relative to autistic actions in the typical perceiver group 
is consistent with previous work that suggests we interpret others’ actions according to 
models built through experience with our own actions (e.g. Sebanz & Shiffrar, 2009, see 
also Chapters 2 and 3 in the current thesis). The present study adds to these findings by 
showing that we are better at making higher-level mental state inferences (e.g., coaxing) 
from actions that look like our own
7
. These results therefore support the current 
hypothesis suggesting that our understanding of others’ actions may be determined by 
our own action experiences.  
These findings have important implications for interaction difficulties between autistic 
and non-autistic individuals. Successful interactions depend on accurate anticipation 
and prediction of others’ movements, allowing us to attribute affective states, intentions 
and goals to our interaction partner so that we can adjust our behaviour accordingly 
(Behrends, Müller, & Dziobek, 2012). Therefore, if typical action models are not 
effective for interpreting the movements of individuals with autism, then the ‘social 
impairments’ exhibited by individuals with autism may, at least in part, be a product of 
a failure by typical individuals to infer correctly the affective states, desires and 
intentions of autistic individuals. Repeated inappropriate and /or inconsistent feedback 
from typical interactants following misunderstanding of autistic actions could 
subsequently obstruct learning about typical social interaction in those with autism, 
adding to social communication difficulties.  
                                                        
7
It is important to note that all mental state information must have been derived from movement 
kinematics in the current study because there were no facial expressions, postures or language in 
the animations. However, despite the fact that jerk is an important cue concerning mental states 
(e.g. Pollick et al., 2001), other kinematic cues (such as the correlation between the movements 
of the two triangles) that were not measured in the current animations may also have contributed 
to inferences.  
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Crucially, incorrect interpretation of the movements of individuals with autism by 
typical individuals could also have important implications for clinical diagnosis. Autism 
is diagnosed following observation-based behavioural assessments of social functioning 
by a qualified clinician. On the basis of the current findings, and some recent similar 
work (Brewer et al., 2016; Sheppard et al., 2016) we might predict that social 
expressions by individuals with autism are more frequently incorrectly labelled. 
Therefore, these individuals may be assessed as lacking social understanding or 
expression by non-autistic clinicians, whereas in reality they simply have models 
incompatible with those of the assessor. Similarly, other assessments, which evaluate an 
individual’s internal state, may fail to do so correctly when performed with autistic 
individuals, impacting on sentencing, medical support and treatments. Further study of 
how typical individuals could learn to interpret atypical expressions could improve 
intervention strategies and also reduce frustration, social anxiety and mood problems in 
individuals with autism (Simonoff et al., 2012), who may express their internal states 
but be frequently misunderstood.  
Despite performing the task at a reasonable level, with comparable performance to the 
typical group when observing ‘other’ group animations, the autism group did not show 
the same benefit from observing ‘same’ group animations – performance when 
observing autistic animations was comparable in the two observer groups. One potential 
explanation for the lack of ‘same’ group benefit relates to the trend towards increased 
variability in the kinematics of the autistic relative to typical generators. For example, 
there was a trend for the four animation-specific jerk values to differ more in each 
individual in the autism group (between-group t-test on the standard deviations of the 
four jerk values; t(29)=1.94, p=.062). Increased variability in autistic actions may mean 
that a given autistic participant’s action models are a poorer fit to those of other autistic 
individuals (note that autistic facial expressions have also been shown to have more 
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idiosyncratic qualities, which may similarly impair expression understanding; Brewer et 
al., 2016; Macdonald et al., 1989). Alternatively, autistic action models may be tuned to 
both atypical (autistic) and typical movements. Throughout their lives most individuals 
with autism have much experience observing and interacting with typical others, who 
move typically, as well as experience with their own atypical movements. In contrast, 
typical individuals are likely to have experience of typical movements only. These 
hypotheses could be elucidated by studying perception of autistic movements in 
individuals without autism but who have increased experience with this group.   
In conclusion, the current study has replicated previous findings that individuals with 
autism produce actions with atypical kinematics. Moreover, typical individuals are less 
accurate in ascribing internal states to autistic actions relative to the actions of other 
typical individuals. This result suggests that kinematic differences might exacerbate 
social-communication difficulties between autistic and typical individuals.  
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Chapter 7: Action kinematics at 10 months are associated with later 
social abilities at 14 months in infants at high- and low-risk for 
developing autism  
 
Under the current hypothesis some of the social and communication difficulties between 
individuals with autism and typical individuals can be explained by differences in how 
actions are produced. Autism is a neurodevelopmental disorder and therefore it is 
important to ask if differences in movement kinematics can be identified early in 
development. Findings of this nature would be important for designing interventions, 
and possibly understanding the cascade of social-cognitive difficulties that occur across 
autistic development. The current study therefore measured the jerk of movements of 
10-month-old infants with either a high or low familial risk of developing autism during 
a ‘free-play’ session and related it to later social skills (measured at 14 months). It was 
found that infants who made movements that were less jerky had more atypical social 
skills later in development. Although this pattern is opposite to that predicted based on 
the adult literature, it is in line with recent models about how motor variability relates to 
motor learning. Importantly, it also suggests that early differences in movement 
kinematics may indeed impact the development of early social skills, and that 
movement kinematics may represent a good candidate biomarker for social disorder.   
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7.1. Introduction  
Autism is a neurodevelopmental disorder, and diagnosis only reliably occurs around 3 
years of age (Baird et al., 2003; Charman et al., 2005). Despite the earlier identification 
of some autistic traits and behaviours through standardised assessments or 
questionnaires (e.g., Cox et al., 1999), the most robust means of diagnosis involves 
several lengthy clinical assessments in a variety of environments (Charman et al., 2016). 
However, early and intensive interventions are thought to yield the most beneficial 
outcomes (Baird et al., 2003) as the trajectory of an atypically developing brain may be 
shaped by providing differential experiences to scaffold development (Eldevik et al., 
2009; Howlin, Magiati, & Charman, 2009; Warren et al., 2011).  
The hypothesis in the current thesis posits that through our intensive experience with 
our own actions we generate models that we use to help us perceive and understand 
others’ actions. In the case of autism, it is hypothesised that production of actions with 
kinematic parameters that are different from typical individuals can impact social 
communication bi-directionally between these two groups. It is therefore important to 
examine whether action kinematics are atypical early in the lives of those who will later 
develop social difficulties or receive a diagnosis of autism. Developing with atypical 
action could have a cascade of effects for how children with autism and those with 
whom they interact learn about each other’s internal states. Therefore, if action 
differences are present early it increases the potential impact of them on social 
development.  
As well as possibly influencing the development of internal state models, early atypical 
action kinematics may also be an ideal candidate biomarker of the emergence of early 
autistic symptomology. The sensory and motor networks within the brain are the first to 
mature fully in infancy (Deoni et al., 2011; Gogtay et al., 2004; Paus, 2005). 
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Consequently, disruptions to these systems might have the most profound effects on the 
development of more complex mechanisms, which might be grounded in more basic 
skills (Johnson, 2011; Karmiloff-Smith, 2009). Moreover action kinematics are easily 
measurable from a very young age, and do not necessarily require development of any 
specific motor skills. Identifying whether there is a relationship between atypical 
movements and social development might therefore also inform the aetiology of autism 
and aid early intervention design. 
Most previous studies investigating motor abnormalities in early autism are 
retrospective, using home videos to code motor behaviours. In these studies infants who 
later develop autism show greater irregularities in postural control, such that movements 
often show asymmetric properties, and most motor milestones, such as rolling or 
crawling are often delayed (Baranek, 1999; Teitelbaum, et al., 1998). More recently, 
studies have capitalised on the high incidence of sibling recurrence in autism to conduct 
prospective longitudinal studies using infant siblings of children who have autism as 
participants  – an estimated 20% of children who have an older sibling with autism will 
likely also develop autism or Broader Autism Phenotype (presentation of subclinical 
autistic traits and characteristics, Constantino, Zhang, Frazier, Abbacchi, & Law, 2010; 
Ozonoff et al., 2011). These prospective studies have also shown that infants at risk of 
developing autism show atypical motor development (Bhat, Galloway, & Landa, 2012; 
Iverson & Wozniak, 2007; Landa & Garrett-Mayer, 2006; Mulligan & White, 2012). 
For example, Leonard, Elsabbagh, Hill, and the BASIS team (2014) measured motor 
skills – via two standardised motor assessments, the Mullen Scales of Early Learning 
(Mullen, 1995) and the Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scales (Sparrow, Cicchetti, & 
Balla, 2005) – of infants with either a high or low familial risk of developing autism. As 
expected, the high-risk infants had worse fine and gross motor skills measured as early 
as 7 months, and the developmental trajectory of their motor skills was atypical up to 36 
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months. Motor differences measured at 3 months on standardised assessments have also 
been found to relate to later communication problems (Bhat et al., 2012), and there is 
some evidence that better motor skills protect against poor social outcomes (Sutera et 
al., 2007). 
 To date, no studies have measured the kinematic qualities of the movements of infants 
who are at risk of developing autism. Advancements in wearable technology, such as 
accelerometers, enables reliable measures of acceleration and jerk to be easily obtained 
in a range of settings, making this method and measurement generally more 
ecologically valid and time efficient than standardised assessments. Of course, as 
already noted, assessing the kinematic characteristics of infants’ movements could also 
shed light on the mechanisms underpinning any motor delays in infants at risk of 
developing autism, and help characterise the specific impairments that link motor and 
social deficits.   
The current study therefore measured the jerk (due to the fact it is jerk that has been 
consistently found to be atypical in autistic adults) of the movements of a group of 10-
month-old infants with either a high or low familial risk of developing autism in a 
naturalistic play setting. Four months later social skills were measured using a social 
and communication assessment. It was hypothesised that action kinematics would be 
predictive of later social skills. More precisely, based on the previous adult findings, it 
was predicted that infants who produced movements with more jerk would have worse 
social skills later in development.  
7.2. Methods 
Please note that the data analysed in this Chapter are taken from an on-going 
longitudinal study. Therefore these are preliminary results as data from more infants 
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from the full data-set are still to be analysed and some of the assessment scores have not 
been double coded to research standards.  
7.2.1. Participants  
Participants were families recruited via a range of means (flyers and online 
advertisements) to take part in a longitudinal research programme: The British Autism 
Study of Infant Siblings (BASIS; www.basisnetwork.org). This research programme is 
a multi-site network within the UK that facilitates research into infant siblings of 
children with a clinical diagnosis of autism. Ethical approval was granted by London 
Central NHS Research Ethics Committee (approval number: 13/LO/0751 STAARS). 
Families were invited to testing sessions when the infants were 10-months-old and 14-
months-old (as well as 5-months-old where no accelerometer data were collected, and 
later ages which were not analysed for present purposes).  
At the time the data for the current experiment was analysed 77 infant siblings of 
children with a clinical diagnosis of autism (High-Risk infants, HR) and 24 infants 
without any familial risk of autism (Low-Risk infants, LR) had been recruited for the 
longitudinal project. Of these participants kinematic data had been obtained from 55 
infants (42 HR and 13 LR) during the 10 month testing day. 25 HR and 7 LR infants 
data was unusable due to technical issues during testing, e.g., the accelerometer not 
responding or the digital output not recognised (see Section 7.2.2.1) and 10 HR and 4 
LR infants did not participate in the task where the kinematic data was analysed e.g., 
due to fussiness or the family not attending the 10 month testing day. Of the 55 infants 
who had usable data from the 10 month testing day, 44 infants (36 HR, 8 LR) returned 
for the 14-month testing day (see Table 7.1 for demographic data of participants who 
contributed to the final analysis reported in this thesis). Due to the small number of LR 
infants all analyses conducted were performed collapsed across all participants. 
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 Table 7.1: Demographic data for the Low-Risk and High-Risk infants 
 Note due to small sample sizes all participants were collapsed into one group for all analyses 
 
7.2.2. Kinematic data  
7.2.2.1. Accelerometer and behavioural task 
A BioNormadix® wireless Tri-axial Accelerometer (BN-ACCL3), with a measuring 
range of ±16 g (1 g [gravitational force]= 9.81 m/s
2
) and sampling rate of 100 Hz was 
used to collect acceleration data. Data were sent online during the testing session to the 
BioPac® software, where it was stored to be cleaned and analysed offline using 
Matlab® (see Section 7.2.2.2). The device (6 cm x 4 cm x 2 cm, weight 54 g) was 
placed in a pouch on the left thigh to capture the acceleration of the leg movements 
throughout the testing session without disrupting freedom of movement. The infants all 
participated in a larger battery of behavioural tasks across a full day, with breaks 
whenever the caregiver or infant required.  
The behavioural ‘free-play’ session where the acceleration data was collected was also 
recorded using three bespoke digital video cameras, which were remote controlled and 
time-locked using in-house custom software. The cameras were positioned such that all 
angles of the testing room were recorded. The accelerometer was synced with the video 
recordings via a digital output signal from a light. This digital output (the light 
switching on) was sent from the BioPac® software and added a time-stamped signal to 
 Mean age in days 
at 10 month testing 
session (SEM) 
Mean age in days 
at 14 month testing 
session (SEM) 
Gender (N=male) 
 
High-Risk Infants 
(N=36) 
 
 
318.33 (2.31) 
 
453.36 (3.31) 
 
21 
Low-Risk Infants 
(N=8) 
 
311.00 (5.39) 442.88 (4.90) 5 
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a channel on the BioPac® data. The light was also visible in the video recordings, 
which was verified by the experimenters. Acceleration data was recorded constantly 
throughout the whole ‘free-play’ testing session.  
The ‘free-play’ session was an unstructured task where the infants were presented with 
a pre-designated range of toys on a mat and were free to engage with the toys as they 
pleased. The infant’s caregiver was present during the session, but was requested to try 
to leave the infant to play unassisted. The session lasted approximately three minutes.  
7.2.2.2. Acceleration data cleaning  
The accelerometer recorded acceleration, measured in ‘g’ units (gravitational force), 
across three axes (x, y and z) on separate channels. The three raw signals were low-pass 
filtered using a 5 Hz Butterworth filter, and 3D acceleration was calculated as the root 
sum of the square of the three axes. A high-pass Butterworth filter was then applied to 
the 3D acceleration, at 1 Hz, to remove the fixed 1 g acceleration experienced by the 
accelerometer due to the earth’s natural gravitational pull regardless of movement (i.e., 
to centre the acceleration recordings around 0 g when there was no movement for ease 
of interpretation). These filters were visually verified such that they maintained the 
pattern of movements. The processed data was cropped to the ‘free-play’ session using 
a purpose written script in Matlab®. The mean duration of the ‘free-play’ session across 
participants was 3 minutes 20 seconds.  
From the acceleration data periods where the infant did not move were removed, by 
setting a threshold (acceleration values less than .01 g or .098 m/s
2
) through visual 
inspection of the data to identify the acceleration values that represented times when the 
infants were not moving. Jerk was calculated as the first derivative of the acceleration 
data (see Figure 7.1A for example of a jerk trace), and averaged to obtain a measure of 
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absolute mean jerk across the movement data. Finally this value was multiplied by 9.81 
to transform the measure of ‘g’ into m/s3. Please note, only jerk was analysed in this 
Chapter as this was the only kinematic measure that distinguished autistic and typical 
participants in Chapter 6. The number of data-points that were classed as periods of no 
movement and removed from this analysis was summed to find the proportion of the 
testing session that the infant did not move their leg.  
7.2.3. Social assessment – Autism Observation Scale for Infants  
The Autism Observation Scale for Infants (AOSI, Bryson, Zwaigenbaum, McDermott, 
Rombough, & Brian, 2008) was conducted with the infants at 14 months of age (see 
Table 7.1 for demographic information). This semi-structured observational measure is 
conducted with a trained examiner. It consists of 18 test items which are designed to 
identify markers for autistic or atypical social development (note this measure is not 
diagnostic, see Table 7.2 for list and description of test items). Each item was coded as a 
0 for a typical social response or 1 for an atypical social response. All assessments are 
required to be double scored, once by the examiner during the assessment and again by 
an independent examiner who marks the assessment from a video. Any discrepancies in 
scores were discussed until a consensus score is decided
8
. The AOSI has previously 
been shown to have good inter-rater reliability, and moderate test-retest reliability 
(between 6 and 12 months of testing, Bryson et al., 2008).  
As the current experiment is designed to measure how movement kinematics can 
predict social skills it was important to ensure that the social measure only included 
items that measured social behaviours. 
                                                        
8
As the current experiment is on-going some of the AOSI scores in this data set have not been 
double coded, therefore they are subject to change and caution should be taken interpreting the 
current results. 
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Table 7.2: Description of the behaviours assessed in the AOSI 
Item Behaviour assessed 
 
 
Visual tracking* 
 
 
Ability to visually follow a moving object laterally across the 
midline. 
 
Disengagement of attention* Ability to disengage and move eyes/attention from one of two 
competing visual stimuli. 
 
Orientation to name Ability to move head and/or eyes toward and look at the 
examiner when name is called. 
 
Differential response to facial 
emotion 
Ability to respond differentially through facial, head or other 
motor movements to a change in the examiner’s facial 
expression from smiling to a neutral expression. 
 
Anticipatory social response Ability to anticipate and enjoy social (vs. physical) cause-effect 
relationships. 
 
Imitation Ability to reproduce an action produced by the examiner. 
 
Social babbling Ability to engage in back-and-forth (reciprocal) vocalisations 
with the examiner. 
 
Eye contact Ability to consistently establish appropriately sustained eye 
contact with the examiner. 
 
Reciprocal social smile Ability to smile in response to the examiner’s smile. 
 
Coordination of eye gaze and 
action* 
Ability to co-ordinate gaze with actions on objects. 
 
 
Behavioural reactivity General responsiveness, including under reactivity and over 
reactivity, to the activities and toys introduced, and to the 
examiner’s actions. 
 
Cuddliness Physical responsiveness to being cuddled by parent. 
 
Soothability Ease of being soothed by parent using social means such as 
touch, other forms of human contact, or verbal reassurance. 
 
Social interest and shared affect Ease of engagement and interest in activities, and ability to 
share positive affect with the examiner. 
 
Transitions* Ease and consistency with which toys are relinquished and 
movement is made from one activity to another. 
 
Motor control* Degree to which motor behaviour is goal-directed, organised 
and modulated. 
 
Atypical motor behaviour* Presence of developmentally atypical gait, locomotion, motor 
mannerisms/postures or repetitive motor behaviours. 
 
Atypical sensory behaviour* Presence of developmentally atypical sensory behaviours in any 
modality (e.g. smelling of toys, staring at hands/shapes/objects, 
or feeling textures). 
Note: Items were scored 0 for typical response and 1 for presence of atypical response. Table 
taken from Bryson et al., 2008. *Denotes non-social specific items where scores were not 
included when calculating the total marker score. 
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Seven of the items on the AOSI target sensory and motor behaviours (marked with an 
asterisk on Table 7.2) therefore scores on these items were not included. The total 
number of items or ‘markers’ where the infant showed atypical behaviours (i.e., scored 
1) was calculated by adding the scores for each item. The total marker score was out of 
11.  
7.3. Results 
There was large variability in how frequently the infants moved during the testing 
session which contributed to the measures of jerk (i.e., infants who moved more would 
have greater levels of jerk). Therefore, to control for variability in the kinematic 
measure that was related to the amount, rather than quality of the movement the 
proportion of static time was entered as a control measure in the analysis. Furthermore, 
although all infants were approximately the same age on the day of each testing session 
there was some variability (see Table 7.1), which could contribute to differences motor 
and social development, therefore age on day of testing at 10 months and 14 months 
were also added as control variables. There were no multivariate outliers.  
To examine the hypothesis that movement kinematics measured at 10 months predict 
social skills measured at 14 months a partial correlation were conducted between mean 
jerk and total marker score, with the proportion of time the infants were static, and age 
in days at the 10 month and 14 month sessions as control variables. A negative 
relationship was found between absolute mean jerk and total marker score (r=-.309, 
N=44, p=.049, 95% CI [-.024, -.548]).This pattern of results suggests that infants who 
moved with greater jerk had better social skills (see Figure 7.1B).  
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7.4. Discussion 
The current experiment measured the mean jerk of leg movements of a group of 10-
month-old infants with either a high or low familial risk of developing autism in a 
naturalistic play setting. Social skills were measured in the same infants at 14 months 
using a standardised social and communication assessment. The preliminary results 
revealed there was a negative relationship between the kinematic measure and later 
social skills. More precisely, infants who produced more jerky movements at 10 months 
of age had better social skills at 14 months of age. These results tentatively suggest that 
the movement kinematics of infants at 10 months are related to the development of 
social skills.  
Figure 7.1: (A) Example jerk traces across a section of the free-play session. (B) 
Scatterplot showing negative correlation between absolute mean jerk during the free 
play session at 10 months and total number of atypical social markers the infants 
scored in the AOSI at 14 months. 
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The direction of the relationship between movement kinematics and social skills in the 
current experiment is opposite to that predicted based on the findings of adult studies of 
autism. Specifically, adults with autism have previously been found to produce 
movements with greater jerk compared to typically developed adults (e.g., see results of 
the Generation Phase of Chapter 6) and therefore it was predicted that greater jerk 
would predict poorer, not better social skills. It is possible that the relationship between 
the kinematic characteristics of movements and social skills reverses from infancy to 
adulthood. For example, several characteristics of autism observed in children and 
adults, such as reduced attention to others’ eyes (Jones & Klin, 2013) or reduced social 
smiling (Ozonoff et al., 2010), indeed show evidence of initial increases in early infancy 
which then decline by toddlerhood (see Jones et al., 2014, for review). 
However, most prospective and retrospective studies investigating motor differences in 
infants who later develop autism consistently find impairments or atypical motor 
development and do not find patterns that reverse in these macro-level behavioural 
differences (Bhat, et al., 2012; Iverson & Wozniak, 2007; Landa & Garrett-Mayer, 
2006; Leonard et al., 2014; Mulligan & White, 2012). These motor atypicalities 
continue to be reliably observed across childhood and into adulthood in individuals with 
autism (Cook, 2016; Fournier, et al., 2010; Gowen & Hamilton, 2013). Considering 
these previous findings of similar types of atypical motor production throughout autistic 
development, it is possible that kinematic atypicalities are representative of an 
underlying motor control deficit which manifests differently in infancy and adulthood. 
More precisely, movements that have low jerk in infancy, but high jerk in adulthood 
could both be symptomatic of an atypical motor system, which, most importantly, might 
also affect social and communication skill development and utilisation. In support of a 
hypothesis of a reversal in the characteristics of action kinematics from early 
development to adulthood in autism, toddlers at a high-risk of developing autism 
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initially produce reaching movements that are less accelerated than toddlers without a 
familial risk (at 18 months), but by 36 months the group difference is smaller (Focaroli, 
Taffoni, Parsons, Keller, & Iverson, 2016).  
Kinematic variants early in life might therefore signify the beginning of an atypical 
motor developmental trajectory, which might impede learning from and about others, 
leading to social difficulties and possibly an autism diagnosis later in life. One possible 
explanation of the present findings is that high kinematic variability – which would be 
signalled through high jerk – is a necessary stage of typical motor development, where 
the cortical visual-motor and subcortical motor control systems learn through trial and 
error how to produce the most efficient actions (Hadders-Algra, 2000). Motor 
variability is argued to be an essential feature of efficient motor learning, such that 
through controlled spatial and temporal exploration of novel movement trajectories one 
is able to transfer knowledge and learn novel actions faster (Wu, Miyamoto, Castro, 
Ölveczky, & Smith, 2014). Indeed, studies classifying the kinematic trajectories of 
typical infants’ reaching movements show that movements are initially highly variable 
and contain multiple peaks in acceleration (i.e., increased jerk), before eventually 
following the most efficient trajectory by late toddlerhood (e.g., minimum jerk; Berthier 
& Keen, 2006; Rönnqvist & Domellöf, 2006; von Hofsten, 1991). It is conceivable that 
infants who miss, or are perhaps delayed in experiencing a necessary period of 
increased motor variability early in the development of their motor control systems fail 
to learn how to effectively modulate and exploit the kinematic variability of their 
movements, and therefore are slower to learn novel actions as well as possibly having 
generally poor motor control throughout life. By adulthood, it could be therefore 
speculated that those who have learnt good motor control through initial high variability 
in movements are able to produce well-controlled movements with low jerk.  
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Due to the large variability in the types of movements that infants are producing during 
the ‘free-play’ session in the current experiment it currently is not possible to examine 
the kinematic trajectories of individual movements in detail. Therefore, it is not possible 
to make any strong assumptions about the underlying cause of kinematic differences 
that predict later social difficulties. Future work could look to isolate specific movement 
types (e.g., periods of crawling or reaching) to analyse more precisely the kinematic 
disturbances in the infants who later develop social difficulties, and identify what 
qualities are making their movements less jerky. Regardless of the underlying 
mechanism driving the effect found in the current experiment these preliminary results 
are encouraging, suggesting atypical movement kinematics may be an early biomarker 
for the development of autism. Accelerometers are relatively inexpensive, non-intrusive 
and can be easily used in a range of settings. Movement kinematics can therefore be 
measured in a variety of ecologically valid naturalistic settings, and on a large scale. 
This methodology is useful as it is possible to measure a wide range of behaviours, 
environments and contexts, and ages to try to unpick the precise nature of the process 
which generates differences in movement kinematics across development, as well as 
how exactly kinematic characteristics relate to social difficulties throughout life. Further 
information about the infants in the existing dataset will help to answer some of these 
questions, particularly as it becomes known which infants receive a clinical diagnosis of 
autism.  
In conclusion, developing our understanding of the relationship between early atypical 
kinematics and social learning might be fundamental to understanding autistic 
development, as well as finding a connection between the disparate symptoms that are 
often studied in isolation, e.g., social communication difficulties and repetitive and 
stereotyped behaviours. Furthermore, early action atypicalities may provide a useful 
marker of infants likely to develop social disorders such as autism.   
 141 
 
Chapter 8: General Discussion  
8.1. Overview  
The kinematic cues embedded within our movements are important signals that can 
communicate our internal states to others. The current thesis examined the hypothesis 
that our intensive experience producing our own actions calibrates mental 
representations of our actions, which we use to aid perception and understanding of 
others’ actions from kinematic cues. The presented studies supported this hypothesis by 
demonstrating that the recognition of others’ internal states can be predicted by the 
kinematics of an individual’s own movements.  
Chapters 2 and 3 showed that perception of others’ affective states is determined by 
one’s own movement kinematics across typical development. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 tested 
the hypothesis that atypical movement kinematics in autism contribute to social and 
communication difficulties. Chapters 4 and 5 measured two basic skills required to 
make internal state judgments from observing others’ actions: visual time perception 
and sensitivity to kinematic signals that describe ‘natural’ motion. Both studies found 
no deficits in the autism group compared to the typically developed group – and some 
enhanced abilities – suggesting that these basic skills are intact. However, Chapter 6 
demonstrated that typical individuals exhibit disrupted understanding of autistic internal 
states expressed through their atypical movements. Atypical actions may therefore 
contribute to social and communicative problems in autism given that typical 
individuals will often misread the internal states of those with autism from action cues. 
Finally, in a longitudinal developmental study presented in Chapter 7, differences in 
movement kinematics were found to be associated with later social skills, adding 
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support to the notion that action kinematics are important for social understanding and 
may even be used as a biomarker for atypical social development. 
In the following sections of the discussion I will examine several overarching 
theoretical factors that are relevant to the conclusions of the studies presented and main 
hypothesis tested in this thesis. I will also provide some suggestions for future work that 
can develop the findings of the current thesis in line with these theoretical factors, 
which will further our understanding of how one’s movements can influence the quality 
of social communication and interactions with others who move differently.  
8.2. The effect of observational learning on the generation of action models  
There is vast evidence that we learn most efficiently about consistent and contingent 
information in our environment (Elsner & Hommel, 2004; Cook, Bird, Catmur, Press, 
& Heyes, 2014; de Klerk et al., 2015; Hebb, 1949; Perin, Berger, & Markram, 2011; 
Ray & Heyes, 2011). The most consistent and contingent action-effects come from 
visual-motor experiences with our own actions. Hence, the primary prediction of the 
current hypothesis was that our action models are tuned to experiences of our own 
actions. This hypothesis was supported by the findings of studies presented in the 
current thesis, suggesting our action models are yoked to our own movements, and our 
social judgments about others are calibrated to these models.   
However, it is important to note that much of our visual experience of actions comes 
from observing others. There is ample evidence that we are able to learn vast amounts 
of information from observing others’ actions throughout our lives, such as how to use 
tools, and understanding action-effect mappings (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014; Paulus, 
Hunnius, & Bekkering, 2013). Some even argue that we learn to categorise our own 
internal states early in life through observing others’ behavioural responses to our own 
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actions (Gergely & Watson, 1996), which may be particularly relevant when learning to 
self-regulate one’s internal state expressions (Halberstadt, 1986; Heller & Casey, 2016; 
Meyer et al., 2014; Sanders et al., 2015; Zeman et al., 2013). We therefore might expect 
that our perceptual models of internal states include information that we have garnered 
through observing and interacting with others as well as our own actions. For example, 
our interaction partners can often verbally communicate to us how they feel, which we 
can associate with how they are moving.  
In the case of those with autism, observational learning from others is likely to 
contribute to the specific pattern of results in Chapter 6 – the fact that typical 
individuals exhibited disrupted recognition of internal states from autistic relative to 
typical actions but there was no same group advantage in the autistic group. 
Specifically, those with autism are likely to have much observational experience with 
typical others because the majority of the population are typically developing. In 
contrast, most typical individuals will have little observational experience of those with 
autism. Therefore, if observational learning plays a role in our action model generation, 
we might expect autistic individuals to have perceptual models that are tuned to both 
types of kinematics. It is worth noting that the diversity of perceptual tuning (i.e., of 
both autistic and typical visual inputs) may also result in action models that are 
generally less precise, leading to less accurate interpretation when observing either 
movement types, and hence the generally deficient internal state attribution when 
interacting with most others (Brewer, et al, 2017; Happé, 2015). The ability to 
incorporate successfully information acquired from observation of others and one’s own 
actions into perceptual models may also depend on other higher-level executive 
abilities, such as cognitive flexibility, which are also known to be impaired within the 
autistic populations (see Section 8.4 and 8.5 for further discussion of this point).  
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Importantly, if we tune our action models through observational learning of others as 
well as from our own movements, we would predict that individuals who have more 
autistic action experience, but are not autistic might be better placed to interpret the 
actions of those with autism. To examine this prediction the experiment conducted in 
Chapter 6 could be repeated using typically developed individuals who have greater 
experience with autistic individuals (e.g., care-workers or clinicians) and compare them 
to other typical individuals who have no experience with autistic individuals. If action 
models are also tuned to our observational experiences of others we would expect the 
group with more visual experience of autistic individuals to show superior performance 
on the autistic animations relative to the individuals without autistic experience. 
However, if observational learning does not contribute to our generation of action 
models, then both groups should show a similar pattern of performance to the typical 
group in Chapter 6. Results from this proposed study might be helpful in informing 
interventions with individuals with autism, such that social interactions between typical 
and autistic individuals could be improved following intensive observational training of 
‘non-autistic’ key workers. 
8.3. Criterion setting and perceptual narrowing – mutually exclusive accounts?    
 
The findings of the studies presented in the current thesis provide some support for the 
‘criterion setting’ version of the current hypothesis (see Section 1.4.1). Under this 
account, experience with our movements furnishes models with distinct criteria for 
identifying internal states – for instance, a fast walker’s criterion for identifying anger 
will be faster than a slow walker’s criterion, as suggested by the findings in Chapters 2 
and 3. Such a criterion setting account could also explain the findings in Chapter 6. For 
example, a typical individual tends to move with lower jerk than autistic individuals. 
Therefore, an animation demonstrating seducing – which is conveyed through low jerk, 
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smooth movements – may not be identified as such when a typical individual is 
interpreting an autistic action because the jerk is too high to be categorised this way.  
An alternative to the criterion setting account is that experience with one’s own actions 
results in ‘perceptual narrowing’ of action models, such that we are most sensitive to 
kinematic information that aligns with one’s own action kinematics. Chapter 5 found no 
evidence to support such a hypothesis given that autistic and typical individuals 
exhibited no ‘own-group’ perceptual enhancement, which also makes this interpretation 
of the results of Chapter 6 less likely.  
However, as outlined in Chapter 1 (see Section 1.2.3) there are several action perception 
studies that do demonstrate enhanced perceptual sensitivity for actions specific to one’s 
own motoric repertoire. One important distinction between these previous action 
perception studies and the studies presented in the current thesis are the type of actions 
and perceptual judgments measured. For example, in the previous studies participants 
are often asked to predict the outcomes of another’s action sequence (Aglioti et al., 
2008; Brault, et al., 2012; Diersch, et al., 2012; Diersch et al., 2013; Kandel, et al., 
2000; Sebanz & Shiffrar, 2009) or distinguish self-action from that of others (Knoblich 
& Prinz, 2001; Loula et al., 2005) using movement stimuli that are highly practiced by 
the participants. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the sensitivity account likely requires 
exclusive, extensive and highly repetitive experience with a rigid action in order to 
finely tune action models. An expert will, by definition, have the necessary rigid 
motoric experiences to develop highly precise models of action sequences that enable 
very accurate predictions about others movements that fall within their specific motoric 
expertise. In contrast a novice, despite possibly having the perceptual capabilities to 
detect kinematic information within others’ actions, might not have any model of the 
observed action sequence by which to assess the kinematic information which they 
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perceive. The perceptual sensitivity effects observed in these previous studies could be 
due to fine-tuning of kinematic models which only occurs following highly specific 
action experiences. The kinematic features of an individual’s actions as measured in the 
studies presented in this thesis – e.g., high velocity or high jerk actions – are generalised 
features that are perhaps not akin to the restrained action sequences experienced by 
professional athletes. 
Moreover, it is possible that an initial step, before fine-tuning of one’s action models 
occurs, is a criterion setting process. For example, one might initially learn coarse 
mappings between kinematic cues and goals (in the case of experts, learning the 
predicted action sequence and outcome) or internal states, and hence furnish action 
models with specific kinematic criteria that represent different outcomes or internal 
states, before models are refined and become more precise following extensive and rigid 
rehearsal. ‘Perceptual narrowing’ or this secondary fine-tuning may be unlikely to occur 
with respect to the vast range of internal states we experience in our varied everyday 
lives. For example, when we feel sad there will be some continuity between our 
experiences (e.g., decrease in velocity from typical pace), but this might vary depending 
on the context (e.g., whether we are at home or at work) and we will also perform a 
range of actions depending on what we are doing (e.g., walking to catch a bus or 
cooking). Therefore our models of our internal states might not be as precise as specific 
action sequences that we perform repetitively in order to produce actions with expert 
precision, and thus internal state attribution may rely more on a criterion setting type 
mechanism.  
It is possible, however, that ‘perceptual narrowing’ for specific internal states occurs 
following intensive experience conveying that given state. For example, individuals 
who experience clinical depression will frequently move much slower than average, 
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while concurrently experiencing feelings of sadness (Michalak et al., 2009). These 
individuals may have criteria for different internal states, which are centred around their 
action experiences, but also become highly sensitive to variations in sad (or slow) 
kinematic signals. Subsequently, these depressed individuals may be able to distinguish 
very accurately subtle differences in others’ slow (sad) movements, but fail to recognise 
similar subtleties in faster movements, and therefore cannot differentiate their 
interaction partner’s bliss from jubilation. On the other hand, an individual who 
frequently experiences aggression and moves very quickly may be astute at reading 
differing levels of anger in others, but fail to recognise varying levels of sadness (or 
fear). Future work could look to further address the relationship between ‘perceptual 
narrowing’ and internal state experiences by studying groups of individuals who have 
more extreme internal state experiences (e.g., individuals with clinical depression or 
antisocial personality disorder) and measuring their different internal state criteria 
(which are predicted to follow a similar pattern as that presented in the current thesis 
based on their typical action kinematics) as well as perceptual sensitivity to variations in 
different internal state cues (which are predicted to show greatest sensitivity for internal 
states they frequently experience).  
8.4. The role of executive processes in using models of action to interpret others’ 
internal states  
The evidence presented in the current thesis demonstrates that when deliberating upon 
the internal states of those with whom we interact the low-level properties of 
movements (kinematics) can constrain one’s ability to understand, highlighting the 
relevance of bottom-up processes during action perception. However, higher-level 
cognitive processes, or top-down mechanisms (Adolphs, 2003), are of course also 
critical to one’s ability to generate and utilise mental representations of action. For 
example, executive processes, such as cognitive flexibility or one’s ability to allocate 
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attention to relevant sensory information, are likely pivotal processes that enable us to 
extract relevant kinematic information from the stream of sensory inputs during social 
interactions.  
As outlined in Chapter 1, when attributing internal states to biological motion stimuli a 
network, which includes frontal (e.g., mPFC) and posterior (e.g., pSTS) regions 
(Blakemore, 2008; Castelli et al., 2000; Gobbini et al., 2007; Grossman et al., 2000; 
Herrington, Nymberg, & Schultz, 2011; Kaiser & Pelphrey, 2012; Van Overwalle & 
Baetens, 2009), and in some cases also motor regions (e.g., the PMC or IPL; Tidoni et 
al., 2013; van Kemenade et al., 2012) is often active. The activation within this network 
when observing biological motion stimuli appears to be partially governed by task 
demands (Alaerts, Swinnen, & Wenderoth, 2017; Herrington, Nymberg, Faja, Price, & 
Schultz, 2012; Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). Specifically, these studies find top-
down signals from frontal regions modulate activity in the integrative sensory regions, 
which in turn modulates activity in lower-level visual areas (e.g., V5, Hillebrandt et al., 
2015). Consequently, high-level regions might not only be important for helping us 
interpret the low-level information, but also for directing our neural resources and 
attention to the relevant sensory signals in order to obtain the most informative 
information. 
During social interactions there are numerous signals one must interpret simultaneously 
(e.g., facial expression, voice, body movements, other non-animate objects involved in 
the interaction), and therefore attention must be divided and allocated to the signals 
deemed to be most relevant and informative. Attention allocation is likely an online 
process which involves rapid analysis and integration of incoming sensory cues and 
stored information. Other areas of the brain may feed into the centres that help us 
encode and interpret others’ behaviour (e.g., other frontal regions, such as the 
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dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and subcortical regions, such as the insula, Menon & 
Uddin, 2010). Therefore, to make accurate judgments about others’ internal states from 
their actions one must finely tune both top-down and bottom-up processes, as well as 
proficiently integrating signals from both systems.   
Individuals with autism have previously been found to exhibit atypicalities modulating 
top-down and bottom-up neural signals when observing others’ actions and attributing 
intentions (Alaerts et al., 2017; Castelli et al., 2002; Koldewyn, Whitney, & Rivera, 
2011). Moreover, they exhibit differences in attention allocation to dynamic social 
information (Ames & Fletcher-Watson, 2010;) and attention modulation to sensory 
distractors (even if task relevant, Keehn, Westerfield, Müller, & Townsend, 2017) 
relative to typical individuals, which has also been identified as an early marker of 
autistic symptomology in high-risk infants (Elsabbagh et al., 2013; Jones et al., 2014). 
Therefore, individuals with autism might have similar levels of exposure to the relevant 
kinematic information required to generate models and learn from others, yet poor 
ability to flexibly move their attention to learn about socially relevant kinematic 
information. To test this hypothesis further one could study detailed eye-movement 
trajectories during observation of dynamic social events, to distinguish not only what 
information is salient to autistic individuals, but also when they decide to attend.  
8.5. Generalisations and implications for other clinical populations  
8.5.1. Is there a core motor deficit specific to autism?  
Atypical motor production appears to be a relatively consistent finding throughout the 
autism literature (Cook 2016; Fournier, et al., 2010; Gowen & Hamilton, 2013). 
Following the findings of the current thesis (e.g., Chapter 6), future work characterising 
more specifically the ‘autistic movement signature’ will likely be fundamental for 
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helping typical individuals to understand individuals with autism, as well as possibly 
improving social development in individuals who develop autism. More longitudinal 
studies, such as the study presented in Chapter 7, will markedly enhance our 
understanding of how early motor production differences translate into social 
difficulties. Studies of this nature will be essential to disentangling the precise role 
motor dysfunctions play in autistic development, and critically identifying whether 
motor differences of the type studied in this thesis represent a core deficit that results in 
a highly complex cascade of social difficulties, or – perhaps more likely – they 
exacerbate social problems that also have a variety of additional causes e.g., reduced 
attention towards others, deficient executive functioning.  
Autism is also a highly heterogeneous disorder, and recently work has been conducted 
to operationalise some of the specific characteristics that define possible subgroups of 
the autistic phenotype (Lombardo et al., 2016) in an attempt to identify whether there 
are separable categories of traits or risk factors that can intensify symptomology. It is 
important to note that all studies testing perceptual abilities in autism in this thesis were 
conducted with high-functioning adults with autism and matched typically developed 
adults. A range of studies suggest that intellectual ability in autism may improve ‘social 
outcomes’ (see Howlin & Magiati, 2017 for review). More specifically for the current 
thesis some previous studies suggest that individuals with autism who have greater 
intellectual difficulties also have more impaired biological motion processing 
difficulties (e.g., Jones et al., 2011; Koldewyn et al., 2010; Rutherford & Troje, 2011). 
However, it is unclear whether the effect of increased cognitive or intellectual abilities 
play a protective role in alleviating some features of autism, or those with autism and 
higher IQs are able to develop more efficient compensatory mechanisms, which 
improve their social abilities at a surface level but the underlying deficit still persists 
(Livingston & Happé, 2017). As demonstrated in Chapter 7, action kinematics can be 
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measured easily in a range of settings, without complex instructions or task demands. 
Collecting kinematic measures from individuals with autism but who have lower 
intellectual abilities could be an interesting avenue to further specify the relationship 
between motor and social skills and whether it generalises to lower functioning 
individuals.  
8.5.2. Implications for other clinical populations who move differently   
The findings in the current thesis linking motor production differences to social 
development (Chapter 7), as well as demonstrating social understanding difficulties in 
non-autistic individuals when interpreting movements that are dissimilar to their own 
(Chapter 3 and 6) are essential for furthering our understanding of the connection 
between motor production and social and communication skills. These findings have 
important implications for a range of clinical disorders that present with motor 
abnormalities. For example, other clinical populations characterised by developmental 
(e.g., Tourette Syndrome or cerebral palsy) or neurodegenerative (e.g., Huntington’s 
Disease or cerebellar ataxia) motor atypicalities have also been found to exhibit poor 
social skills such as disrupted internal state attribution (Caillies, Hody, & Calmus, 2012; 
Eddy & Cavanna, 2015; Eddy & Rickards, 2015; Garrard, Martin, Giunti, & Cipolotti, 
2008). Furthermore, the studies presented may help to explain why children with 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and motor dysfunctions are rated as 
having more social interaction difficulties than children with ADHD only (Tervo, 
Azuma, Fogas, & Fiechtner, 2007). Internal states expressed by these children with 
ADHD may be misunderstood by their typical peers, possibly resulting in increased 
frustration and inadequate social interactions (Nijmeijer et al., 2008). Even children and 
adults with motor dysfunction, without any clinical diagnosis, are more likely to 
experience less favourable social interactions (Bejerot & Humble, 2013).  
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The findings presented in the current thesis are therefore likely to apply to a number of 
conditions characterised by atypical movements, and suggest that interaction difficulties 
between typical and atypical individuals may not be attributable solely to the individual 
who has received a clinical diagnosis. Future work could take the paradigms presented 
in this thesis to ask similar questions within these different populations. This work 
might not only inform the current hypothesis, as to how movement differences between 
different groups affects social communication, but also identify additional mechanisms 
that support the association between action and perception that might vary across 
individuals with different behavioural profiles. For instance, it would inform whether 
the motor atypicalities are similar in nature, e.g., reflected in similar kinematic profiles 
between individuals with autism and ADHD, and which other processes are necessary 
to produce different types of social deficits.  
8.6. Conclusion  
In conclusion, the present thesis has demonstrated that the kinematic information 
embedded within our movements is a critical signal to communicate our internal states 
to others, and we interpret this information via models tuned to our own actions. We 
show enhanced understanding of those who move most like ourselves, and fail to 
identify accurately the internal states of others who move dissimilarly. These findings 
can have important implications for how groups of individuals who move in markedly 
different ways interact, and highlights the importance of action for understanding social 
cognition across typical and atypical development.  
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